South Korea is officially accusing North Korea of planting anti-personnel mines on its territory. What could this incident lead to, and who objectively benefits from it?
Is The North to Blame Again?
Normally, the author would try to conduct a thorough investigation to establish the truth. Several versions could be considered:
- Differing interpretations of the border: perhaps the North and South have different understandings of the demarcation line and agreement on this issue cannot be reached, especially since the DPRK categorically refuses any contacts with the South.
- Natural displacement of mines: it cannot be ruled out that the mines were affected by rans. However, the South Korean investigation, according to reports, established that they were buried deliberately. The only question is when exactly – a year ago or several weeks ago.
Supporters of the South Korean story will readily believe in sabotage by North Korea. Those leaning towards the North’s position believes in a provocation orchestrated by the South. According to this version, the North Korean anti-personnel mines were supposedly brought from the Ukrainian theater of military operations and handed over to Seoul to give the investigation an appearance of credibility.
Unfortunately, we live in the era of “post-truth,” when the parties often form a media narrative instead of establishing the real facts. Those who accept this narrative consider it the truth, experiencing it so deeply that it is perceived as reality, while any inconsistencies are ignored. Therefore, we shall focus not on the causes of the incident, but on its possible consequences.
Border Incident: A Push Toward Dialogue Or Renewed Tensions?
An attempt to use the recent incident as a pretext for resuming inter-Korean dialogue, even on such a sensitive topic, is unlikely to produce tangible results. However, considering heightened vigilance, both sides will probably refrain from escalation. In this sense, the current situation differs sharply from the events of 2015. Back then, in response to “North Korean provocations,” the South deployed propaganda broadcasts, and both sides put their troops on the border on combat alert. Only after four days of tense high-level negotiations was further escalation avoided. Seoul stopped the broadcasts, and Pyongyang expressed regret (though it did not apologize) in connection with the incident.
Today, there are no contacts between the sides at all. Moreover, South Korea’s actions are perceived by Pyongyang as an additional argument for completely cutting off all communication with Seoul. Kim Yo Jong has repeatedly made sharp criticisms, and her rhetoric remains extremely harsh. Therefore, even though Seoul will continue to insist that Pyongyang stop strengthening the borders, the sides will most likely not stop and will exchange threatening statements, promising to “tear the legs off” anyone who crosses the line.
Nevertheless, until recently, such incidents were resolved peacefully. When North Korean soldiers, while fortifying the borders, entered South Korean territory, a warning shot into the air was a sufficient signal for them to retreat.
Controversy Surrounding the Incident Has Revealed Internal Disagreements Within the Ruling Party
The incident has also exposed deep contradictions on the North Korean issue at the highest level of the country’s leadership. These disagreements reflect the debate between two main factions within the Democratic Party of South Korea, conventionally called the “Alliance Faction” and the “Independence Faction.”
The first group, which includes populists and supporters of Lee Jae Myung, acts situationally, oriented toward the alliance with the United States. Dialogue with the North for them is more a set of rhetorical exercises that are known in advance not to produce results, but are necessary to maintain a favorable foreign-policy image.
The “Independence faction,” on the contrary, advocates a more independent policy in relations with the United States (ideally, for strategic autonomy) and for real dialogue with the DPRK. However, not all of their proposals are realistic.
Tension Between Factions: Spat Over Armistice Violation
The recent incident led to a sharp exchange between the Minister of Foreign Affairs (representing the “Alliance Faction”) and the Minister of Unification (representing the “Independence Faction”). The “Alliance Faction” accused North Korea of violating the 1953 Armistice Agreement. It is noteworthy that back in the 2010s, Pyongyang officially declared that it was no longer observing this agreement. From the Alliance’s point of view, this requires an apology from North Korea and response measures in the form of strengthened border control –at least.
Moreover, some experts close to this faction question the advisability of preserving the DMZ in its current form. In their view, the DMZ only symbolized the principle of “One Korea,” which the North abandoned at the end of 2023, instead of solving real military and strategic tasks.
Unfortunate Incident Or Pretext For Dialogue?
For the “Independence Faction,” the explosions are viewed as an unfortunate incident that should not affect the current inter-Korean course. On the contrary, they propose using it as an opportunity to start a dialogue.
President Lee Jae Myung, in his public statements, tries to find a balance between the positions of both factions. On the one hand, he characterizes the explosions as an “incident”, avoiding controversial phrasing. On the other hand, he emphasizes the need to strengthen the country’s defense capacity. The situation with the mines, apparently, indicates that the sharp discussions between the factions are coming out into the public sphere.
Radical Turn, Possible Scenario?
The author has long predicted –although he considers this option unlikely –the possibility of a radical change in President Lee Jae Myung’s approach. Perhaps he will get tired of knocking on a locked door and decide on a drastic step. He may be pushed toward this both by the drop in his ratings in recent months and by certain difficulties in relations with the United States. Lee Jae Myung is a populist politician. Despite the fact that, while he was opposition leader, he was an ultra-left nationalist and was even involved in corruption schemes connected with the DPRK, today he is ready to act pragmatically. The author is interested to see whether he will decide on a risky but extravagant step.
Historical Context and New Slogan
It is worth recalling that a number of officials from the Yoon Suk Yeol administration who dealt with “inter-Korean issues” had previously been ultra-leftists, but with age changed their views to the less moderate right-leaning ones. One of them said: “We defeated the totalitarian dictatorship in the South, and now it is time to defeat the totalitarian dictatorship in the North.” Today, when Yoon Suk Yeol has received a life sentence and a hefty term on other charges, the prosecutor’s office has been liquidated, and the judicial system has been undermined, the next institutional challenge is not expected before 2028. Perhaps President Lee Jae Myung may take up this slogan.
Such a decision could bring him significant benefits. First, it would allow him to get out of the deadlock of contradictory promises. In particular, there would no longer be a need to take inter-Korean dialogue into account, which would make it possible to calmly build up military potential and ensure operational control over the troops in wartime. Second, relations with the United States would improve, and accusations of sympathy for the North would disappear. Third, although Lee would lose some votes among ideological leftists, it would be compensated by the support of conservatives, for whom a hard line toward the DPRK is a key element of their identity.
Theoretically, a high-profile incident with South Korean casualties could lead to a change of strategy. That is exactly what Lee Myung-bak did after the sinking of the Cheonan corvette. However, while Lee is trying to please everyone, the more likely scenario appears to be hushing up the incident or shifting attention to another high-profile scandal similar to the current mishaps in relations between Seoul and Kiev (with the ambassador being recalled). Therefore, the author will carefully monitor the situation, since its deterioration could seriously affect regional security.
If one considers the explosion as a catalyst for a shift of course, then this would be much more advantageous for the South than for the North. North Korea, despite its harsh rhetoric, is currently not looking for pretexts for provocations.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences
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