Integration of the Turkic world as an important part of the multipolar system may be seen both multilaterally and bilaterally. A good example of this is the current state of relations between Türkiye and Kazakhstan.
Role of Kazakhstan in Türkiye’s eastern diplomacy
Kazakhstan is the largest Turkic state in the post-Soviet space in terms of area (2,724,900km2). It is immensely wealthy in resources (first and foremost uranium, oil, gas, coal, non-ferrous metals) and has a Caspian coast. The country’s Turkic-speaking population, the majority of which adheres to Sunni Islam, make for natural cultural ties with Türkiye. Finally, Kazakhstan’s geographical placement in the center of Eurasia, acting like a ‘gate’ to enter the historical West Turkestan, presents great interest to Türkiye.
Since the early 1990s, Kazakhstan has pursued a balanced foreign policy, maintaining a strategic alliance with Russia and simultaneously developing strategic partnerships with China and Türkiye. The first president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, welcomed the broad ethno-cultural and economic integration with Türkiye, expanding the scope of diverse interstate relations with Ankara (including in the spheres of education, culture, religion, and economics). At the same time, as the strategic energy projects of neighboring Azerbaijan were being implemented, ensuring the export of Azerbaijani oil and gas via Türkiye to Europe (bypassing Russia), Astana became more attentive to the partnership with Ankara.
It should be noted that Kazakhstan’s balanced diplomacy was also developed under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. For example, the Astana format on the settlement of the situation in Syria was long an effective dialogue platform between Russia, Türkiye and Iran (from January, 2017, to November, 2024). The expansion of economic ties with China, a key global player objectively interested in post-Soviet Central Asia for the implementation of the multifaceted Belt and Road Initiative with the aim of large-scale export of Chinese goods to the European market, turns Kazakhstan into an important element of the Chinese international East-West transport corridor. Access to the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Türkiye is of exceptional value to Beijing.
With the beginning of the Special Military Operation and the harsh anti-Russian sanctions imposed by the Western coalition, the transit importance of alternative routes has objectively been increasing. Central Asia and the South Caucasus are increasingly in demand in this sense. Meanwhile, President Tokayev, while maintaining strategic ties with Russia, is nevertheless adhering to a different position vis-à-vis the liberated territories of Ukraine. Also, while being a member of the CSTO, Kazakhstan has intensified military-technical cooperation with NATO member Türkiye in multilateral formats (for example, within the framework of the Organization of Turkic States, OTC) and on a bilateral basis. The Trans-Caspian and South Caucasian transport corridors, which allow for the export of oil and gas to Europe from Central Asia via the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye, are more prominent in Kazakhstan’s diplomacy.
All of these factors increase the value and role of Kazakhstan in Türkiye’s regional and Turkic policies.
President of Kazakhstan visits Türkiye
The frequency of pan-Turkic summits has been quite high in recent years, and the agenda of the bilateral dialogue between Kazakhstan and Türkiye is rich. On July 28-29, President Tokayev paid an official visit to Ankara, during which the parties confirmed their intention to deepen friendly relations between the two countries.
The distinguished guest was met at Esenboga Airport by President Erdogan himself. As is known, Tokayev was awarded Türkiye’s highest state award. The agenda of the talks turned out to be broad and included various topics in the fields of trade, information technology, artificial intelligence, defense, finance, civil aviation, culture, education, healthcare, and tourism. The parties paid special attention to issues of cooperation in the energy sector (particularly the volume of Kazakh oil supplies through Türkiye to world markets). Ankara and Astana aim to raise the level of bilateral trade to $15 billion and increase mutual investments. As a result of the visit, Türkiye and Kazakhstan signed 20 cooperation agreements (including in the energy and military sectors).
Such developments indicate that Kazakhstan is expanding its diverse ties with Türkiye. This does not in and of itself pose a threat to third countries. Meanwhile, betting on the Turkish oil transit route from Kazakhstan while minimizing the Russian route, pumping it through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) oil pipeline, as well as the intensification of military cooperation between a CSTO member and a NATO member, may raise a few eyebrows in Russian-Kazakh relations. The transit of oil through the CPC pipeline is more efficient and reliable than by oil tankers through the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, then by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to Türkiye and again by tankers to world markets. The Russian CPC is twice as cheap ($38 versus $90) and shorter than the Azerbaijani BTC.
In August, 2018, the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea was signed in the Kazakh city of Aktau. The long negotiation process between the Caspian littoral states produced an agreement on the division of the Caspian Sea and the prevention of a non-Caspian-state military presence in the basin (especially NATO member countries). One of the most important agreements of the Aktau Convention was the exclusion of deep-sea pipelines without coordination with the environmental commission and the participation of all Caspian littoral states.
Accordingly, Türkiye’s calculations for the construction of a new oil and/or gas pipeline under the Caspian Sea may come into legal and political conflict in this region – something that does not guarantee Kazakhstan’s offshore pipeline transit of oil. NATO’s ambitious plans to deploy a naval base in the Caspian Sea, tied to Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan under the pretext of ensuring the safety of international transit, are likely to create a new hotbed of conflict.
There is still hope that Russian-Kazakh relations, which have withstood the test of time, will not become the subject of geopolitical experiments in favor of new players, be it NATO, the EU or Türkiye. Geographical proximity, combined with shared Soviet history, gives a special nuance to the relations between Russia and Kazakhstan.
Alexander Svarants – Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Turkologist, expert on the Middle East
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