Trump claims to want to settle thirty years of disputes with Russia. Is this possible? What would it take? Is the West willing to actually reach the accommodations and agreements necessary for this?
In analyzing President Trump’s 28-point plan for a peaceful settlement in Ukraine, I draw attention to Point No. 2: “A comprehensive non-aggression agreement will be concluded between Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. All ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered settled.”
What does it mean to settle issues from the last 30 years? Is the West truly willing to undertake such a thing?
I can propose a very simple, succinct, concise, and precise suggestion for how to settle issues from the last 30 years and to resolve ambiguities.
1. No further expansion of NATO, anywhere, unless NATO decides to invite Morocco to join as part of a “southward expansion” of an alliance that long since violated the promises against eastward expansion. But one would wonder why Morocco, which has very few geopolitical rivals or threats, would want to sign up to join NATO and obligate itself by treaty to participate in NATO provocations across the Mediterranean. Perhaps the clarification should be “no further expansion of NATO into any territory that was ever part of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union.” Unfortunately, the Baltic States are already in NATO, and Finland recently joined NATO, so that issue is not easily resolved, so that is the hand we are locked in to playing at the table, thanks to prior administrations, unless the US undertakes something as bold as quitting NATO or inviting Russia into NATO (either idea would have its own unique merits).
2. Recognition of Russian primacy as the principal and primary geopolitical area with a sphere of influence in the territory of the former Russian Empire and Soviet Union, specifically as regards the Caucasus and Central Asia. This means Russia is the primary guarantor of security within this zone or sphere.
3. Recognition of Russia as a civilizational state, worthy of respect, dignity, and acceptance in a community of nations of great powers, to be taken seriously and whose concerns are to be respected and given proper consideration due and befitting a nation of such great power status.
4. Acceptance of Russia as the Eurasian civilizational state representing a synthesis of West and East in a unique civilization that is fundamentally, in ideological conception, Greco-Roman and Byzantine, without the baggage of the muddled ideas of the modern Western Enlightenment that led directly to the metaphysical collapse of Western/Anglo civilization and the rise of modern Western liberal democracy with the technocrat state as savior in place of God and manufactured consensus in place of tradition.
5. End all attempts at subversion of Russia, Belarus, and other former Soviet republics. This means the US should withdraw all support for American-based NGOs and think tanks, which are really just quasi-government entities and fronts for the CIA, as those entities aim to destabilize and promote color revolutions. The USA should also direct its intelligence forces to share intelligence with their Russian counterparts to help disrupt the activities of Euro-based NGOs and think tanks that seek to destabilize Russia. An American-Russian détente is possible, but it is unlikely the Euros will match this détente, as the technocrats in Brussels likely lack the moral authority and intellectual integrity to admit their ship is sinking due to their stewardship at the helm, and they will try to cling to their Russophobia and derail an American-Russian détente, by fanning the flames of subversion and angling for a 2014 Maidan insurrection to occur in Minsk or Moscow. Russian intelligence and security forces are exceptionally skilled and competent at their task of safeguarding Russian society, but to the extent they want or request American assistance, the US should help foil the efforts of Euro based NGOs that seek to destabilize Russia or spread chaos in the former Soviet Union.
6. The US should formally recognize Russian territorial sovereignty over Crimea and the oblasts of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia. If nothing else, this reflects the reality of the military situation on the ground.
7. To avert likely future hotspots, most or all of Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts should be ceded to Russia in recognition of the ethnic and linguistic realities of those oblasts. Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts should also be ceded (in whole or substantial part). This would be done in recognition of the historic, linguistic, and ethnic factors present in those oblasts, as well as providing a coherent land corridor through to Transnistria.
8. The US should recognize the right of Transnistria to join Russia and should accommodate this by formally recognizing Transnistria as part of Russia. Moldova should be partitioned between Russia and Romania. Although I don’t claim to know what the precise shape of that partition should be.
9. Ukraine’s armed forces should be limited to a maximum of 200,000 active personnel, of which no more than 100,000 can be army/ground forces, naval infantry, or VDV forces. The rest have to be in the air force, air defense forces, coast guard, navy, and national police. National police cannot possess or utilize weapons larger than caliber 7.62 mm and cannot possess armed drones or armored/armed military or paramilitary vehicles but may possess civilian vehicles with ballistic protection as police patrol cars. Reserves cannot exceed 100,000 in total number of armed/trained/ready reservists, and the reservists must serve for at least 10 years before being discharged from reserve status. Discharged reservists may not keep their service rifles or any individual kit beyond their boots, uniform, medals, and service knife—no firearms, no grenades, no body armor, and no optical or communications devices.
Whether Belarus or any former Soviet republic wishes to unify into the Russian Federation, I leave that to the discretion of Russia and the former Soviet republics to resolve among themselves. It is their business, and I leave them to it.
Based on my understanding of Russia’s perception of their own interests and what I calculate to be their interests (there is strong alignment between Russia’s perception of their own interests and their objective interests as they actually are, contrasted with the US, where elite perception of American interests is wildly disconnected from the objective reality of actual American interests), there is very little in the crucial core interests of Russia that the USA cannot accommodate or work around.
