The global trade system has entered a phase increasingly called “reglobalization.”
A World of Multiple “Clubs,” Not a “Single Market”
This is not just growth in the number of agreements. Their function is changing fundamentally. If in the 1990s–2000s such agreements were a tool for deepening liberalization within the logic of a “large global market,” today they increasingly serve as instruments of geopolitics, risk management, and “insurance” for market access. Western sanctions, tariff wars, and the paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body have pushed countries toward a strategy of “club” diversification: instead of betting on a single hegemon or on universal rules, they are building a network of flexible bilateral and mini-multilateral pacts. It is telling that EAEU analysis directly states: “Trade instruments today have become instruments of policy, geopolitics, and industrial transformation.”
Let us consider just two examples illustrating different strategies within the same trend, and then Russia’s place and its course toward multipolarity in this new architecture.
Vietnam–EFTA (VEFTA): Betting on “High-Standard Rules”
On October 18, 2026, in Hanoi, Vietnam and the European Free Trade Association (Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein) signed a free trade agreement after 14 years of negotiations. The agreement is comprehensive: it covers not only tariffs on goods but also trade in services, investment, intellectual property, government procurement, competition policy, small and medium-sized enterprises, dispute settlement, and—critically—“trade and sustainable development.”
What is Vietnam’s strategic logic? An emerging-market country is voluntarily taking on obligations under standards traditionally associated with developed economies. This is not a “concession” but an investment in “positioning within value chains.” EFTA is not merely a high-income market; it is a set of jurisdictions with advanced technologies, innovation ecosystems, and demanding consumers. Access to them on “high-bar” terms allows Vietnamese enterprises not to remain stuck in assembly and raw materials but to aspire to higher stages of processing. The agreement is expected to open opportunities for diversifying export and import markets, improving competitiveness, and attracting “quality” investment capital and technology.
It is telling that trade between Vietnam and EFTA averages about $2 billion a year, and the trade structure is complementary: Vietnam exports seafood, footwear, textiles, machinery, and electronics. This is a moderate but strategically important volume—the example shows not a pursuit of immediate growth but long-term embedding in the “high-standards club.”
Malaysia–Bangladesh (MBFTA): A “Defensive” Alliance on the Threshold of LDC Graduation
On October 27, 2026, the first round of free trade negotiations between Malaysia and Bangladesh began in Dhaka; the target date for concluding the agreement is 2027. Formally, this is a standard bilateral track, but its motivation is fundamentally different from the Vietnam example.
For Bangladesh, the agreement is existential from the standpoint of market access. The country graduates from the least developed country (LDC) category on November 24, 2026, which strips it of preferences in many markets. Bangladesh is negotiating with 8–10 countries, including Malaysia, to retain preferential access after graduation. Malaysia in this pairing is not just a market but a “gateway” to Southeast Asia and a partner in sectors such as the halal industry, building semiconductor competencies, digital trade, logistics, and joint ventures in special economic zones.
The strategic logic here is defensive rather than offensive: it is not about conquering new heights but about preserving competitive positions during a transition period. This is an example of how the new regionalism becomes a “soft landing” tool for countries losing status-based preferences.
Driving Forces: Why Regionalism Is Mutating
Both examples are part of a broader picture. In parallel, in 2026, the EU–Mercosur agreement entered into force on a provisional basis (signed January 17, applied from May 1); CPTPP is expanding (applications from Indonesia, the Philippines, the UAE, Argentina, and Uruguay) and so is RCEP (applications from Hong Kong, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Chile). Four driving forces stand behind this.
First, the erosion of the multilateral system. The blocking of the WTO Appellate Body and unilateral tariff measures have undermined confidence in universal rules. Countries are looking for “fallback airfields” in the form of regional agreements, which, by the WTO’s definition, are an exception to the principle of non-discrimination.
Second, the imperative of supply-chain resilience. After pandemic and geopolitical shocks, the priority shifted from “efficiency” (just-in-time) to “resilience” (just-in-case). Diversifying suppliers and markets has become a strategic necessity.
Third, the fight over rules. New agreements are less about tariffs than about standards: digital trade, “green” barriers, and intellectual property. Whoever sets the rules in their “club” gains a competitive advantage.
Fourth, the rise of South–South. Trade between developing countries is growing at a faster pace, and new alliances are increasingly formed along South–South and “Global South–developed economies” lines (as in the Vietnam–EFTA example).
The Russian Vector: Multipolarity as Trade Architecture
Russia’s course toward building a multipolar world is not an abstract declaration but a practical trade strategy that fits into the trend described above. Russia is consistently building dialogue with partners “on the principles of equality, mutual respect, and non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.” In September 2026, the State Duma ratified five agreements deepening cooperation within the EAEU and with Belarus, Abkhazia, India, and Myanmar.
The EAEU as an “economic center of the multipolar world.” According to an assessment by Russia’s deputy foreign minister, intra-EAEU trade reached $95 billion—almost twice as much as before the union was created in 2014. Trade with external partners has been impressively dynamic: growth with Vietnam of about 90%, with Iran of 170%, and with China of more than twofold (2025 data). The EAEU has signed more than 80 memorandums with international partners, predominantly from the Global South.
Geography of expansion. In 2025, free trade agreements were concluded with Mongolia, the UAE, and Indonesia; their ratification and entry into force are expected in 2026. Negotiations on trade liberalization with India have intensified. At the EAEU summit in Astana (May 2026), the launch of FTA negotiations with Tunisia was approved. Western sanctions, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry’s assessment, worked as a “stress test,” pushing the union toward trade diversification, development of new logistics routes, and technological self-sufficiency.
Institutional framework. Russia’s multipolar trade contour relies not only on the EAEU but also on broader platforms: BRICS (11 economies, including Brazil, China, India, Iran, and the UAE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Russia’s trade with SCO countries in 2025 exceeded $400 billion. Russia supports the formation of the Greater Eurasian Partnership as an umbrella concept for linking integration projects.
Thus, Russia’s course toward multipolarity is not “isolation” but a reformatting of trade ties toward the Global South and Eurasia, with an emphasis on national currencies (over 90% of Russia’s payments with SCO countries are made in national currencies) and on creating alternative payment and logistics contours.
Risks and Open Questions
The new regionalism is not a panacea. Fragmentation of rules increases costs for business (the “spaghetti bowl” effect) and creates an “exclusion effect” for those left outside the clubs. Asymmetry of benefits persists: in a “developed–developing economy” pair, benefits are distributed unevenly. Ratification can drag on for years: even signed agreements (as in the case of EU–Mercosur) enter into force only provisionally and partially. Finally, unilateral actions by major players (for example, the shift to annual reviews instead of automatic renewal of USMCA) create chronic uncertainty.
The Vietnam–EFTA and Malaysia–Bangladesh examples show two poles of the new trade regionalism: an offensive strategy of integration into the “high-standards club” and a defensive strategy of preserving market access during a transition period. Both examples confirm the main thesis: trade agreements have ceased to be a technical instrument of tariff policy and have become an instrument of geopolitical positioning and risk management. In this architecture, Russia acts not as a “deviation” from the trend but as one of its active participants—through the EAEU, a network of agreements with the Global South, and linkage with BRICS and the SCO. The question for the future is not whether regionalism will persist (it has already become mainstream) but how compatible these “clubs” will be and whether it will be possible to avoid turning trade fragmentation into a systemic conflict of rules.
Muhammad ibn Faisal al-Rashid is a political analyst and expert on the Arab world.
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