New live-fire exercises conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) indicate that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) is actively incorporating experience gained during its “overseas military operation”.
Who Fired?
Chairman of State Affairs of the DPRK Kim Jong Un observed the test, highly praised the results, and “expressed great satisfaction with the application of important cutting-edge defence scientific technologies in practical weapons testing”. According to the DPRK leader, particular recognition should be given to the fact that “the fire-control system and the automated systems of all the launchers have been completely upgraded in accordance with the requirements of modern warfare, thereby increasing their applicability under combat conditions”. Kim Jong Un noted that the tactical cruise missiles are planned to be deployed with long-range artillery units along the southern border.
Kim reaffirmed that Pyongyang’s determination to strengthen both its nuclear and conventional armed forces remains unaltered, warning that its resolve to defend its military sovereignty and right to self-defence “will be expressed through even more decisive actions”.
The South Korean military confirmed the launches, stating that North Korea had fired various types of projectiles, including short-range missiles, projectiles from multiple rocket launcher systems, and possibly loitering munitions, commonly referred to as kamikaze drones.
The 26 May launches were the DPRK’s eighth missile test since the onset of the year 2026 and constituted part of a programme aimed at improving combat readiness and refining the operational use of new weapons systems. On 12 April, the destroyer Choe Hyon carried out test launches of strategic cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles over the Yellow Sea, observed by Kim Jong Un. On 19 April, North Korea launched a surface-to-surface ballistic missile during a test involving cluster munitions.
What Was It?
This “all-barrels” launch served several purposes. First, it allowed the armed forces to practise coordinated employment of a diverse range of weapons systems. As KCNA pinpointed, the exercise was “part of the plan to modernise the artillery and missile forces in order to achieve the five-year national defence development goals”.
Second, it tested the ability to overwhelm air-defence systems and conduct more sophisticated combined strikes.
Third, the fire-control and launcher automation systems were upgraded in line with the realities of modern warfare. In this way, Pyongyang is applying experience acquired while providing military assistance during combat operations in the Kursk Region under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between the Russian Federation and the DPRK.
General Information
The exercise involved relatively new developments: a “light multiple-purpose missile system” and an “extended-range tactical cruise missile system”.
As noted by Russian military analyst Vladimir Khrustalev, both new North Korean missile systems were first displayed during the parade marking the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea on 10 October 2025. However, while the purpose of the North Korean analogue of HIMARS was relatively clear from the outset, the role of the second system remained uncertain.
It has now emerged that the system is a “tactical cruise missile featuring terminal guidance based on artificial intelligence technology, combined with a precision self-guided navigation system and a terrain-matching navigation system,” which successfully delivered a precision strike against a target at a range of 100 kilometres (80 kilometres according to South Korean data).
Reaction of Opponents
The Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the statement which was naturally expected: “We have strengthened surveillance and monitoring in preparation for possible additional launches and are closely sharing relevant information with the United States and Japan while maintaining full readiness.”
The launches were linked by the RK experts to the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to the DPRK. This is a factual statement. Chinese leader Xi Jinping to Pyongyang from June 8-10, and it was indeed the first visit by a Chinese leader to Pyongyang since 2019. In this regard, the launch appears intended as a signal that North Korea continues to demonstrate its military capabilities and has no intention of abandoning its course of strengthening missile forces.
A form of response came in the shape of large-scale live-fire exercises conducted by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Korea on 28 May 2026, 25 kilometres from the DPRK border, under the supervision of Defence Minister Ahn Gyu-back. These were the first comprehensive live-fire exercises under the administration of President Lee Jae-myung.
The manoeuvres took place at the Seungjin Training Ground in the city of Pocheon, Gyeonggi Province. The exercises were open to the public and were observed by approximately 1,900 people, including 400 civilians selected through an open application process.
Around 1,400 service personnel from 27 units participated, with more than 450 pieces of equipment involved, including K2 tanks, Chunmoo multiple rocket launcher systems, K9 self-propelled howitzers, KF-21 fighter aircraft, and various types of unmanned aerial vehicles, including kamikaze drones and multi-legged robotic systems.
During the exercises, troops practised repelling enemy attacks, conducting reconnaissance using unmanned aerial vehicles, battlefield management through artificial intelligence systems, and carrying out combined strikes using ground-based, airborne, and unmanned weapons platforms.
Author’s Commentary
Experts often remark that “generals are always preparing for the war already bygone”, and in the case of North Korea, this image is frequently reinforced by the anachronistic uniform of many senior officers. However, it should be kept in mind that the DPRK leader was born in 1982 and obtained specialised military education. He closely follows developments in the ongoing revolution in military affairs, and it was not by chance that the proposal to assist in the liberation of the Kursk Region originated in Pyongyang rather than in Moscow.
The memorial complex constructed in Pyongyang in honour of those who succumbed to the “overseas military operation” contains 1,141 graves, while between 11,000 and 13,000 personnel reportedly took part in the operation. It is difficult to directly juxtapose these figures and other casualty rates, but in any case the KPA paid a significant price for this new experience.
That experience is now being actively examined, assimilated, and disseminated throughout the armed forces.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences
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