The analysis of Seoul’s actions leads to the conclusion that expectations for the improvement in Russia-South Korea relations under President Lee Jae-myung have not materialised. The reason for such a situation is not the external factors related to the US policy, but rather the deliberate course of the new South Korean leadership.
Glorifying Nazism? South Korea is In!
The UN General Assembly resolution condemning the glorification of Nazism was supported by 114 countries, with 11 abstaining and 52 states having voted against, including Ukraine, Moldova, and the Baltic states. South Korea also voted against the resolution—a symptomatic move for a nation that, were it not for the Soviet Army, might have lost its national identity.
South Korea does not vote for Russian-sponsored resolutions of this type. However, while under previous Democratic presidents, Seoul abstained, and under the “globalist” Yoon Suk Yeol, a vote against was meant to demonstrate South Korea’s affiliation with the collective West, explaining such “pragmatic diplomacy” by the Lee Jae-myung government is an interesting question. Nothing prevented Singapore and other countries, even more allied with the West, from supporting the resolution.
Russia’s Competitor in the Arms Market
South Korea’s policy in arms trade, including with European allies of Ukraine, continues to develop. Poland is a key importer, meaning South Korean tanks are approaching the border with the Kaliningrad region.
As noted by Alexandra Zueva, an expert at the Institute of World Military Economics and Strategy at the Higher School of Economics, South Korea seeks to present its military-technical cooperation with the West as purely business relations, posing no threat to Russia. However, the reality is different. By 2030, the Republic of Korea plans to become the world’s fourth-largest player in the arms market. To achieve this goal, South Korea intends to overtake Russia and strengthen its positions in both Asian and European markets. Moreover, as part of this strategy, South Korea plans to create a production hub in Eastern Europe, making use of local factories to manufacture its weapons, as its own capacities are already booked with orders three years in advance.
This presents a dilemma: if Lee Jae-myung adheres to a pragmatic approach, what would be more beneficial for Seoul? Cooperation with Russia under a hypothetical return to the pre-Special Military Operation situation, as hoped for by Russia’s supporters? Or expanding exports of South Korean weaponry to new markets where conflict serves as a “bogeyman,” stimulating demand for items like the K-2 tank?
Anti-Russian Propaganda in State Media
On December 5, South Korean media, citing materials in Ukrainian newspapers, published a story about Kateryna Rashevska, a legal expert at the Ukrainian Regional Center for Human Rights. Speaking at a US Congressional subcommittee, she claimed that, according to her information, at least two Ukrainian children had been abducted by Russian forces in Ukraine and forcibly sent to a camp in North Korea. It was reported that at this camp, children were taught to fight “Japanese militarists” and were introduced to Korean veterans involved in the 1968 attack on the American ship USS Pueblo, which resulted in nine US servicemen killed and wounded.
However, it turned out that the presented evidence amounted to photographs of a trip by Russian children to the North Korean children’s camp “Songdowon” (the North Korean counterpart of “Artek”) in the summer of 2025.
The author closely watches such publications. It is one thing when a major private newspaper reprints materials from international agencies like Reuters or AP which are known to be of anti-Russian orientation. But it is an absolutely different thing when a government agency independently publishes such materials. The jury is still out on whether this is an isolated incident or the start of a new trend.
And the Main Point
On December 3, 2025, President Lee addressed journalists on the anniversary of the attempts to impose martial law. South Korean media mainly wrote about the president’s readiness to compromise on the long-disputed issue of South Korea-US joint military exercises, stating that Seoul could discuss their reduction if necessary to facilitate the resumption of US-North Korea talks, or that “Seoul does not intend to go beyond a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula” (in Lee’s view, issues like uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, and the potential acquisition of nuclear submarines do not violate non-proliferation norms as they are not related to nuclear weapons development). But what is particularly important for us is what he said about Moscow-Seoul relations, raising the Russian topic for the first time since his election.
Lee Jae-myung outlined the Republic of Korea’s position regarding Russia, stating: “In connection with international sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation due to its illegal invasion of Ukraine and violation of international law, the Republic of Korea has also joined them. We sincerely hope for the earliest possible end to the war between Russia and Ukraine, based on humanitarian considerations and the desire for peace on the planet. We also express concern about the development of relations between Russia and North Korea, which, from our point of view, is moving in an extremely undesirable direction. The Republic of Korea will make constant efforts to improve relations with Russia and maintain dialogue. IN case of the corresponding need and readiness, we are open to holding a meeting, but under current conditions, this appears very difficult.”
To overcome the current impasse, continuous efforts towards de-escalation and the restoration of communication channels are required. Seoul intends to “work to prevent further deterioration of the situation and seek opportunities to improve relations wherever possible.” However, against the backdrop of the facts stated above, this statement may be perceived as a formal promise, akin to the phrase “we will call you back” at the end of a job interview.
Thus, Lee Jae-myung essentially confirmed the significance of Russian-South Korean relations for Seoul but simultaneously emphasised that dialogue with Moscow would be limited until the Ukrainian conflict is settled. This suggests a low probability of both revising sanctions policy and the return of South Korean companies to the Russian market. Predictions about the end of sanctions pressure after the conclusion of the Special Military Operation may prove erroneous, as the end of the campaign on Russia’s terms would most likely provoke a new round of restrictive measures.
Reasons?
According to some Russian scholars and experts, Lee Jae-myung has no personal opinion on Russia, at least because, unlike other politicians, he has had no involvement with the Russian agenda. The president focuses on domestic policy, while foreign policy has been delegated to the apparatus, which is oriented not so much even towards America as towards Europe, because Europe, as noted above, is a very promising market for military-technical cooperation. In this regard, Lee’s policy is no different from Yoon’s.
The former ambassador to Russia, now National Security Advisor Wi Sung Lac, was ambassador under conservatives and was no particular friend of Russia (the ambassador to the Russian Federation is often a nomenclatural position). Furthermore, he is not part of Lee’s inner circle.
Although Lee Jae-myung’s victory led to an end to open criticism of Russia in the context of the Special Military Operation, contrary to the periodic diplomatic spats under Yoon Suk Yeol, this is the only noticeable improvement. No phone call between the leaders occurred. No special envoy was sent to Russia, despite such missions being carried out to at least 15 other countries, including Poland.
Journalist and orientalist Oleg Kiryanov underlines Lee Jae-myung seeking ways to get closer to China and Japan, but relations with Russia have entered a period of “great hibernation.”
Nevertheless, if Seoul continues to demonstrate its unwavering orientation towards the United States and unwillingness to change its political course, this may prompt Moscow to reconsider its stances.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences
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