The topic of a possible Trump-Kim Jong Un summit is being actively hyped by political opponents and the media in order to create informational commotion. Considering the current geopolitical situation, real negotiations are practically impossible due to the lack of leverage, a common agenda, and mutual benefit.

Who Is Pushing For the Summit and Why?
What is this? An attempt to throw salt on South Korea’s wound, reminding it who is the master of the house? Or is Trump genuinely interested in talking with one of the few leaders on whom his standard negotiating techniques did not work? It seems this interest is mutual. If Kim Jong Un’s letters to Trump published in the media are authentic, then they reveal a curious duality; on the one hand, restrained respect for Trump as an individual, on the other, a clear message that personal sympathy does not in any way affect state policy. Both leaders understand this point perfectly well.
A Game of Fear
The topic of the summit is also being actively promoted by Trump’s opponents, from former national security advisor John Bolton to representatives of the Democratic establishment and the expert community. Their goal is not to discuss a real meeting, but to create an apocalyptic picture. They paint a portrait of a narcissistic president who, in order to satisfy his own ambitions, is ready to destroy the system of alliances and make unacceptable concessions to tyranny.
The main fear of the critics is the recognition of North Korea’s de facto status as a nuclear power. But doesn’t that recognition already exist? It is unlikely that Pyongyang will officially enter the nuclear club with the approval of the Big Five, but it is obvious that the DPRK is already a full-fledged nuclear power, possessing both a sufficient arsenal and advanced delivery systems.
It has reached the point of absurdity: the well-known hawk Victor Cha even proposed a scenario in which Trump could invite Kim Jong Un to a G20 summit in the United States.
South Korean Angle: Between Fear and Hope
For Seoul, there is nothing more frightening than a deal behind its back. If Trump decides to negotiate with Kim at the expense of South Korea’s interests or by weakening the American contingent, the consequences for the region will be unpredictable.
That is why Seoul is nervous and handing out advice. Conservatives echo Trump’s American opponents, while Democrats, on the contrary, have joyfully seized on the prospect of dialogue. Lee Jae Myung is ready to provide assistance in organizing negotiations, Unification Minister Chung Dong-young is calling for a “new era”, and parliament members are preparing a resolution on including South Korea in the negotiation process.
But how realistic are these efforts? While politicians make fine statements, in practice we only see endless military exercises and a deadlocked dispute over denuclearization. Pyongyang is not ready to disarm, and Washington is not ready to back down, and no amount of mediation will help here.
The “Olympic warming” of 2018–2019 proved that Trump and Kim manage perfectly well without aides. Moon Jae-in at the time tried to play the mediator, but instead of honest diplomacy, he merely conveyed inflated expectations to both sides. In the end, when the US and DPRK leaders were confronted with reality, they preferred to communicate directly. And not without reason; even when their third summit took place on South Korean soil, the president of South Korea was simply not invited to it.
Why a 2026 Summit Is Unlikely
The situation in the world has changed dramatically since Donald Trump’s first term, and today the likelihood of new negotiations with the DPRK is close to zero.
Firstly, Pyongyang’s position has strengthened significantly. The quality of life in the country has risen, and its missile and nuclear potential has made a qualitative leap. If in 2017 the DPRK’s ability to strike New York was more theoretical, today experts acknowledge that its new ICBMs are capable of reaching the American capital. Moreover, against the backdrop of global polarization, the DPRK has strengthened its alliance with China and Russia. The signing of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Russia and the participation of North Korean military personnel in combat operations in the Kursk region confirm that any aggression against the DPRK now risks escalating into a macro-regional nuclear conflict.
Secondly, Trump has virtually no leverage over Pyongyang. A military option is ruled out, as the US president is not ready for a full-scale war. Economic pressure is also ineffective, as any attempts by Washington to tighten sanctions through the UN will be blocked by Moscow and Beijing. The pandemic experience, when the DPRK successfully withstood three years of complete self-isolation, proved the system’s resilience to external shocks. Sanctions are no longer an instrument for destabilizing the regime.
As for any pluses, Kim is dubious about their actual significance. What can Trump offer that North Korea is not receiving from Xi Jinping or Vladimir Putin? Even if one allows for the possibility of the US being ready to take serious steps, Trump will face serious push-back from within his country. The US establishment and the electorate still view the DPRK as an “evil state”. Any attempts to make a deal with Pyongyang will be considered an unacceptable bow to tyranny, which will do the president not good,
Thirdly, the question arises: what exactly would Trump and Kim talk about? For the US, denuclearization remains the key topic, but Pyongyang has ruled it out of the agenda in advance, threatening to derail the talks. For North Korea, its nuclear status is non-negotiable, and frankly, the complete disarmament of North Korea is possible only with a radical regime change, i.e. with the elimination of the existing political system, which is currently unrealistic.
Even if ideas about shifting from disarmament to arms control are voiced in Washington (this idea is expressed even by hawks like Victor Cha), both Trump’s political opponents and regional actors, including South Korea, will be in opposition. In the absence of real leverage and an adequate agenda, negotiations lose their meaning. Moreover, the very fact of shaking hands with the US president benefits primarily Kim, whereas for the American leader such dividends are questionable.
The Only Possible Format
Most likely, the only scenario for a Trump-Kim meeting would be a brief protocol contact on the sidelines of a major event. It would be a meeting lasting a few minutes, with a handshake for the cameras, routine recollections of past contacts, and vague statements about readiness to continue the dialogue. The sides would agree to agree, which would allow each of them to declare a diplomatic victory without making any binding decisions.
In a more optimistic scenario, the sides could discuss lifting the ban on US citizens traveling to the DPRK, signing a treaty to end the Korean War, or creating direct communication channels (though full diplomatic relations would still be very far off). Such initiatives were previously voiced by Democratic members of the House of Representatives Brad Sherman and Judy Chu.
As a result, we are witnessing a telling situation that reflects the essence of modern “media politics”, where experts with serious faces discuss the agenda and consequences of a wholly unrealizable event, fussing over nothing. A true analyst should not bend to this temptation and see the essence behind the media facade.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences
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