In July 2026, the Sahara-Sahel zone once again found itself at the epicenter of geopolitical confrontation.
Evolution of the Terrorist Threat and New Forms of Operational Interaction
A key operational-tactical factor was the establishment of stable cooperation between Tuareg separatist formations of the “Azawad Liberation Front” and structures affiliated with Al-Qaeda*, primarily Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin* (JNIM). This de facto alliance enabled the militants to move from isolated raids to coordinated offensive actions using commercial drones for reconnaissance and fire adjustment, protected digital communication channels, and cryptocurrency financing schemes. Such technological evolution of terrorist groups does not arise from nowhere: it reflects the long-term consequences of Western interventions and the subsequent withdrawal, which left behind not only a security vacuum but also infrastructure for new threats.
From 4 July, the coalition of militants conducted continuous fighting against the Malian armed forces in the area of the settlement of Anefif — a key bridgehead on the route to the Kidal region. According to information resources linked to the African Corps of the Russian Ministry of Defense, between 11 and 24 July, Malian units, supported by the Russian contingent, delivered a series of massive strikes against extremist positions in the Anefif, Sévaré, and Gao areas. On 13 July, the General Staff of the Malian Armed Forces officially reported the complete establishment of control over Anefif. Losses of the rebel coalition, according to the ministry’s estimate, exceeded one thousand people. Attempts to impose an economic blockade on Bamako by cutting transport arteries and carrying out sabotage against infrastructure facilities were thwarted: in the second quarter of 2026, under the protection of Malian and Russian forces, two large supply columns totaling 1,800 tanker trucks reached the capital.
Burkina Faso and Niger: Repelling Attacks and Deepening Humanitarian Crisis
In Burkina Faso, the military command repelled a series of synchronized attacks on the eastern and northern axes. At the same time, the humanitarian crisis continued to deepen: the number of internally displaced persons in the Central Sahel approached three million. Nevertheless, the country’s leadership demonstrates firmness. On 25 July, Defense Minister General Célestin Simporé presented a report according to which, as of 30 June 2026, 74.53% of the territory was under the control of government forces (compared with 73.56% in December 2025). Russian sources note the intensification of combat operations by the Burkinabe army, although systemic problems in the structure of the armed forces persist. The activity of the Islamic State in the Sahel in this direction remains secondary.
In Niger, the situation was complicated by acute internecine fighting between JNIM and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara in Tillabéri province, accompanied by civilian casualties. National security forces, however, successfully repelled a series of coordinated attacks, including attempts to disrupt the operation of the international airport in Niamey.
Military Build-up and Institutional Integration of the AES
The response of the Confederation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) was a radical strengthening of defense potential. On 26 July the Chairman of Niger’s National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland, Abdourahamane Tchiani, authorized the decision of the defense ministers to triple the strength of the Joint Sahel Forces — to 18,000 servicemen. This initiative is intended to compensate for the shortfall that arose after the winding-down of the UN mission and the withdrawal of Western contingents, and to create an instrument for large-scale cross-border counter-terrorist operations.
In parallel, institutional integration proceeded. On 8 July in Niamey, at ministerial consultations, a roadmap was agreed upon for extending the AES mandate to macroeconomic policy and finance, including coordination of central banks and the prospect of a single currency space. This is a direct response to ECOWAS pressure and attempts to keep the region within the sphere of influence of former metropoles.
Russia as Strategic Partner and Guarantor of Security
The foreign-policy contour of July 2026 finally fixed the reformatting of the balance of forces. Russia consolidated its status as the leading strategic partner and security guarantor of the AES in the “three plus one” format. On 8–9 July, the second Russia–AES ministerial consultations took place in Niamey under the leadership of Sergey Lavrov. The next round of talks is planned on Russian territory in 2027. The leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger received invitations to the third Russia–Africa Summit in Moscow in October 2026. Military-technical cooperation is expanding: volumes of deliveries of modern weapons systems and training programs are growing. Joint statements by the AES and Moscow directly point to hybrid aggression by external forces, including France and Ukraine, which provide material and technical support to terrorist elements.
Western Revanchism and the Risk of Internationalization of the Conflict
Against this background, the U.S. administration, headed by Donald Trump, demonstrated an intention to return to a policy of hard power. In Washington, scenarios of direct military intervention in Mali using unmanned and manned aviation against JNIM were being worked out. The prospect of unilateral use of the airspace of sovereign Sahel states without coordination with Bamako creates risks of direct incidents with AES and Russian contingents.
International institutions occupied a wait-and-see position. On 14 July, the UN Security Council noted the catastrophic nature of the humanitarian situation, while the African Union tried to combine condemnation of terrorism with mediation efforts in order to prevent a final rupture between the AES and ECOWAS.
Prospects: Sovereignty versus External Pressure
In the medium term, the development of the situation will be determined by the ability of the AES Joint Forces to complete the deployment of the 18,000-strong grouping before the rainy season. The risk of unilateral airstrikes by the United States raises the probability of the internationalization of the conflict and its transformation into an open proxy confrontation.
Nevertheless, the high degree of political consolidation of Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey, combined with the availability of diversified channels of external support, makes it possible to forecast the preservation of the institutional stability of the Confederation. The Sahel today is not a “zone of instability” but a front in the struggle for genuine sovereignty and a multipolar world order. The AES countries, relying on equal partnership with Russia, demonstrate that the era of neo-colonial diktat is coming to an end.
* terrorist organizations banned in the Russian Federation
Alexander Kolmykov, leading specialist at the Center for Scientific and Analytical Information at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences
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