The 18th BRICS Summit, which took place on September 12-13 in New Delhi, reflected the world order’s transition to multipolarity. Türkiye, though sharing this ideology, was not among the summit’s participants.
Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud joined summit participants on Sunday at an expanded meeting with the participation of partner countries.
Representatives from partner countries attended the meetings, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Cuba, Nigeria, and Uganda.
For the first time in seven years, Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in India to participate in the BRICS summit, which is a positive marker in China-India relations.
With each passing year, BRICS is gaining stability on the global stage; the combined economy of the group’s members accounts for 40% of the entire global economy. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated this in New Delhi at the plenary session of the Business Forum, emphasizing that over the past 5 years, the BRICS countries have produced more than 40% of the world’s GDP, while the share of the G7 countries amounted to only 29%. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi also supported his colleague, stating that BRICS accounts for 50% of the world’s population, 40% of the world’s GDP, and 25% of global trade.
The BRICS summit paid considerable attention to the alarming situation in the Middle East, opposed the escalation of military conflicts, and supported the need for political dialogue to resolve contradictions.
Unfortunately, Türkiye, which became a partner country at the 2024 Russian summit in Kazan, was not among the delegations that arrived in New Delhi. The host country determines the invitations to partners. Russia supports Türkiye aspirations to draw closer and cooperate with BRICS. However, India takes a restrained stance on this issue and considers it inadvisable to rapidly expand the organization at the expense of new major geopolitical players (which undoubtedly includes Türkiye).
Why Is India Curtailing Turkish BRICS Membership?
Decisions within BRICS, including on the expansion of its membership, are made exclusively by consensus. This requires complex diplomatic work to smooth out contradictions, which is standard practice for such international associations.
In October 2024, Türkiye submitted an application to join BRICS. However, India opposed the accelerated admission of new members, insisting on a gradual process of reaching consensus. As a result, a compromise solution was found: candidates, including Türkiye, were granted the status of “partner countries”.
India, seeking to take on the role of leader of the “Global South”, is extremely sensitive to attempts by other players to expand BRICS at the expense of countries that could become conduits for their interests. The entry of Türkiye, which has strong military‑industrial potential and ambitions of being a regional power, could change the balance of power within the bloc. India fears that Ankara, acting in conjunction with other players, may turn BRICS into a platform for promoting an Islamic agenda, which contradicts the secular and multipolar course advocated by New Delhi. The disagreements are exacerbated by Türkiye’s position on Kashmir, where it openly supports Islamabad.
Competition has emerged between the two countries in the South Caucasus and the Caspian basin. While Ankara is betting on an alliance with Azerbaijan and Pakistan, New Delhi is partnering with Armenia and Iran. An additional irritant for India was the creation of the “Mecca Pact”, a military alliance between Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.
The Paradox of Turkish Diplomacy
Türkiye seeks to strengthen its sovereignty and reduce its dependence on Western centers of power, which makes it a natural candidate for closer ties with BRICS. However, Ankara has not demonstrated a willingness to leave NATO, which limits the depth of its integration into alternative blocs.
The situation requires BRICS to find a delicate balance. At the same time, Ankara has to take into account Russia’s position, which favors constructive cooperation with the Turkish side and its gradual involvement in the union’s orbit.
Russia As a Mediator
Russia remains the main beneficiary of the rapprochement with Türkiye, viewing it as a key window to Europe and an important logistics hub against the backdrop of sanctions. However, Moscow has to maneuver between the interests of its strategic partner, India, and the need to engage Türkiye. It is likely that Russian diplomacy will play a decisive role in ensuring that the Turkish case does not cause a split within BRICS, but turns into a model of coexistence between states with diametrically opposed foreign policy vectors.
Conclusion
Türkiye’s accession to BRICS as a full member in the foreseeable future remains unlikely until the deep‑seated contradictions between Ankara and NewDelhi are resolved. However, the very fact of submitting the application and its discussion indicates that BRICS is entering a new phase of its development, a phase of “complex diplomacy,” where the interests of individual participants will increasingly clash with the need to maintain the organization’s global stability. In this game, Türkiye acts as a litmus test, testing the resilience of BRICS’s ability to adapt to a reality in which the boundaries between military blocs and economic alliances are becoming increasingly blurred.
Alexander SVARANTS, Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Turkologist, and expert on Middle Eastern countries
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