Trump’s pragmatic outreach to Türkiye marks a strategic pivot from Washington’s moralistic approach, signaling a transactional partnership aimed at reshaping regional balances and restoring Ankara’s value to U.S. global strategy.
Beyond Ideology
President Trump’s renewed engagement with Türkiye marks a clear break from the Biden administration’s unnecessarily aggressive approach. Gone are the lectures on democracy and human rights; in their place is a pragmatic, transactional calculus. Trump’s foreign policy instinct — that America gains more from deals than from doctrines — now defines Washington’s posture toward Ankara, as it very much does towards several other countries.
This shift was on full display during President Erdoğan’s visit to the White House in September 2025. Instead of clashing over the Russian S-400 missile system or Türkiye’s apparent democratic slide, Trump focused on what could be gained through cooperation. The outcomes spoke for themselves: Turkish Airlines announced multi-billion-dollar Boeing purchases; Ankara floated a $100 million settlement in the long-running Halkbank case; and discussions reportedly included the possibility of restoring Turkey’s suspended participation in the F-35 program, that is if it agreed to curb its energy ties with Russia.
This is the essence of Trumpian transactionalism: a foreign policy driven by tangible reciprocity rather than abstract ideals. Where Biden sought to isolate Erdoğan for defying Western norms, Trump sees an opportunity to harness his ambitions for US advantage. Türkiye, under this view, is not a pariah but a pivotal power, especially one that can help Washington manage crises from Gaza and Syria to the wider contest with Iran and Russia.
Critics within America appear to warn that such pragmatism risks empowering authoritarian partners and eroding America’s moral standing. Yet Trump’s advisers argue that the Biden administration’s moral posturing achieved little because Türkiye still bought the S-400s and charted an independent path. Trump’s realism, they contend, accepts the world as it is: defined by leverage, not lectures.
Towards Pragmatism
Ankara, as it stands, seems willing to work with the US. This is so because, Türkiye’s renewed engagement with Washington under President Trump reflects a calculated effort to reposition Ankara within an evolving global order, not simply a return to Western alignment. The outreach is driven by converging pressures — strategic, economic, and geopolitical — that have left Türkiye seeking flexibility rather than loyalty.
At the strategic level, Erdoğan aims to end Türkiye’s partial isolation within NATO. Since the 2019 acquisition of Russian S-400 systems, Ankara has faced US sanctions and exclusion from the F-35 program — measures that curtailed its access to advanced defense technology. By reopening dialogue with Trump, Erdoğan seeks a pathway back into Western defense networks while maintaining leverage with Moscow. The White House discussions on potential sanctions relief and Türkiye’s conditional re-entry into the F-35 consortium — in exchange for curbing energy ties with Russia — reflect Ankara’s goal of balancing rather than choosing sides. Although, the actual balancing might still take some time, it is evident that Ankara now prefers this course.
Economically, Türkiye’s motivations are even more pressing. With inflation hovering near historic highs and investor confidence fragile, Erdoğan views closer US ties as a stabilizing mechanism. The announcement of multi-billion-dollar Boeing purchases and Ankara’s proposal to settle the Halkbank case signal a broader bid to rebuild credibility with Western markets and financial institutions. For Erdoğan, symbolic economic cooperation with the US doubles as a signal to investors that Türkiye is still anchored to transatlantic commerce.
Regionally, Ankara looks to reclaim its role as a decisive actor in Middle Eastern diplomacy. Engagement with Washington offers leverage in Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Gaza — arenas where Türkiye has often found itself competing with, rather than coordinating alongside, US policy. Cordial ties with the US, for instance, will allow Ankara to protect the regime it was able to install after forcing al-Asad out of power. Reasserting relevance through transactional cooperation allows Erdoğan to reposition itself as a key player in the region, which is undergoing rapid transformation in the context of Gaza reconstruction, Western tensions with Iran, and the Arab state’s search for broader regional security frameworks.
Can Türkiye balance super-powers?
While Türkiye’s revamped ties with the US are certainly a key opening, there is little denying that Ankara is also walking a very tight rope, trying to keep one foot in Washington and the other in Moscow, even as the ground beneath both shifts. Trump’s transactional reset with Erdoğan has given Türkiye a temporary opening, but it also comes with strings. Washington wants results, not rhetoric: concrete moves to scale back Türkiye’s energy ties with Russia, greater coordination in Syria, and a definitive distancing from Moscow’s defense sector. Ankara’s hopes of regaining access to the F-35 program and easing CAATSA sanctions hinge on proving that it is willing to align, at least partially, with US strategic priorities.
But Moscow is watching closely, with any too deep a move towards Washington could be seen as betrayal of the post-2016 balance both countries have been able to maintain. Therefore, if Washington and Moscow move deeper into confrontation, Ankara’s carefully crafted neutrality could turn into something less of a strategy and more like a countdown to choosing sides.
In the end, Türkiye’s strength — both internationally and domestically — rests on maintaining its usefulness to competing powers rather than committing fully to one side. In a world where the US/NATO and Russia could be increasingly at odds, loyalty to either would limit Türkiye’s freedom of action and expose it to retaliation from the other. By contrast, remaining indispensable to both allows Erdoğan to extract concessions, wield leverage, and sustain Türkiye’s strategic autonomy. For Washington, Türkiye matters because of its NATO membership, its control over the Black Sea straits, and its role in regional diplomacy. For Moscow, Ankara is vital as a conduit for energy and a useful wedge inside NATO.
Erdoğan’s challenge — and skill — lies in convincing both powers that alienating Türkiye would be costlier than accommodating it. Only by doing so can he transforms vulnerability into bargaining power. Anakar’s survival, therefore, depends not on choosing sides, but on ensuring that neither side can afford to lose it. Going forward, projecting itself as indispensable will be the centrepiece of Ankara’s diplomacy.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
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