It is entirely possible to respect core Russian national interests and a Russian sphere of influence in its historical frontier regions, while upholding actual American interests, as opposed to imagined or hallucinated American interests. For instance, America has no actual core national interests in Georgia, which I must clarify before CNN insists I advocated surrendering Atlanta to the Russians; I am not referring to Georgia the state in the USA but obviously Georgia, capital Tbilisi, former Soviet Republic.
Whatever course of action Russia, Belarus, and the other former Soviet Republics embark upon, the US should, unconditionally, lift all sanctions against Belarus and Russia as well as state entities and nationals within those two nations. It isn’t plausible to pursue productive relations and maintain peace while maintaining sanctions against governments, entire nations, state media, prominent intellectuals, and significant businessmen.
Sanctions are not consistent with fostering cooperation and joint collaborative efforts for mutual economic and cultural benefit. Let us not lose sight of the fact that many sanctions are clearly for purely philosophical, academic, and ideological reasons. The sanctions on Aleksandr Dugin speak for themselves, as Professor Dugin is not a businessman, not a politician, and not involved in any military or economic activity of any sort, let alone activities that could be considered hostile or threatening to the USA.
What is it about the views articulated by Professor Dugin that the West finds so offensive? It seems the West really does not understand Russia, or they only understand Russia through the framework of their own corrupted lens, which is not able to accurately discern and analyze reality. Although Plato reasoned in the Theaetetus that sensory perception is not the manner by which we obtain true knowledge, the West has long since turned its back on Plato and, in a sense, even turned its back on the sophistry and epistemic relativism of Protagoras, since the West now demands its subjects deny what they see and hear, which is the final, most essential command of the party.
As a metaphysical realist who also believes in political realism, there will likely be numerous points on which Professor Dugin and I agree, which I shall briefly touch on as I round out this article.
The cause of most problems between the West and Russia
Russia, from a perspective of civilization, is a synthesis between West and East, which has resulted in the formation of the modern Eurasian civilizational state. This is neither fully Western nor fully Eastern, but something akin to Alexander’s Hellenistic Empire, which was a fusion of Greek and Persian culture. In this instance Russia is the faithful steward of the ideas of Greece, Rome, and Byzantium, as they call themselves Third Rome, Moscow Third Rome, which is a well-earned and deserved title.
Fundamentally, the bulk of the problems between the West and Russia arise due to the West not understanding how to interact with Russia, as Russia either remains a mystery to much of the West, or when the West does start to figure Russia out, they refuse to treat Russia as Russia ought to be treated. It is sort of like not knowing your neighbor, his name, his job, or anything about him, and as you begin to figure these things out, you talk down to him and act better than him. The West gains very little by frequently disrespecting Russia, yet it still insists on perpetrating such disrespect.
Instead of a historic and great power, they see Russia as perhaps the Qing dynasty of the mid- to late 19th century, a weak shell of a former great power capable of being dictated to with the imposition of unequal treaties of humiliation. Whether or not this supposed modern Russian national weakness is the case, which I don’t think it is, it ignores certain political realities about how nations deal with each other on the world stage. It isn’t conducive for international relations for a hegemon to intrude into an area where it has no crucial interests and is putting the crucial interests of the main regional great power at risk.
American gains in Eastern Europe are irrelevant to core American national interests. It would be prudent and practical for us to recognize our Russian partners, sitting at the crossroads between the West and the East, are uniquely positioned as the primary guarantor of security in their main region. This region is Eurasia, or in this instance Eastern Europe, the Black Sea, Central Asia, and the Russian region of the Pacific. As to the Arctic, the Arctic powers would cooperate, collaborate, and participate in mutually beneficial projects. Failure to understand and appreciate these facts, this reality, will lead to dangerous misunderstandings, miscalculations, missteps, and possibly war.
The best way to avert the possibility of war, the most realistic and plausible way, is to recognize and concede core security interests for our partners in Moscow, in their sphere and to not intrude into that legitimate sphere, at least not without authorization or invitation on their part.
The USA should stop trying to “one-up” or “get one over” on Russia and should offer a viable path to long-term economic cooperation, trade, and cultural understanding.
Even with economic and cultural partnership, we will still have friendly competition the way cousins or brothers compete to see who can get the highest marks in university or who can get the championship trophy in a wrestling tournament, but this is good-spirited competition and not subversion of core national interests.
What I propose is an about-face on American policy regarding Russia and a plan that, if greenlit, could be pursued vigorously and result in a coherent peace and the beginnings of détente within days of a delegation’s arrival in Moscow. But it isn’t clear that the USA actually wants a permanent settlement of all ambiguities and disputes with Russia.
It took me less than 90 minutes to come up with the ideas in the proposal I articulated above. I’m not an Ivy League educated career diplomat, so it begs the question, why can’t the supposedly best diplomatic minds in the USA come up with workable and feasible offers that are acceptable in Moscow and can be presented to Russia at least as a starting point for discussions?
Bryan Anthony Reo is a licensed attorney based in Ohio and an analyst of military history, geopolitics, and international relations
Follow new articles on our Telegram channel
