The announcement at the end of October about the possible accession of Taiwan to the Luzon Economic Corridor (LEC) project, which was launched six months earlier by the United States, Japan and the Philippines, provides an opportunity to focus on new noteworthy developments in the increasingly tense situation in Southeast Asia
The Taiwan problem is an integral element of the situation in Southeast Asia
But the same problem, rather than simply manifesting itself, is becoming an integral element in the extremely difficult situation in Southeast Asia. First of all, for geographical reasons, since the main Philippine Island of Luzon, which gives its name to the project mentioned at the beginning of this article, is relatively close to Taiwan. The last Balikatan military exercises were also held on the territory of this island, and their scenario included, among other things, a possible aggravation of the situation in Taiwan.
The US State Department’s report on the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and the Luzon Economic Corridor project, launched during the summit between the US, Japan and the Philippines held on April 11-12 this year in Washington could hardly be described as a display of sabre rattling. Nevertheless some “reference points” related to the LEC make a clear link between this project and the solution of purely military tasks.
That being said, the main purpose of the LEC is related to a more fundamental problem caused by the global competition between the United States and its main geopolitical opponent, namely the PRC.
The LEC project in the context of the struggle against the PRC for influence on the Global South
This project was one of the concrete results of the growing awareness of the Biden administration, which came to power in the United States in early 2021, on the true nature of the challenge posed by the emergence of China as a global power. It should be noted once again that as far back as in the late 1990s, US political commentators pointed to China as a contender to occupy this role in the next stage of the Great World Game.
As for the reaction of the US political establishment to this news, as announced by its own experts, two main developments stand out in the process of its formation, which took place over the next two decades. The first of these was the ascent, once again, of the “neo-isolationist” wing of the American political elite, which gave a clear preference to solving internal problems, the urgency of which was already very apparent.
The second of these points was due to a long misunderstanding of the exact nature of the challenge posed by the emergence of the PRC as the second global power. For a long time, it was expected to result in a Thucydides’ Trap situation, similar to that which occurred at the beginning of the 20th century, triggering the First World War. It cannot be said that this “trap” is irrelevant today, since the rapid (and inevitable) transformation of the PRC into one of the main military world powers is becoming quite an obvious fact.
But still, we repeat, only at the when the Biden administration came to power did the US finally receive an answer to the question about the real nature of the challenge from the PRC. It turned out to largely non-military in character and almost entirely due to the critical importance of influencing the processes taking place in majority of countries in the world, now together known as the Global South. The implementation in these countries of the key project of Beijing’s key Belt and Road Initiative, which quietly advanced during the first two decades of the 21st century, had already yielded quite obvious results by the beginning of 2021. It is worth noting that Chinese leader Xi Jinping once again outlined the special importance of the Global South in modern world processes during the BRICS Summit recently held in Kazan, Russia.
Washington’s reaction (immediately echoed by that of Brussels) to this realization was evident in the organizational and political fever of the first year of the Biden administration. In terms of media exposure, the highest profile events were the G7 and NATO summits held in June 2021 in Cornwall in the south-west of England. Australia, South Korea, India and South Africa were invited as guests. The presence of the latter two at these events was intended to mark the fundamental turn in the Western countries’ interests towards the Global South.
A month later, the initiative was launched under the ambitious title “Build Back Better World” (B3W). However, the following year (2022) it was rebranded under the more specific name of Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). And to coincide with this initiative, in May 2022 Joe Biden announced the formation of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) in a region which the US sees as of key importance. In the autumn of the same year, the first working meeting of the 14 IPEF member countries was held.
Adopting a similar format to the PGII initiative, on April 11, 2024, in Washington, Joe Biden, His Philippine counterpart Ferdinand Marcos Jr., and former Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida launched a project to create an economic corridor on the Philippine island of Luzon. Of the four “reference points” specified by the authors of the project, two familiar names stand out, namely Subic Bay and Clark. During the Cold War these were, respectively, the locations of the largest US Naval and Air Force bases in Southeast Asia. And there can hardly be any doubt that in the formation of this “purely economic” project, the interests of the Pentagon, which is now “returning” to the Philippines, were taken into account.
On the possible accession to the LEC of Taiwan
On October 23, the Taipei Times reported that the Taiwanese government was considering joining the three existing participants (i.e. US, Japan and the Philippines) in the LEC project. Concerning that report, it seems appropriate to make two remarks.
First, such a prospect would be fully consistent with the course adopted by the current Taiwanese leadership, which aims, as much as possible, to present itself on the world stage as an independent state engaging in international relations. If such a desire is evident in Taiwan’s participation in the work of the Pacific Island Forum (PIF), which operates in an area some five to ten thousand kilometers from Taiwan, then it is even more evident in relation to the new LEC project, which is based in the immediate vicinity of the island.
But the reaction from Beijing regarding Taiwan’s attempts to join this project in the Philippines, a country that is today certainly one of the main sources of China’s problems in Southeast Asia, will undoubtedly be much tougher than its reaction to Taiwan’s activity (encouraged, of course, by the United States) at the last meeting of the PIF.
Secondly, Taiwan’s possible accession to the LEC would become much more significant if this issue is considered in the context of the development of the wider situation in the Indo-Pacific region. After all, it is particularly noteworthy that Taiwan forms a key link in the so-called First Island Line, which extends from north to south from the Japanese island of Hokkaido (although the concept often takes in the Kuril Islands) to the southernmost island of the Philippine archipelago. Strengthening control over this line of islands, including by connecting Taiwan to a certain “economic project” in the Philippines, would allow China’s geopolitical opponents to actually fence it off from the Pacific Ocean. As for what that might mean for China, that hardly needs expanding on.
And it is, first and foremost, from this perspective that Beijing will assess and decide on its response to the prospect of Taiwan’s possible involvement in the Luzon Economic Corridor project.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
