Russia is thoroughly preparing for the upcoming APEC summit in Shenzhen, China, on November 18–19, 2026. Moscow has expressed its readiness to discuss a wide range of issues within the framework of a Russia–China–U.S. meeting, while refraining from comparing it to a “new Yalta.”

- Economy and trade. Russia plans to promote its vision of regional economic integration through the coordination of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and APEC. The multiplicative development of the Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) helps Russia gain access to Asia-Pacific markets and integrate into the supply chains of regional countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and ASEAN as a whole.
At the same time, Moscow is interested in the full (or at least gradual) restoration of economic ties with the United States and Western countries. Moscow’s trade and economic agenda includes such issues as the lifting or easing of certain sanctions, the unblocking of financial and logistics channels, the restoration of contacts in the energy sector, access to technology, the resolution of issues related to frozen Russian assets, and the exclusion of secondary sanctions against Russia’s partners.
- Development of artificial intelligence. Russia intends to present concrete projects in the field of new technologies, such as the application of AI solutions in creative industries and mathematical modeling of sustainable development using AI technologies and big data.
- Energy and food. Russia plans to expand cooperation and enter the energy markets of Asia-Pacific countries, diversifying its supplies by seeking new buyers of Russian energy resources, primarily among ASEAN states.
- The Arctic and transport routes. Russia has presented an initiative to create the National Digital Transport and Logistics Platform “GosLog,” which could serve as a foundation for managing freight transportation in the region. Moscow will promote the development of the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor (TTC) in general and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in particular, as well as the International North–South Transport Corridor. Amid the reorientation of exports toward the East, Russia is interested in ensuring the uninterrupted and secure supply of energy resources to the countries of the region.
- The international situation and Russia’s positioning. Despite the priority of the socio-economic agenda at the APEC forum, Moscow intends to advance a new concept of Eurasian security (articulated by Vladimir Putin at a meeting with the leadership of the Russian Foreign Ministry on June 14, 2024). This concept envisages the involvement of all countries in Eurasia –including European and NATO states –in dialogue and covers a broad range of issues such as mutual restrictions on the deployment of armaments, confidence-building measures between Russia and NATO, the restoration of military communication channels, the prevention of dangerous incidents, and the updating of strategic arms control mechanisms.
Russia’s Interests at the APEC Summit
Moscow does not intend to limit itself to formal participation in the discussions at the APEC forum. Russia’s “Turn to the East” strategy regards the APEC forum as an important platform through which Russia can more actively send political and economic signals to the international community.
- Russia intends to actively contribute to the development of a common economic space without barriers or dividing lines. The key objective is to achieve integration between the EAEU and APEC, which would provide a powerful impetus to the development of the Greater Eurasian Partnership.
- Promotion of Russian technological solutions. Russia wants to showcase the expert potential of Russian business and academic circles and raise the visibility of domestic technological products across the Asia-Pacific region.
- Geopolitics and Russia’s status. Russia is interested in strengthening its standing on the international stage. Active participation in the region’s key forum is intended to demonstrate that Russia remains an important and constructive player in the region despite intense sanctions pressure from the United States and Western countries.
The “Turn to the East” Provides New Impetus for the Development of the GEP
The eastern vector of Russian strategy has taken shape under the influence of two main factors: structural tectonic shifts in the global economy and unprecedented geopolitical pressure from the West. As a result of the sharp rupture of stable economic ties in the western direction, the Asia-Pacific region, which accounts for 60% of global GDP and 40% of the world’s population, is becoming a new source of economic growth and technological development for Russia.
At the same time, the key instrument of the “Turn to the East” strategy is the Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) initiative, which President Vladimir Putin first advanced in 2015. The GEP is a flexible integration project open to all countries and associations on the continent and designed to remove barriers to economic cooperation. The APEC forum plays an important role in implementing the ideas of the GEP and linking Russia’s integration project (the EAEU) with the economies of the entire Asia-Pacific region.
Russia’s strategy in its eastern orientation is defined by the following tasks:
- Economic reorientation and the search for new markets. Under sanctions, Russia is interested in open, predictable, and non-discriminatory markets in the Asia-Pacific region. Already today, the economies of APEC countries account for nearly half of Russian exports. The main growth points in the trade balance are non-resource goods and innovative products. Moscow seeks to consolidate and develop this trend.
- Technological sovereignty and the promotion of its own solutions. Russia intends to use APEC as a platform to advance its technological products and expert potential, competing with Chinese and American AI models and taking concrete steps to raise the visibility of Russian technologies and integrate them into regional processes in the Asia-Pacific market.
- Depoliticization of APEC and its transformation into a platform for constructive dialogue free from Western pressure. Together with China, Russia seeks to remove the region from under the Western agenda and form a multipolar system in which decisions are made on the basis of consensus and mutual respect.
