While North Korea appears to have enshrined the concept of two (albeit hostile) states in its constitution, the first signs of discussion on this matter have begun to appear in South Korea.
Discussions on naming the North
First of all, it is worth noting that the names of the Korean states differ. In the North, the ancient ethnonym ‘Choson’ is used, whereas in the South, ‘Taehan’ or ‘Han’guk’ – which designate Koreans as a nation – predominate. Accordingly, to refer to ‘the part of the peninsula occupied by a hostile entity,’ South Korea has traditionally used the term ‘Pukhan.’ This name does not simply mean ‘North Korea,’ but rather ‘the northern part of Han’guk,’ which underlines the provisions of Article 3 of the country’s Constitution: ‘The territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands.’ Article 4 adds, ‘The Republic of Korea seeks unification and formulates and carries out a policy of peaceful unification based on the principles of freedom and democracy.’
A similar approach was used in the North, where South Korea was designated as ‘Nam Choson’ – ‘the southern part of Choson’.
However, since the end of 2023, when the DPRK abandoned the unification paradigm, instead of ‘Nam Choson,’ the official self-designation of South Korea has been used to refer to it. This indicates recognition of the existence of two separate and hostile states on the Korean Peninsula.
During 2026, the Republic of Korea’s Minister of Unification, Chung Dong-young, repeatedly used the official name of North Korea in his speeches. It instigated a public discussion, one element of which was a conference entitled ‘Choosing a Name for Peaceful Coexistence: Pukhan or Choson?’, organised by the Korean Political Science Association with the ministry’s support.
Of course, the majority of participants in this orchestrated event argued that adopting the official name of North Korea would not jeopardise the South’s Constitution, which defines North Korea as part of South Korean territory and North Koreans as citizens of South Korea. As Professor Kim Sung-kyung of Sogang University stated, the name ‘Pukhan’ did not help unite the two Koreas; on the contrary, it helped entrench division, and therefore ‘it is high time to restore relations (by addressing each other by official names) now that the two Koreas have firmly established themselves as independent countries’.
Lee Dong-gi, a professor at Kangwon National University, went even further, arguing that ‘the two Koreas have begun to become different nations. In the long term, we may have to abandon unification or fundamentally reconsider what unification means. This step could help establish peace, and addressing North Korea by its official name could be a starting point.’
Cho Sung-ryul, a visiting professor at Kyungnam University, proposed a middle ground: using ‘Choson’ when dealing with the other country, and ‘Pukhan’ domestically.
However, not all experts argued that calling the North ‘Choson’ was appropriate. Park Won-gon, a professor of international studies at Ewha University, warned that adopting the terminology preferred by Pyongyang would be tantamount to recognising its hostile two-state concept. ‘This is the same as abandoning unification.’ The conservative opposition also condemned the public discussion of terminology, calling it unconstitutional and suggesting that the ministry’s leadership should be dismissed.
In the end, on 28 April, the Ministry of Unification stated that the question of terminology would not be decided unilaterally and ‘will be determined through public discussion via various channels’.
At the same time, it became known that South Korea intends to reinstate the position of advisor on unification and security affairs at its embassy in Russia. The post had remained vacant since February of the previous year, and was then completely abolished as part of state apparatus optimisation. The return of this post in Russia indicates that Moscow is once again being viewed as an important direction in the context of the North Korean agenda.
White Paper on Korean Unification: emphasis on peaceful coexistence of ‘two states’ with North Korea
On 18 May 2026, the Ministry of Unification presented its annual ‘White Paper on Unification,’ the content of which is radically different from previous editions. ‘Given the reality that the South and the North exist as two de facto states, the government of Lee Jae Myung will pursue a policy of ‘peaceful coexistence and mutual growth on the Korean Peninsula, abandoning pressure and confrontation’ in its foreign policy towards the DPRK, and wishes to see the inter-Korean military agreement of 19 September 2018 reactivated. To achieve this, as steps to ease military tension and restore trust, it plans to cease the sending of anti-Pyongyang leaflets into North Korea and halt loudspeaker broadcasts along the border.
Furthermore, the document sets out three key principles of inter-Korean relations: Seoul respects the North Korean system, does not seek unification through absorption, and does not take hostile actions towards the North.
In terms of the North Korean line of ‘two hostile states,’ the ministry emphasises the need to transition to ‘peaceful relations between two states’ aimed at achieving unification. This contradicts the traditional position that inter-Korean ties are a ‘special relationship’ that is formed in the process of pursuing unification, rather than a relationship between states.
The conservative reaction was predictable: this violates Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution. Conservative lawmaker Park Choong-kwon, a North Korean defector, called the White Paper ‘a declaration that completely violates the human rights of 26 million North Koreans’ and ‘an act of self-mutilation with a fatal outcome’. The leader of the People Power Party, Jang Dong-hyuk, wrote on his Facebook account that ‘Lee Jae-myung has trampled on the Constitution, destroyed national security, and abandoned peaceful unification’ and can no longer be considered President of the Republic of Korea.
The ministry rejected the criticism, stating that the ‘two states’ terminology ‘does not in any way mean recognition of North Korea as a legitimate state’ and merely underlines the need to pursue a unification policy based on recognising the fact that the two Koreas ‘effectively exist as two states’.
Author’s commentary
Of course, cross-recognition of the reality of two states at least reduces the risk of conflict on the peninsula. If each Korea regards the other as a hostile state, rather than as part of a divided country that must be reunified (and that means unification through absorption), the ontological reason for the Second Korean War disappears. Yes, such an existence would be peaceful only in a very loose sense, but its analogue would be the Cold War confrontation between the USSR and the US, which – despite the arms race, aggressive rhetoric, and occasional incidents – no one tried to escalate it into a hot phase. The risks of unacceptable damage from nuclear conflict were all too obvious.
In theory, the North and the South could sign an agreement similar to the 1972 ‘Basic Treaty’ between West and East Germany, whereby the parties recognised each other’s existence and even opened representative offices. However, when it comes to a populist regime, attention should be paid not to words, but to deeds. Military exercises continue; the ROK participates in drafting resolutions on human rights in the DPRK, and the argument of the North Korean threat is used to justify why Seoul needs nuclear-powered submarines.
We have repeatedly pointed out that there is no unified policy on inter-Korean relations. The Ministry of Unification pulls in one direction, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Advisor pull in another.
- It is not entirely clear to what extent all of the above is the position of the Blue House as a whole, rather than that faction of it associated with the Ministry of Unification. Without a presidential decision and nationwide support, all such steps are conditional.
- Neither is it entirely clear to what extent such statements are not actually a discussion of the North Korean issue, but rather the beginning of a new round of factional struggle. History often presents cases where disputes on religious or ideological topics merely mask ambitions for power.
- Furthermore, to recognise reality, the constitution needs to be changed. Meanwhile, for now, the phrase that Seoul ‘does not seek to absorb the DPRK and respects the political system in place in that country’ is grounds for impeachment and conviction on charges of treason, and if President Lee did not have a pliant parliament, such a scenario would be quite likely. But we recently wrote on the outcomes of the attempt to modify the constitution this year. The authorities refused even to alter the length of the presidential term, let alone make more fundamental changes.
Perhaps if the next elections result in the ‘pragmatics’ of Lee Jae Myung being replaced by a genuinely left-wing politician, something like this might happen. But for now, even if Minister Chung may honestly be pursuing his own line, at the state level this is merely idle talk.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences
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