While South Korea is preoccupied with the safety of its citizens, the impact of the conflict on fuel supplies, and changes in the Seoul-Washington alliance, North Korea has expressed uncompromising political and diplomatic support for Tehran.

The DPRK’s Stance: “A Vicious Bandit-Like Attack!”
However, the author believes that North Korea is closely monitoring the development of the situation. The scenario of American actions in this war resembles the core strategy planned against the DPRK since the beginning of the 21st century. It also points to the general US approach to waging wars with maximum gain and minimal risk.
This refers to a “decapitation strike” with the bet on the air superiority against the country’s top leadership, critical infrastructure, military industry, and military units capable of putting up resistance. Although North Korean defence and the extent to which it is prepared for such attacks surpass those of Iran, it is critically significant for Pyongyang to put this real-world experiment under analysis in order to devise additional measures to strengthen its defensive capabilities.
The South China Morning Post also noted that against the backdrop of the conflict, Iran and North Korea are “quite likely” to resume cooperation in missile and nuclear armaments, based on their shared hostility towards Washington and many years of military partnership.
Pyongyang’s Harsh Rhetoric
On the political and diplomatic level, North Korea has stuck to a firm pro-Iranian stance, mincing no words. On 1st March 2026, a spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry of North Korea referred to the invasion as a “vicious bandit-like attack,” “from start to finish an illegal act of aggression and the most repugnant form of encroachment on sovereignty.” On 11th March, Pyongyang reiterated its “concern over the aggressive actions of the US and Israel, which, by committing an illegal military attack on Iran, are destroying the foundation of peace and security in the region and exacerbating instability on an international scale.” Support was expressed for Iran’s new leader.
The Position of the Republic of Korea: Concern and Evacuation
The standpoint of South Korea in the current situation is characterised by duality. On the one hand, the South Korean government refrained from making direct statements in approval of the invasion. On the other hand, there were no overt attempts to openly condemn the step, including those from left-wing non-governmental organisations.
On 28th February 2026, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea called on all the belligerents to exert maximum effort to de-escalate tension in the region. There was also an emergency response group formed under the leadership of the Prime Minister to address the emerging issues in a comprehensive way.
On 2nd March, South Korea conveyed “deep concern” over the situation in the Middle East while simultaneously emphasising its readiness to participate in efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue.
However, the incident with a banner on the outer wall of the Iranian embassy in Seoul, depicting the slain Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and bearing the English inscription “When will the world hold war criminals accountable?”, provoked a mixed reaction. South Korean media ran headlines condemning such calls, for example, “Calls for war should not be heard on the streets of Seoul.” Newspapers noted that while Iran’s desire to draw the attention of the international community to injustice is entirely understandable, the chosen method goes beyond the realms of conventional diplomacy and puts the host country in an awkward situation.
Such a strategy opted for by Iran may be attributed to three factors:
– A reluctance to unnecessarily provoke Donald Trump.
– Certain military and political arrangements with the UAE, including the military presence of South Korean special forces units in the Emirates.
– A desire to avoid souring relations with Iran as an important oil exporter and partner in other spheres.
It was mainly in right-wing media such as The Korea Times where there appeared newspaper articles with an anti-Iranian slant, containing quotes such as “This is a vivid example of what happens when a regime constantly tests international boundaries and assumes that it will never take its toll on it … But wholesale defiance narrows diplomatic space. Strategic patience eventually runs out.”
Thus, Seoul’s interests and concerns have focused on several key areas. First and foremost, the focus has been put on ensuring the safety and timely evacuation of all the South Korean citizens residing in Iran and the Middle East. Given Iran’s strikes on the territories of US allies, the geography of the conflict has proven quite extensive, thereby increasing risks for the country’s citizens.