Moscow regards APEC as a key instrument for economic reorientation, technological advancement, and the formation of a multipolar world order in the Asia-Pacific region.
Prospects for a Trilateral Meeting of the Leaders of Russia, China, and the United States at the APEC Summit in Shenzhen
Russia, China, and the United States are among the 21 APEC participants, so a formal platform for trilateral contact exists. At the Valdai Discussion Club meeting held in Sochi on October 1, 2026, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized that there are no barriers between Moscow and Beijing; the leaders of the two countries “understand each other without words.” As for Washington, the situation looks “more complicated.” The factors that cloud and undermine Russian-American relations “have accumulated over decades.” Summing up the discussion in Sochi, Vladimir Putin sent a clear signal to the international community that Moscow supports a trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Shenzhen and has given Washington and Beijing a carte blanche to shape the agenda for the upcoming encounter. As of early November 2026, the probability of a trilateral meeting between Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Donald Trump appears higher than the probability of a full-fledged negotiating format with a pre-agreed agenda.
Trilateral Meeting: Interests of the Parties and Current Risks
Moscow is publicly interested in a trilateral format. In the corridors of Russian ministries and agencies, the idea of the meeting is described as interesting; the Kremlin has also confirmed that Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump discussed the possibility of a trilateral contact involving Xi Jinping.
China is capable of providing a neutral and politically convenient platform. For Beijing, this is an opportunity to demonstrate China’s central role in regional and global diplomacy without formally turning the event into a separate crisis-management summit.
For Donald Trump, the very image of a negotiator is advantageous. If the White House concludes that the meeting would allow him to demonstrate the ability to engage simultaneously with Moscow and Beijing, the U.S. president may at least support a brief contact. This is especially likely if there is a need for a political signal on Ukraine, arms control, or the U.S.–China trade agenda.
Overall, the leaders of the three countries have strong incentives for bilateral contacts. A meeting between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump and a meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping could take place independently of a trilateral format. If both bilateral contacts are included in the program, it would be relatively straightforward from a technical standpoint to add a short three-way conversation.
The very fact of the U.S. president’s participation in the event has already been stated by Trump himself. As early as September 25, 2026, he confirmed his intention to attend the summit during a joint press conference with Chinese President Xi Jinping following the latter’s visit to Washington.
Another problem lies in the absence of a common agenda. For Moscow, the central topics are Ukraine, relations with the United States, sanctions, and a new security architecture. For Washington, they are pressure on Russia, Chinese trade policy, and strategic rivalry with Beijing. For China, they are preventing an anti-Chinese coalition and maintaining manageable relations with both Moscow and Washington simultaneously. These agendas intersect but do not coincide.
A third factor (though not in order of importance) is the reputational risks for Beijing. China is not interested in having its APEC summit effectively absorbed by the Russian-American crisis or perceived as a platform for demonstrating a Moscow–Beijing coalition against Washington. Therefore, the Chinese side will support the possibility of a trilateral contact but will not put it in the forefront in advance.
Returning to the most probable scenario, i.e. not a separate summit, but a short political conversation in addition to the bilateral meetings of the leaders of Russia, China, and the United States, the agenda would likely include the following issues: the situation around Ukraine and the prospects for Russian-American dialogue, U.S.–China trade and economic contradictions, issues of strategic stability and arms control, the prevention of direct escalation between the United States and China, and common crises, including energy, food security, and international settlements.
In summary, politically such a meeting serves the interests of all three leaders as an instrument for demonstrating global status and managing risks, but institutionally APEC is not a platform for mandatory political negotiations.
Therefore, the most realistic outcome is neither a “grand Yalta” nor the formation of a new triangle alliance, but a limited contact among the three leaders.
As for Russia, a potential meeting of the three leaders carries important political significance. Moscow gains the opportunity to restore direct dialogue with Washington at the highest level (the Anchorage talks of August 15, 2025, were a first step), to consolidate its status as a great power (Moscow is one of the architects of the agenda), to maintain close cooperation with China (without directing it against any side of the triangle), to prevent a U.S.–China deal without Moscow’s participation (taking Russian interests into account), and so forth.
In the short term, Russia seeks to demonstrate the absence of isolation, to test Washington’s readiness for practical dialogue, and to affirm Russia’s role in the formation of a new world order (including that reinforced by Russian-Chinese agreements in Moscow, Beijing, and at the SCO anniversary summit in Bishkek). In the medium term, Russia is counting on a more flexible system of interaction in which Moscow retains room for maneuver between Washington and Beijing. Therefore, for the Kremlin the value of the meeting is determined not only by prospective decisions but also by the very possibility of conducting dialogue with the two key centers of power at the same time.
Tlesh Mamahatov, PhD in Economics, Principal Research Fellow at the “Russia, China and the World” Center, Institute for China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Alexander Mokretsky, Senior Research Fellow at the “Russia, China and the World” Center, Institute for China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences
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