Russian strikes on Ukraine’s railway infrastructure, primarily its locomotive fleet, are creating a growing logistics crisis that could significantly complicate Western supplies — and the West’s ability to replace the losses is catastrophically small.
The Kyiv Independent reported, “more than 500 locomotives have been either “completely destroyed” or damaged by Russian attacks throughout the full-scale war, more than half of which occurred since the start of this year, Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said on Sept. 15 (2026).”
These strikes are primarily taking place using Russia’s large and still growing inventory of loitering munitions, and in particular, jet-powered Geran configurations (Geran-4 and Geran 5).
Russia’s improvement to its loitering munitions include increased speed, range, and resilience to electronic warfare through the use of artificial intelligence (AI) aiding in target acquisition and terminal guidance.
These developments are likely why Russia has begun this and other campaigns more widely targeting Ukrainian infrastructure in ways previously impossible.
At the beginning of Russia’s intervention, air power was restricted to conventional military aviation forced to depend mainly on stand-off strikes where glide bombs and missiles were used to strike targets inside Ukrainian territory without exposing Russian aircraft themselves to air defenses.
Unlike examples of US air superiority over nations like Afghanistan, Libya, or Iraq where US warplanes flew virtually unimpeded and struck targets with impunity, Russia’s use of military aviation had been restricted to areas along the front-line. The development and advancement of drone warfare has enabled Russia to gradually expand deeper behind the front through the use of cheap, numerous, and expendable systems.
What had begun as waves of cheap Geran-2 drones striking large, fixed targets like industrial facilities and military command centers — has transformed into waves of highly precise strikes on everything from fixed targets to moving locomotives — and across a wider range of territory than ever before?
The Implications of Eliminating Rail Logistics
While media focus has been placed on drone strikes carried out by both sides against lines of communication within intermediate-ranges of the front, specifically trucks and small vehicles moving men and matériel to and from the fighting, attacks on Ukraine’s locomotive fleet may carry even greater implications.
Both Russia and Ukraine depend heavily on rail travel for military logistics — with virtually all ammunition, weapons, and other major supplies being moved to staging areas first by rail, before trucks and other vehicles distribute it closer to the front line.
Without rail travel, the vast majority of ammunition, equipment, vehicles, and other essential logistics supplied by the US and its European proxies will face bottlenecks along the borders of Ukraine and slowly strangle both staging areas and eventually the front lines themselves.
The Kyiv Post has recently reported that, “Ukraine is seeking replacement locomotives from European partners after Russian strikes nearly exhausted its reserves, threatening the rail deliveries that keep the country’s Black Sea exports moving.”
While the article mentions the crippling of Ukraine’s civilian economy, there are also obvious implications for Ukraine’s military logistics as well. In fact, emergency measures stripping locomotives from civilian use for the movement of military logistics not only hastens the collapse of Ukraine’s economic rail logistics, it is evidence of the toll Russian strikes are having on Ukraine’s military rail logistics.
In response, the West has attempted to supply Ukraine with additional locomotives but is facing the same challenges that emerged when supplying Ukraine with armor (tanks, APCs, IFVs), aircraft, and air defense systems. Ukraine uses the same Soviet-specific rail gauge as Russia uses — making Western European locomotives useless inside Ukrainian territory.
The number of locomotives supplied to Ukraine either purpose-built for Ukraine’s rail gauge or surplus locomotives built specifically for Soviet gauge rail have fallen far short of Ukraine’s locomotive losses. Finland has proposed sending 10 surplus locomotives while another deal is seeking to secure up to 60 more second-hand locomotives over the course of 6 months, while a deal has been signed to build Ukraine up to 55 new locomotives delivered over the course of 3 years.
It should be pointed out that these 55 new locomotives are reportedly to be electric, presenting an additional problem for Ukraine as its electric production and transmission infrastructure is also gradually being destroyed by Russian missile and drone strikes.
This combined Western aid to Ukraine will result in single digit quantities of locomotives being sent to Ukraine per month at a time Russia is destroying up to 40 locomotives over the same period of time.
