The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) continues to frequently use the term “rules-based international order” in its official publications.
Origins of the Term
“Rules-based order” is often associated with the liberal theory of international relations, the core idea of which is that it is more beneficial for countries to cooperate with each other than to quarrel. Cooperation between states should be realized through multilateral international institutions that establish rules and oversee their implementation.
The practical implementation of such an order is associated with the creation and work of the League of Nations; the term’s use became relevant after the end of World War II and the establishment of the UN. Since then, the term has been most frequently encountered in the political lexicon of American and European politicians.
Japan also adopted it, benefiting from adhering to these principles. The country needed to restore its reputation and credibility after WW2, which was facilitated by maintaining an image of a “law-abiding” country that adheres to international rules.
However, in recent years, the world has changed, the United States has moved away from its support for the liberal international order, and players who have used the term “rules-based international order” have not always articulated the semantic and ideological aspects underlying it, and if they do, they often invest the concept with different meanings.
What, then, does Japan mean by “rules-based order” today?
Japan’s Use of the Term: Theory and Practice
In the 21st century, the Japanese MOFA’s use of “rules-based order” often refers not to the global but to the regional order, particularly international relations in the Indo-Pacific region. The first steps toward this can be seen in 2006, when Prime Minister Aso Taro announced Japan’s desire to create an “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”— an area stretching from Europe to India, Southeast Asia, and Japan — that embraces market economies, democracy, and respect for the rule of law and fundamental human rights. However, the formation of the current policy is associated with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
In 2014, Shinzo Abe outlined three principles of the “rule of law” at sea: states must advance and explain their claims based on international law; they must not use force or coercion to enforce their claims; and they must seek to resolve disputes peacefully.
Currently, the term “rules-based order” is closely associated with the MOFA’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) concept. It envisions expanding and strengthening Japan’s ties with countries in the region, facilitating the transformation of the Indo-Pacific into a secure, free-trade, and prosperous region where the “rule of law” is valued.
Interestingly, Japan’s understanding of “rule-based order” no longer emphasizes market economics, democracy, and human rights. Japan sought to adapt to different countries with diverse political and economic systems, and “rules” ceased to apply to the internal affairs of states, only to their foreign policy.
At the same time, even from Abe’s 2014 principles of “rule of law” at sea, it is clear that the term we are considering is beginning to be used to criticize China’s actions. It is quite possible that the proclamation of the 2014 maritime concept was a response to the conflicts between Japan and China in 2010-2014 related to the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, which we have previously written about.
Although Japan initially voiced the FOIP idea more cautiously, emphasizing its open opposition to the creation of an “Asian version of NATO” through the FOIP aimed at countering China, later, with the deterioration of US-China relations, interpretations here too began to shift. While the concept does not explicitly imply containment of China, certain statements by Japan at meetings with countries supporting the FOIP hint at this.
For example, at the 2021 Japan-US-India-Australia Summit, Japanese Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide expressed opposition to China’s attempts to unilaterally change the status quo in the East China and South China Seas, noting that China’s Coast Guard Law contained problematic provisions from an international law perspective. Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba openly proclaimed the idea of creating an “Asian NATO” (probably aimed against China), and also entered into a less-than-favorable agreement with Trump in September 2025 in order to improve relations between the countries.
In November 2025, Arfiya Eri, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, participated in the 4th Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum of the EU, where she reaffirmed Japan’s high regard for the EU’s commitment to the FOIP concept and security in the region. She also confirmed that Japan would continue to promote the FOIP and outlined the countries with which Japan intends to strengthen alliances to achieve this goal: the EU, Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, ASEAN, and South Asian countries, as well as Pacific Island states (China was not included).
Slightly earlier, at the 28th ASEAN-Japan Summit on October 26, 2025, Sanae Takaichi announced Japan’s readiness to strengthen not only economic and technological cooperation with ASEAN countries but also to establish national security ties by providing defense equipment to willing partners.
Furthermore, the geographic scope of Japan’s application of the “rules-based order” has recently become more blurred. In the 2010s, it narrowed to the Indo-Pacific region. However, Japan’s 2025 Blue Book on Diplomacy states that to maintain a free and open international order based on the rule of law, Japan is crucial to cooperate with countries in the “Global South,” significantly expanding the geography of the term. Furthermore, Japan accused Russia of violating international law when the special military operation began. However, when the US kidnapped Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, Japan made no mention of violating the “rules-based order.” This means that sometimes this order extends to countries outside the Indo-Pacific region, and sometimes it does not, at the discretion of the Japanese MOFA.
Perceptions of the “Rules-Based Order” by Other Political Actors
In Japan itself, experts and the public have disagreed on the meaning of the “rules-based order.” Which rules should Japan and other countries follow? Which should it support or condemn? What kind of world order should it promote? The instability in the Japanese Diet in the 2020s can likely be explained in part by these disputes.
Analysts in China criticize Japan’s use of the term on the grounds that it creates a regionally limited order for the benefit of these countries (and against China). The Chinese Foreign Ministry uses the term “international law” itself to criticize the United States and Japan, claiming that these countries violate it.
ASEAN also has its own interpretation of the “rules-based order,” outlined in the 2019 publication “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.” The core ideas are similar to Japan’s FOIP, but the emphasis is on a rules-based architecture necessary for economic cooperation and peacekeeping, specifically within ASEAN countries.
Conclusions
Despite recent global events, Japan continues to adhere to the idea of a “rules-based international order.” However, the meaning of this term is becoming blurred. Its intended meaning and the geographic scope of its application are becoming less clear.
This ambiguity was intentionally introduced to attract greater support among partner countries. At the same time, the flexibility of this term can also be a drawback. Political actors interpret the term as they see fit, which makes political statements less transparent, and the concept itself is no longer taken seriously.
Daniil Romanenko, a Japanologist researcher from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences
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