On October 24, 2026, on the day of the 76th anniversary of the participation of Chinese volunteers in the Korean War (1950–1953), DPRK leader Kim Jong Un paid a visit to the Chinese city of Dandong in the Liaoning Province.
Brief Chronicle of the Visit
The Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK arrived in China and returned via the new bridge over the Amnokgang River.
The North Korean delegation included high-ranking officials, among which where Cho Yong-won, member of the Presidium of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Secretary of the Party Central Committee; Choe Son-hui, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; secretaries of the Party Central Committee for ideology and international affairs; Kim Yo Jong, the “first sister”; as well as other leading party and government figures. Notably, the economic contingent in the delegation was comparable in size to the ideological one, while military representatives were absent.
Kim Jong Un’s principal Chinese counterpart was Wang Huning, member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference – the fourth-ranking figure in the Chinese leadership. Also participating in the talks were Wang Yi, Director of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Minister of the PRC and other officials.
Although no direct meeting with President Xi Jinping took place, the leaders of the two countries exchanged warm greetings. Kim Jong Un expressed gratitude to the Chinese leadership for the “special and careful attention paid to the visit.”
During the visit, the North Korean leader laid flowers at the monument commemorating the war to resist US aggression and aid Korea (the phrasing used in contemporary China for the country’s participation in the Korean War). The ribbon on the floral basket bore the inscription: “We will never forget the fallen Chinese people’s volunteers. General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Chairman of the State Affairs of the DPRK Kim Jong Un.”
In subsequent remarks, the North Korean leader emphasized: “Our people will never forget the glorious years when we fought together with the Chinese people, and we will pass down from generation to generation a sense of eternal gratitude to the Chinese people, who at the cost of their blood rendered assistance to our revolution.”
The North Korean leader presented the museum with a memorial plaque featuring a historic photograph of Kim Il Sung and the inscription: “In the painting of great history pulses the righteous spirit of defending peace. Reverently recalling the merits of the fallen Chinese people’s volunteers, who linked the borders of the two countries on a single mountain ridge, I express eternal gratitude and respect. Kim Jong Un, October 24, 2026.”
A reception followed, at which Kim Jong Un stated that Korean-Chinese relations possess broad prospects for expanding practical cooperation: “This year marks the 65th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the PRC and the DPRK. We express our gratitude to China for its long-standing support and assistance to the socialist cause in the DPRK. The prospects for cooperation between our countries are very extensive.” The sides discussed strengthening traditional friendship as well as expanding trade and economic cooperation.
After the reception, Kim Jong Un visited a bus factory in Dandong, inspected the production workshops, and listened to a briefing on the enterprise’s operations before returning home. Chinese comrades escorted him to the Korean half of the bridge, the entire event lasting only a few hours.
This was Kim Jong Un’s sixth trip to China in total and the first since September 2025, when he visited Beijing to attend events marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. No new agreements were officially announced.
According to Russian historian and journalist Oleg Kiryanov, Kim Jong Un’s visit was unexpected and highly atypical in a number of respects: there was no meeting of the top leaders, the trip was organized on short notice and without prior wide publicity, it took place not on the commemorative date itself but on the eve of it (the anniversary falls on October 25), and it lasted only half a day. All of this gave rise to speculation, and the author identifies three or four main versions explaining the gesture.
Demonstration of the Leader’s Capacity
The visit took place against the background of earlier internet rumors about the North Korean leader’s death. An urgent high-level trip is the most convincing way to refute such rumors. While a leader’s personal presence may not be required at an exhibition or a less significant event, substitution is impossible at talks of this level. In circumstances where any movements by the DPRK’s top leadership inevitably attract close attention, the very fact of Kim Jong Un’s personal participation in a high-level event serves as a signal both to the domestic audience and to external observers.
Yet this reason alone is clearly insufficient. The Chinese dissident’s rumor had a very limited effect, and South Korean intelligence services had already labeled it a fake the day before the visit.
Emphasizing a Multifaceted Foreign Policy
Considering the growing interaction between the DPRK and Russia, the visit to China can be interpreted as a demonstration that Pyongyang is not betting on a single partner but is building a complementary system of relations.
This approach seems to delegate security to Russia and economy to China. While cooperation with Moscow, as a source of security guarantees, is linked primarily to military and political stability and technological cooperation, interaction with Beijing, the main economic partner, covers trade, economy, logistics, and investment.
Such a strategy allows the DPRK to retain certain freedom of maneuver, avoid excessive dependence on one partner, and demonstrate readiness for multivector cooperation, counting on the complementarity of Moscow and Beijing. In this context, the visit shows that expanding ties with one partner does not mean weakening or ignoring the other. A bridge to Russia is opened, and movement across the bridge to China begins at once.
Reactivating the Memory of the Chinese Volunteers and Combat Brotherhood
In recent years the theme of “combat brotherhood” has noticeably grown in North Korean discourse. This is linked to a number of factors, including a growing need to legitimize the country’s own military activity and participation in international operations, while memory of shared trials helps strengthen the emotional component of allied relations.
Recalling the memory of the Korean People’s Army’s participation in an “overseas military operation,” attention to the contribution of the Chinese volunteers acquires an additional dimension, as it is a way of underscoring that the DPRK values all forms of combat cooperation. Kim Jong Un noted: “Respectful recollection of the great years and history at the place from which the fallen Chinese people’s volunteers were sent is a natural duty and obligation. I once again acknowledged the pricelessness of the blood-forged Korean-Chinese friendship. We will never, from generation to generation, forget the history of the finest sons and daughters of the Chinese people who, at the cost of their blood, rendered assistance to our revolution, and we will resolutely continue the history of Korean-Chinese friendship.” For the Chinese side such an emphasis is also important, as it confirms that the PRC’s contribution to the region’s history has not been forgotten and continues to play a role in shaping the contemporary agenda. Moreover, the visit itself is part of policy. Simultaneously, a ceremony marking the completion of the reconstruction of the Cemetery of Chinese People’s Volunteers was held in Sinpyong County, North Hwanghae Province.
The South Korean Version: Discussing a Summit with Trump
The upcoming APEC summit in Shenzhen, China, in November makes the visit even more interesting. US President Donald Trump is expected to attend, and he has previously expressed interest in resuming talks with Kim Jong Un. South Korean media largely linked the visit to the idea that Kim was either seeking permission for a summit or coordinating positions. Yet, there is no confirmation that the current trip is connected with preparations for it; South Korean experts are once again making a mountain out of a molehill.
In addition, the visit sparked a political quarrel in South Korea. The opposition People Power Party accused the administration of President Lee Jae Myung of lacking a clear strategy toward the DPRK. While Pyongyang is actively expanding its room for diplomatic maneuver via strengthening military cooperation with Russia and developing trade and economic relations with China, Seoul confines itself to statements about “closely monitoring the situation.” Conservatives consider it mistaken to count on the resumption of dialogue solely through unilateral concessions, demanding instead that the South Korea–US alliance be strengthened, security cooperation with the United States and Japan expanded, and approaches to the North Korean issue revised.
As for the improbable summit, Seoul traditionally fears that a possible resumption of talks between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump could lead to a situation in which questions of fateful importance for the Korean Peninsula are discussed without the South’s participation.
Thus, Kim Jong Un’s visit to China in October 2026 is a multi-layered event that combines elements of demonstrating capacity to act, balancing foreign policy, and reactivating historical memory. Each of these motives does not exclude the others but rather complements them, forming a coherent picture of North Korean strategy under current conditions.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences
Follow new articles on our Telegram channel
