The rapidly unfolding process of radical transformations on the international stage, largely driven by recent shifts in US policy, the key external pillar of Taiwan’s government, has compelled Taipei to make significant adjustments to its long-standing course of unconditional alignment with Washington.
The Failed Recall Campaign Against Kuomintang Legislators
The positions of the ruling group based on the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have sharply shrunk in the wake of its loss of the parliamentary majority in the unicameral parliament following the latest general elections held this January. Who holds the majority now is the Kuomintang (KMT) opposition party, supported by a junior coalition partner, the Taiwan People’s Party.
When the ruling camp’s attempts to use prosecutorial and judicial “tools” against opposition officials failed to yield the desired “positive” results, it resorted to a new tactic—an effort to strip the opposition of its majority by launching a recall procedure against several Kuomintang legislators.
In the 113-seat parliament, the opposition currently controls 62 seats, with 52 of them belonging to the Kuomintang and 10 to its allies. The recall campaign against more than half of the Kuomintang’s deputies presupposed two stages: the first round targeted 24 of them, and the other 7 were to be ousted during the second.
As NEO previously reported, the entire scheme collapsed spectacularly at the very first stage. As a result of the vote held on July 26, which was effectively a repeat of the electoral process, none of the 24 Kuomintang lawmakers obtained the required number of negative votes. A month later, the second round met the same fate.
The result was a heavy blow to the DPP and its leader, the incumbent president, Lai Ching-te. Yet it bears repeating that the prospect of Kuomintang’s return to power in Taiwan is hardly a desirable outcome for the People’s Republic of China either, since the party interprets Beijing’s core principles, such as “One China” and “One country, two systems,” in its own way. Nevertheless, unlike the DPP, it does not profess overt separatism.
New Trends in the US Policies Towards China and Taiwan
As misfortunes, reasons unknown, tend to cluster, the Taiwanese ruling grouping’s domestic setback coincided with the emergence of alarming “nuances” in the political actions of its chief external supporter—the United States. They seem to reside in a more positive attitude of Washington to the key Beijing’s message, pertaining to Taipei: “Why would we, the world’s two leading powers, quarrel over the Philippines, who merely drain your taxpayers’ money while pretending to be terrified of a non-existent ‘Chinese threat’?” As for the Taiwanese—we do not intend to kill or enslave them. We wish to live with them peacefully and amicably. You can see it with your own eyes; this is what they want too, despite Taipei separatists continuing to pout and puff out their military cheeks.
Although the generalised “tariff issue,” which has come to the forefront, remains unresolved despite several rounds of targeted talks, with China pressing on with its WTO case against the US on the same matter, positive signals in the bilateral relations are becoming increasingly visible. In particular, there is an agreement concerning TikTok, as well as Beijing’s reported willingness to invest around $1 billion into the US economy in exchange for lifting the so-called “Trump tariffs.” What also turned out quite remarkable was an interview given by newly appointed US ambassador to China David Perdue, accompanied by a group of US congressmen visiting Beijing at the time.
Everything stated above, to reiterate, has made Taipei uneasy, prompting it to take steps that would have been almost unthinkable until recently. For instance, Taiwan has begun to question US Secretary of Commerce H. Latnik’s proposal to “split in half” the business of advanced chip manufacturing. The global leader in that field, TSMC, is still pondering over whether to invest in the financially troubled US tech giant Intel. At the same time, efforts to find alternative external support are also gaining momentum.
Is Japan Preparing to Replace the US Role in Taiwan?
Meanwhile, the evidence is now mounting in favour of the trend, previously observed in NEO, of Japan gradually assuming the role that the United States has long played in Taiwan-related affairs. This is a worrisome development in terms of both Sino-Japanese relations and the broader situation in East Asia.
Thus, in early October, it was reported that the parties were planning to turn joint coast guard exercises, previously held only sporadically, into a regular event, not only bilaterally but also with allied participation. Far more significant, however, in terms of its repercussions, may be the election of Sanae Takaichi as leader of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party, which almost certainly means she will become prime minister by mid-October. Commentators note that she sees Margaret Thatcher as her political role model and has in the past advocated creating a “quasi-security alliance” with Taiwan. Notably, should the situation in Northeast Asia deteriorate, it seems quite possible that Russia could assume a role similar to the one it currently plays in China’s relations with India. Though, it goes without saying that this would presuppose restoring Russia-Japan relations.
Taiwanese Delegation at an International Event in Poland
Europe as a whole remains another crucial focus of Taiwan’s foreign policy. Notably, certain European countries react in a tangibly different way to this engagement. The “Old Europeans” tend to behave cautiously, avoiding unnecessary provocation of Beijing, whereas among the “youngsters” there are those who enjoy “playing with fire,” turning a blind eye to the high sensitivity of the Taiwan issue for China.
It is still understandable when such escapades come from the Baltic small fry, barking on command from their current London-Brussels masters and receiving crumbs from the lordly table in return. But it is a whole new ballgame when a far more significant player, such as Poland, joins in. Moreover, Warsaw has recently demonstrated its willingness to resolve the blockade of one of the “China-Europe” transport corridors on the Belarusian border. Why, then, would it choose to play along with Taipei’s provocations towards China? And that is exactly how it comes across – the presence of Taiwan’s foreign minister and a high-ranking Taiwanese general at some international forum held in Warsaw in late September.
This unwittingly calls to mind one of the stilted stereotypes of “patriotic history,” which, however, has little to do with the science of history per se. It concerns Poland’s “eternal self-defeating policies,” which have repeatedly brought the country to national catastrophe. To the author’s perspective, such “peculiarities” are no more characteristic of Polish history than of that of any other country, including Russia.
On a related note, it is not a “patriotic-historical” approach that could contribute to restoring relations between our two nations, but a scientifically honest one instead, which looks at the past bona fide. Such an attitude is incompatible with the stance of a petulant child or a nervous lady who believes everyone constantly offends and deceives them while burying their head in the sand when faced with uncomfortable truths of bygones or rather recent times.
What matters most now is the adequacy of our assessments of current realities. It is exactly various aspects of the present that are now setting to dominate the policies of the two (yet) main participants in the Taiwan issue.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on Asia-Pacific region issues
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