While North Korea seems to have undergone constitutional changes, in South Korea attempts at substantial reform of the basic law have run into obstacles. Initially the main topic of the debate – the presidential term – was pushed into the background, and then parliamentary initiatives failed.
Since the presidency of Roh Moo-hyun, no former head of state has left office without scandal or legal problems.
After the impeachment of President Yoon Suk-yeol, the country saw intensified debate about curbing ‘imperial presidency’ and the need to modernise the system of presidential terms. The current president, Lee Jae Myung, and his conservative opponent have both spoken in favour of replacing the five-year term with two four-year terms. Lee Jae Myung’s proposals generally boiled down to the following:
- Introducing a four-year presidential term with the right to one re-election. This is intended to strengthen the head of state’s accountability and create a mechanism for a ‘mid-term assessment’ by citizens.
- A second round of presidential elections. Such a mechanism is designed to increase democratic legitimacy and reduce the level of public division.
- Appointment of the prime minister only on the proposal of parliament, with the president obliged to respect his powers.
- Mandatory parliamentary approval of candidates for key posts: heads of the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials, the prosecution service, the police, as well as the heads of telecommunications and human rights bodies.
- Limiting the presidential veto: prohibiting its use in cases concerning corruption by the president himself or his family.
- Tightening the procedure for declaring a state of emergency: mandatory prior notification to parliament. If the National Assembly rejects the declaration or fails to approve it within 48 hours, martial law shall be immediately lifted.
- Expanding citizens’ fundamental rights, including guarantees of safety, health, and access to information.
- Including in the Constitution references to key democratic movements in the country: the Gwangju Uprising of 18 May 1980 (a crucial event in the democratisation movement), the Busan-Masan protest of 1979 (which indirectly led to the assassination of Park Chung-hee), the protests of 6 June 1987 (which marked the end of the Fifth Republic), and the ‘Candlelight Revolution’ (the democratic operation that ousted Park Geun-hye). Including these events in the basic law is intended to emphasise the role of democratic forces as a pillar of statehood from the very beginnings of the Republic of Korea.
Lee emphasised that the changes would not apply to the incumbent president: the Constitution explicitly prohibits applying reform provisions to a head of state who is in power when it is adopted. As an optimal timeframe for holding a referendum on the new Constitution, he named the local elections of 2026 or, as a last resort, the parliamentary elections of 2028.
On 27 August 2025, in an interview to MBC Radio, the Speaker of the National Assembly, Woo Won-shik, stated that the first stage of a constitutional referendum, in which citizens would vote for introducing a four-year presidential term with the possibility of re-election for a second term, could take place in 2026 at the same time as the local elections scheduled for June. He particularly noted that the president has a clear understanding of this issue and enjoys popular support.
However, as the author expected, once the populist Lee Jae Myung became president, he had no intention of limiting his own powers, especially as until at least 2028 he would be working with ‘his own’ parliament, in which any law not requiring a two-thirds majority would be guaranteed to pass, no matter what his political opponents might try to do to delay it. On the other hand, promises made to the people had to be kept, especially since local elections would be held on 3 June 2026, and it would be logical to hold a referendum on amending the constitution at the same time.
On 10 March 2026, Woo Won-shik called on rival parties to form a special committee to ensure that a national referendum on constitutional revision be held alongside the upcoming local elections. Instead of a full revision of the Constitution, the Speaker proposed a ‘step-by-step constitutional reform’, in which the basic law would first be amended on points where the ruling and opposition parties could more easily reach consensus.
On 2 April, President Lee Jae Myung also came out in favour of gradually amending the Constitution, putting as the top-priority tightening the requirements for declaring martial law and incorporating the spirit of past democratic movements.
The primary focus was on changes to the preamble of the constitution, where the Democrats were trying to push through their own historical narrative by including the democratic uprisings of 1980 in Gwangju and the democratic protests of 1979 in Busan and Masan.
State reforms were reflected in only one point, concerning the procedure for declaring martial law. Now, in order to declare a state of emergency, the president must specifically notify parliament.
Thus, the essence of the amendments turned out to be far less comprehensive than experts and public opinion had assumed.
Instead of constructive dialogue, the Democratic Party resorted to moral pressure and simplistic, binary rhetoric. Lee Jae Myung, comparing the constitution to tight clothing, declared that opponents of preventing illegal martial law or strengthening parliamentary control were in fact supporting the practice. Such statements only stiffened the opposition’s resistance, which in turn considered a full revision of the constitution too complicated and politically disadvantageous.
The proposed compromise version of constitutional reform satisfied neither the supporters of radical change within the Democratic Party, nor the conservatives who accused Lee of failing to go back on his election promises. The opposition People Power Party also feared that holding a referendum at the same time as local elections would politicise the process and become a tool for electioneering.
Chronicles of a failed reform:
6 April 2026: The Cabinet of the Republic of Korea approved a proposal to introduce amendments. The bill, supported by 187 lawmakers from the ruling Democratic Party of Toburo and five small parties, failed to win approval from the opposition People Power Party.
Timeline and obstacles: For the referendum to be held simultaneously with the local elections on 3 June, the bill had to be approved by the National Assembly before 10 May. However, without the support of the opposition, the reform was doomed: passing amendments required at least two-thirds of the votes, and even with the Democrats dominating, they could not reach that threshold.
7 May 2026: The bill on constitutional amendments was rejected. Only 178 lawmakers took part in the vote, as the People Power Party boycotted the session, failing to provide for the necessary quorum of 191.
Escalation of conflict: The next day, the People Power Party threatened to initiate obstruction on all bills, regardless of their content, if the constitutional amendments were reintroduced. This effectively meant paralysing parliament’s work for an indefinite period.
Retreat: In the given situation, Woo Won-shik withdrew the amendments from the vote, stating that shutting down parliament was not worth this reform.
The Blue House expressed regret over the abandonment of constitutional reforms aimed at strengthening national security and democracy. In the administration’s opinion, it would be difficult for the public to understand why even minimal changes intended to protect these fundamental values had been rejected.
Although nearly 60% of respondents generally support revising the constitution, this reform now seems to be in jeopardy. The driving force behind the project remains the current Speaker of Parliament, Woo Won-shik, and the forces interested in change are still active.
The situation is complicated by President Lee’s forthcoming departure from active politics after the 2030 presidential election. After he successfully transformed the Democratic Party into his own political base, his retirement from public life will open the way for new factions to form. Leaders seeking to take his place will vie for influence. In this context, a split is likely to occur between pragmatists ready to support Lee’s course as a populist and genuine supporters of left-wing ideology seeking real changes in their favour.
It is not impossible that towards the end of his term, President Lee might consider amending the constitution in order to run for the presidency of the Sixth Republic, and then go on to become the first president of the Seventh. With a parliamentary majority and a consistently high approval rating, such a prospect is quite realistic. Even if the typical presidential fate awaits him, he might keep his campaign promises on reform so that his successor ends up in a weaker position relative to him.
As Korean studies expert and journalist Oleg Kiryanov notes, ‘South Korean politicians agree that the current constitution is outdated. However, because of their narrow, short-term interests, they cannot agree on a mechanism and timeline for changing it, missing yet another historic opportunity for meaningful change.’
Thus, despite the failure of the first attempt, one should patiently await the next opportunity for constitutional reform.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences
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