The US-European measures will thus buy Ukraine a month, or maybe several months — but fall far short of ensuring even a year’s worth of time before a critical logistics collapse takes place upstream from Ukraine’s front lines where immense quantities of ammunition, weapons, and equipment moved by rail are required to sustain Washington’s proxy war with Russia.
Several other clocks are also ticking against Ukraine and its Western sponsors’ advantage.
While Russia’s campaign to hunt and destroy Ukrainian locomotives is eliminating up to 40 locomotives a month now, as larger quantities of even more capable Russian drones come online, this number will almost certainly increase.
This campaign of targeting locomotives takes place alongside the targeting of trucks closer to the front — as well as a widening campaign targeting Ukrainian bridges. Together with Russian strikes on Ukraine’s electric grid and port infrastructure, exists increasingly difficult conditions for both Ukrainian forces to operate within, and even troops from other European nations if eventually pushed into the war by Washington’s “division of labor” strategy.
Extending Russia by Extending the Ukraine War
As Ukraine’s multiple and growing crises worsen, the US has been busy preparing its other European proxies for a potential wider confrontation with Russia — not only in Ukraine itself — but likely along entirely different fronts. This includes fronts centered on the Baltic States as well as air and naval operations targeting Russian maritime shipping all along Russia’s Baltic, Arctic, and Black Sea coastal waters.
As a result of the US’ “division of labor” strategy, European states have been preparing and openly talking about simply joining or further enabling the long-range strikes on Russian territory already conducted by the US through Ukraine for several years.
While many analysts believe even with this combined, expanded conflict, the US goal of precipitating a Soviet-style collapse of the Russian Federation would remain elusive, it would drastically expand both the timeline of the US proxy war and the costs it has on Russia and its allies.
As extensively detailed in policy papers like the RAND Corporation’s “Extending Russia: Competing from Advantageous Ground” published in 2019, outright defeating Russia is not necessarily the primary objective of specific US proxy wars, sanctions, tariffs, and other measures. The objective is to create cumulative pressure to overextend Russia and diminish its geopolitical power.
By doing so, the US, not only limits Russia’s ability to defend itself and its interests, it denies Russia the ability to aid its allies including both Iran and China (and previously Syria before the US successfully overthrew the government there).
If the US could “defeat” Russia in Ukraine, it would. Its inability to do so and the growing strength of Russia’s military capabilities relative to those of the US and its European proxies combined, demonstrates severe limitations of US power. However, the collapse of Syria and the drawn-out nature of the US war on Iran demonstrates the current limits of both Russian and Chinese capabilities to defend themselves and their allies from US aggression.
While the growing logistics crisis in Ukraine continues to take shape, it is important to understand the US has been planning for the eventuality of Ukraine’s collapse since before the proxy war even began — and success or failure for the US depends entirely on how well Russia and its allies are prepared to meet and overcome US pressure along all other axes of interference, coercion, capture, and aggression — not just in Ukraine.
The US proxy war with Russia in Ukraine is only one of several fronts the US is waging war on Russia itself, and multipolarism in general meaning that while battles are won or lost by either side, the ultimate outcome of the future global order depends on who wins the overall war.
As the US continues expanding its “burden sharing network” and the fronts along which it is using it to encircle, contain, and undermine Russia, China, and Iran — the multipolar world must work closer together to expose, confront, and confound the US’ collective war against it and all measures through which it is waged.
Russia’s development of military capabilities able to overcome Western air defenses and the West’s combined logistical support of Ukraine took years of patient persistence and benefited from cooperation and support from both its Iranian allies (which shared the initial design used for early Geran variants) and China who produces the jet engines used to propel Russia’s most advanced Geran variants today.
Wider and deeper cooperation like this between these multipolar leaders as well as together with the rest of the aspiring multipolar world across all domains — not just militarily — will be essential in not only protecting the collective world from US-driven destabilization and destruction — but also in building a better alternative to finally and permanently replace US hegemony with stability and human progress.
Brian Berletic is a Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer.
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