Evacuation of South Korean Citizens and its Aftermath Amidst the Middle East Conflict
Media in the Republic of Korea (ROK) is actively covering the evacuation of the South Korean citizens from the conflict zone in the Middle East. At the onset of the escalation, there were approximately 21,000 South Koreans in the region. The evacuation is proceeding in an organised and smooth manner, facilitated both by moving people out through neighbouring countries (including Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Egypt) and by using charter flights.
Defence Minister Ahn Gyu-back urged the military to maintain readiness to act in case the situation worsened. In general, the evacuation via charter flights is proceeding smoothly, without visible problems or public criticism. Against this backdrop, President Lee’s approval rating has shown a significant increase, reaching its highest level since he took office. According to polls, 66% of South Koreans positively assess Lee Jae Myung’s performance as head of state.
Economic Challenges for South Korea
One of the key problems arising from the conflict is ensuring the security of fuel supplies to South Korea. A significant portion of imported fuel comes from the region affected by the hostilities. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on tankers belonging to the allies of the US have already triggered a sharp rise in fuel prices. In response, the government is taking dual measures: on the one hand, applying pressure on businesses to keep prices down; on the other, considering the use of strategic fuel reserves.
The situation is widely discussed in the Chinese media. Article headlines, such as “In the US-Iran War, Japan and South Korea May Be the First to Succumb,” reflect concerns about potential consequences. A prolonged blockade of the Strait of Hormuz could be seriously detrimental to Seoul and Tokyo, especially considering that earlier, under US pressure, they imposed sanctions on Russia, hence limiting their import routes. A further factor exacerbating the situation is Russia’s announcement that it will cease oil sales to “unfriendly” countries.
The South Korean government has pledged to control prices on essential goods and impose sanctions on companies that raise them unjustifiably. From midnight on 13th March, the country introduced a temporary price cap on petroleum products. Additionally, the government is planning to release 22.46 million barrels of oil from its strategic reserves.
The invasion triggered panic in South Korea’s financial market: the KOSPI index plummeted from 6,165.15 to 5,791.91 points. This drop of 452.22 points (7.24%) broke the record.
Overall, the crisis has negatively affected the country’s economy. However, the real extent of the damage will hinge on the duration and intensity of the conflict. There is a risk of a fuel blockade, as all petroleum products destined for the Republic of Korea are transported by sea.
South Korea’s Defence Industry: Success of “Cheongung-II” Strengthens Position in the Global Market
The recent case of a successful interception of an Iranian ballistic missile by the South Korean medium-range air defence system “Cheongung-II” in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has stirred the waters and sparked a vivid reaction in both South Korean and international media.
According to reports, Cheongung-II missiles were actively used to repel Iranian attacks on American military facilities within the UAE. Approximately 60 missiles were launched, demonstrating an impressive interception effectiveness of 96% against aerial targets. The case marked the system’s first real-world combat use.
The successful “baptism by fire” of the system prompted the UAE authorities to request that South Korea expedite the delivery of the medium-range surface-to-air missile systems stipulated in the 2022 export contract. However, Seoul responded to this request with restraint, likely due to existing contractual obligations to other clients.
Nevertheless, in South Korea, it is believed that the successful use of the Cheongung-II air defence system amidst the Middle East crisis could serve as a powerful incentive for expanding the country’s share in the global arms market and attract new export contracts. In this regard, analysts in their articles have started underlining that Cheongung is not merely a technical achievement, but it is also a symbol of South Korea’s transformation into a reliable supplier of advanced defence technologies on the global stage.
What should be particularly pinpointed is the impact of current events on military cooperation between South Korea and the US. This aspect requires more detailed examination, as it encompasses both the redeployment of American missile defence systems to the Middle East and South Korea’s possible participation in operations to “ensure security of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.” These important matters will be addressed in a separate article.
In conclusion, it is worth quoting an editorial in one of the major newspapers, which accurately reflects the current geopolitical reality: “The strike by the United States and Israel, which brought an end to the 37-year rule of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, confirmed a harsh reality: the international system is increasingly defined by force, not by rules.”
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences
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