A number of notable recent events provide good reason to revisit the subject of the transforming military-political situation in the Indo-Pacific region.
The Revival of ‘US Pacific Command’
With the end of the Cold War, China gradually moved to the forefront of USPACOM’s strategic concerns, having made its presence felt in the waters of the Indian Ocean as well – primarily through the global economic initiative known as the Belt and Road, but with growing backing from its rapidly modernising armed forces. Under these circumstances, the question of control over the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca – which links it to the Indian Ocean – acquired sharply increased significance for Washington.
The task of addressing this challenge fell to USPACOM, which was renamed United States Indo-Pacific Command in 2018 and was expected to coordinate with US Central Command (CENTCOM) in the Indian Ocean. The recent comeback to the command’s original name, we should reiterate, is consistent with the core tenets of the latest iteration of the US National Security Strategy, which places at its centre the issue of maintaining stability in both halves of the American continent and across the Pacific.
At the same time, the jury is still out on who might eventually take over the responsibility in the Indian Ocean, which had previously been assigned to USPACOM, as it turned out, temporarily. CENTCOM alone is not capable of handling the task, and there is a need for some form of “a local partner.” It comes across that Washington is currently grappling with a difficult choice between two rivals, India and Pakistan. The latter rendered the Trump administration a significant favour by helping to engineer a reasonably dignified exit from the ill‑conceived US‑Israeli adventure against Iran. Yet Pakistan today is more of an ally to China rather than to the United States, unlike during the Cold War era. Meanwhile, Washington’s courting of Pakistan, alongside its often clumsy, sometimes ending up close to the bone, manoeuvring towards India, has generated considerable friction in relations with New Delhi.
The recent ministerial meeting of the Quad points to a certain recovery in US‑Indian ties. However, it would be premature to claim that the elements of uncertainty that have emerged over the past few months have been overcome. This is the reason why it is significant to pay attention to the moves of Washington’s two other allies in the Indo‑Pacific: Japan, on the one hand, and, with growing reservations, Europe, on the other.
The Japan Factor and the Role of Leading European Powers
As it has been noted on multiple occasions in NEO, the main vector of Japanese foreign policy is the ‘advance to the South‑West’, with a particular focus on Southeast Asia. This drive, underpinned by a rapidly expanding economy, first manifested itself during the comprehensive post‑war reconstruction of the Japanese state in the mid‑1950s. Its primary instrument has been the pre‑war concept of the ‘flock of flying geese.’ Over the last decade, however, a broadly defined defense policy component has become increasingly visible among the tools employed – a trend that has fueled growing wariness in China, especially as Taiwan comes into sharper focus along Japan’s south‑westward trajectory.
There is little doubt, though, that despite all the importance Japan attaches to Southeast Asia in its own right, the subregion represents an “intermediate stage” on a trajectory that already points towards the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. In the former, the comprehensive rapprochement between Japan and India is taking on pivotal significance. For now, this is unfolding within the Quad framework, but it may well evolve into an independent factor with considerable autonomy from the United States in general and from the question of ‘taking over the baton’ from USPACOM in particular. In this regard, the three‑day visit to India by Prime Minister S. Takaichi, which began on 1 July, was a notable event. Its outcomes require a separate commentary.
The leading European nations, on their part, are also staking a claim to an ever‑greater presence in the Indo‑Pacific as they pursue their own ‘West‑to‑South‑East’ trajectory. This presence has long been substantial in the commercial and economic spheres, but in recent years, a military component has also begun to emerge – both in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific waters adjacent to Asia. A complex web of Japan‑Europe relations is taking shape as these two vectors converge.
One of the most striking trends of recent years has been the attempt to establish some form of framework for Japan‑NATO cooperation. This process gained momentum at the latest NATO Summit, which – not for the first time – was attended by Japan’s Defence Minister.
Unabated Tensions Around Taiwan
Meanwhile, a fresh bout of tension over Taiwan persists, with the Taiwan issue remaining one of the principal drivers of heightened instability in the region. This time the flare‑up was triggered by certain aspects of the maritime delimitation process between Japan and the Philippines – a topic that was high on the agenda during the talks in Tokyo in late May between Prime Minister S. Takaichi and President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who was on a state visit to Japan.
Since the future demarcation zone will lie in close proximity to Taiwan’s eastern coast, and the negotiations took place without any Chinese involvement, Beijing interpreted this as a direct challenge to its national interests. Consequently, there was a predictable sharp uptick in military demonstration activities – both in the strait separating Taiwan from the Philippine island of Luzon and further east in the adjacent waters of the Pacific.
In particular, the People’s Liberation Army Navy mounted a 40‑day cruise by an aircraft carrier strike group, which came under surveillance from Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force reconnaissance aircraft. The Chinese side has asserted that the group’s flagship, the carrier Liaoning, was allegedly subjected to simulated attacks by the Japanese aircraft. Even if this characterisation of Japanese behaviour is something of an exaggeration, the very fact that it has entered the public domain underscores thфe fragility of bilateral relations. Similar incidents have occurred before, during previous exercises involving PLAN warships. In the area around the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands – which lie north of Taiwan, are controlled by Japan, and are claimed by China – such occurrences involving coastguard vessels from both sides are a regular occasion.
All this, let us reiterate, is superimposed on an overarching climate of mutual suspicion between East Asia’s two leading powers, where even outwardly routine aspects of military modernisation – to which both are entitled – become a source of concern. This was the case, for instance, when Japan’s Air Self‑Defence Force expanded its area of responsibility to include space. In practice, what happened was a mere transfer to one of the armed services of a unit that had previously operated within the Ministry of Defence. Nevertheless, it drew predictable negative attention from Beijing.
Overall, the transformation of the military‑political landscape in the Indo‑Pacific continues to tilt towards an increase in confrontational elements among the key players involved. This would seem to be an inevitable consequence of the transitional phase currently characterising the situation on the board of the ‘Great Game’.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on Asia‑Pacific affairs
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