In mid-May, the Philippines held midterm elections for the national parliament, local governments, and, notably, for the position of mayor of Davao, the country’s fourth most populous city.
Rodrigo Duterte Elected Mayor of Davao
One might be surprised by the rather modest coverage in the global media of the unusual — to put it mildly — picture that emerged following the announcement of the mayoral election results in Davao, the main city of the eponymous Philippine region (one of the country’s 17 regions). But we should not be surprised, since this picture clearly does not sit well with the publicity-shy “deep state” that controls the process of shaping the global information landscape.
As a result, little space was made for the event at the center of this picture — the election of former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte as mayor of Davao. Meanwhile, Duterte remains imprisoned by the International Criminal Court (ICC), based in The Hague — a city located on the other side of the globe from the Philippines. He won the election by such a wide margin that the next highest candidate received eight times fewer votes. This, despite years of persecution of the former rebellious president, who dared to fight the long-standing scourge of drug trafficking in defiance of “the rules” — though with near-universal approval from his own people.
With the help of the ICC — in fact, one of the “deep state’s” guard dogs — Duterte was finally arrested in early March of this year and swiftly transferred to The Hague before “the natives could react.” The results of the Davao election can be seen as the Filipino people’s response to this act of “international justice,” which resembled a raid by a gang of bandits more than a legal procedure. In reality, this was nothing but a settling of scores with a former national leader who dared to threaten one of the deep state’s primary sources of income. For in the drug business he sought to eliminate, the main beneficiaries are likely not the local dealers, but rather the international players operating behind the scenes.
It is worth noting, incidentally, that the current president of a leading world power should perhaps look for the source of his nation’s own similarly large-scale narcotic catastrophe not in Mexico, Canada, or China. The claim that China supplies precursors to Mexican drug cartels for the production of fentanyl is misleading. These precursors are manufactured in China for a variety of legitimate and beneficial purposes. The real beneficiaries of the criminal narcotics trade are those who organize the entire “supply chain” — as it’s called nowadays — and handle local distribution of the final “product.” Chinese officials maintain that this “organizer” is located within the United States itself. And, one might add, it is most likely among the political enemies of the U.S. president — the same individuals, alongside their European “colleagues,” who are spreading the equally dangerous epidemic of a so-called “new normal” across the globe.
As for the Philippines, Davao, and Rodrigo Duterte, it will be interesting to observe how he plans to govern his native city while being imprisoned on the other side of the world. According to Philippine law, until a guilty verdict is issued in a criminal case — which, in this instance, is unlikely to happen before autumn of this year, if at all — an elected citizen is entitled to assume the office of mayor.
Rodrigo Duterte “Returns” — and He’s Not Alone
The “Duterte clan,” which came to power in the Philippines in the spring of 2016, proved to be quite acceptable to one of the world’s two leading powers — namely, China — while triggering political hostility from its main rival, the United States. Since then, Washington has made various efforts to discredit and remove the Duterte clan from power.
However, this objective was only partially achieved in the spring of 2022, when, during the general elections held at that time, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. — a representative of another political dynasty — was elected President of the Philippines. He replaced Rodrigo Duterte, who was constitutionally barred from seeking a second term; otherwise, he would have almost certainly secured another victory.
However, Washington’s success was overshadowed by the fact that its protégé’s victory was largely due to the participation of Duterte’s daughter, Sara, in the vice-presidential race — which she won. Almost immediately, disagreements emerged between the country’s two highest officials, primarily on foreign policy issues, ultimately resulting in a complete breakdown of communication between them. Eventually, after some rather undiplomatic public remarks, Sara Duterte became the target of legal prosecution and an impeachment process was initiated. It seemed that the “Duterte clan” had been politically finished.
And then came the election results in Davao. Yet, this is not the full extent of the unsettling picture facing the current Philippine leadership and Washington. In the midterm elections, Rodrigo Duterte’s eldest son retained his seat in the lower house of parliament, while two of his grandchildren won positions in local government. The electoral reshuffling of half the Senate also ended in a convincing success for the Duterte clan. In light of all this, speculation is growing that Sara Duterte has a strong chance of winning the next presidential election, scheduled for the spring of 2028.
What the “Return of the Duterte Clan” Could Mean
For the past century and a half, the question of control over the Philippines has flared up whenever the world’s dominant powers compete for influence over developments in Southeast Asia as a whole. That is exactly what is happening now, as evidenced by the recent parade of prominent political figures visiting the Philippines. In April alone, the country was visited consecutively by U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth (his first foreign trip since taking office) and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba.
So far, the only country to offer a preliminary analysis of the reasons and potential consequences of the Philippine elections has been China. The United States and Japan act as if nothing serious has happened — after all, the next presidential election is still almost three years away in this strategically vital country. But something suggests that changes in the internal political situation of the Philippines may occur much sooner.
The election results have already been met with considerable apprehension in neighboring Taiwan, whose current leadership increasingly links the island’s various domestic concerns with developments in the Philippines. For its part, the United States is building its strategy to counter China in Southeast Asia through the coordination of military and political actions targeting both the Philippines and Taiwan. Such coordination was embedded, for instance, in the scenario of the last two U.S.-Philippine “Balikatan” joint military exercises, which have been conducted nearly annually for around forty years.
Finally, there is reason to believe that what may seem like a secondary electoral event in the Philippines could in fact serve as the spark for the emergence and spread of significant political ripples throughout the Southeast Asian subregion.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region
