The Philippines is more of an object than a subject of the political processes unfolding in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, everything connected with this country, one way or another, is not only under close observation by leading regional players but also involves their participation to various extents.
The question of control over the Philippines is becoming acute once again
And today, as global political processes shift to the Indo-Pacific region, especially to the Southeast Asian subregion, the Philippines once again finds itself in the spotlight of current leading players. Moreover, it happens in a specific way: former enemies, the United States and Japan, are now Manila’s allies, while the United States and China have turned from former allies into, to put it mildly, opponents. Amidst renewed tensions in Japanese–Chinese relations, the military-political alliance between Tokyo and Washington retains its strategic significance. At the same time, the Philippines, as a sovereign state and a member of both the United Nations and the regional organisation ASEAN, is once again becoming the object of increased attention from key international actors. Their interest is focused on the domestic political processes taking place in the country.
Transformation of the domestic political situation in the Philippines
The rivalry among leading players for influence over the Philippines significantly shapes its current domestic political agenda, stimulating the struggle between political clans that view differently the country’s due positioning amid the deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia. In this regard, a landmark event was the formation in 2016 of the ‘Duterte clan’, which interrupted the undivided dominance of alternating pro-American political groups on the Philippines’ domestic political scene. This happened at a moment when the question of the country’s foreign policy orientation became acute once again.
It should be noted, however, that during the subsequent six-year period, President Rodrigo Duterte’s ‘new course’ was by no means anti-American or pro-Chinese. His government merely balanced between the two leading world powers, doing it in a skilful fashion. During this very period, Japan’s strengthening role became evident in the Philippines’ foreign policy positioning.
Nevertheless, neither Washington nor Tokyo was satisfied with Manila’s foreign policy balancing act; they expected the restoration of the Philippines’ former status as the de facto main anti-Chinese military-political base in Southeast Asia. And, in general, this was achieved in the summer of 2022, when, during the following general elections, a representative of the ‘Marcos clan,’ namely Ferdinand Marcos Jr., assumed the presidency. This happened mainly because R. Duterte could not run for a second consecutive term; otherwise, he would have won again.
But the outcome of these elections, which was positive for Beijing’s regional opponents, was considerably levelled off as R. Duterte’s daughter, Sara, ran for vice-president alongside F. Marcos Jr. And the differences over the very issue of foreign policy emerged almost immediately between the new president and vice-president, having become absolutely uncompromising after a year and a half. S. Duterte became the main obstacle to fulfilling the aforementioned expectations of Beijing’s opponents, for whom removing her from the Philippines’ political space acquired particular urgency. Not least because in the spring of 2028, the next general elections will take place, and based on their outcome, S. Duterte would with high probability become the new president.
However, in mid-May 2026, the country’s lower house of parliament, controlled by supporters of F. Marcos Jr., impeached her. And at the beginning of July, the upper house (the Senate) is set to begin an investigation into her on several charges at once. This means that S. Duterte’s very participation in the 2028 elections is now in grave doubt.
Let us recall that a similar attempt was made to remove her father from the Philippines’ political field. This refers to the operation carried out in March 2025 on the orders of the International Criminal Court – that is, one of the watchdogs of the globalist behind-the-scenes – during which R. Duterte was literally abducted at Manila airport and immediately (‘before the natives could come to their senses’) transferred to a prison in The Hague. Since then, the date of his trial has been up in the air. This is despite the fact that back in 2019, the Philippines had already withdrawn from the agreement establishing the ICC.
Nevertheless, it is too early for the enemies of the ‘Duterte clan’ to rest on their laurels. And not only because, unlike in the lower house of the Philippines’ parliament, at least half of the 24-seat Senate are supporters of both Dutertes. Already while being behind bars in The Hague, R. Duterte won a resounding victory in the mayoral election in his hometown, Davao. So the ‘human rights defenders’ of the ICC are keeping a lawfully elected mayor of one of the country’s largest cities – a country that falls beyond the jurisdiction of this institution – in prison.
Someone is trying to turn the global situation into a madhouse.
The Philippines in the scope of the main players
The worsening situation in Southeast Asia may play the role of one of the main catalysts of this process, and everything connected with the Philippines in one way or another will once again wind up at the centre of the agenda. The nature of these transformations in the Philippines and in Southeast Asia should by no means be reduced to the question of the ruling circles in Manila. Because the basis of the growing tension here is a much more significant factor: overlapping territorial claims in the waters of the South China Sea.
All the coastal countries have claims of the kind, but they manifest themselves most acutely in the relations between the Philippines and China. In 2016, another judicial body based in The Hague participated in the ‘resolution’ of the Philippine–Chinese territorial disputes. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that the Philippines’ territorial claim, which had lain in the safe of the Permanent Court of Arbitration for three years, coincided with R. Duterte’s assumption of the presidency. The PCA’s ruling, favourable to the Philippines, contained a message: ‘Go ahead! We are on your side.’
Let us pinpoint immediately that R. Duterte, of course, did not reject the aforementioned PCA ruling, but neither did he ‘go ahead.’ Like all other ASEAN member states, he shifted the ‘territorial question’ to the plane of long and difficult, but nevertheless, negotiations with the Chinese leadership. However, this was precisely his ‘guilt’ in the eyes of Beijing’s main regional opponents. All his current difficulties are significantly related to this fact. The current president, F. Marcos Jr., who adopted a ‘Help, we’re being robbed!’ rhetoric, proved very timely for Washington and Tokyo. They saw in him a perfect opportunity to provide assistance to ‘yet another victim of the growing Chinese aggression.’ In recent years, support from these two key opponents of China has indeed become more tangible.
In particular, during F. Marcos Jr.’s planned visit to Japan from 26 to 29 May, he will be received at the highest level.
It is important to note that the current leadership of the Philippines is demonstrating undeniable political acumen. In conditions of intense international competition, such a quality is critically important for the survival of politicians. It seems that Manila has detected the shift in the position of US President D. Trump regarding the Taiwan issue, which is key in relations with China, and has lowered the intensity of its rhetoric concerning a possible conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
Observing the rhetoric of less significant political players can sometimes reveal global trends.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on Asia-Pacific region issues
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