At the end of June this year, Japan released two government documents dealing with the country’s foreign and defense policy. It seems appropriate to briefly touch upon those aspects that carry the greatest weight today.
Yet the foreign policy course of the current U.S. president, Donald Trump, has become one of the chief sources of uncertainty on the international stage. These uncertainties stem both from Washington’s mixed signals toward Beijing and from the distinctly unfriendly, if not unintended, messages directed at America’s main regional partners and allies. The latter were triggered above all by Trump’s launching of a “tariff war.”
It is against this backdrop of uncertainty that Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense published their respective Blue and White Papers. Both outline Tokyo’s priorities and concerns on the global stage, but above all in the surrounding zones of the Indo-Pacific.
China and Japan’s Security Concerns
Japan’s wary stance toward China is clearly reflected in both documents. In the very introduction to the Defense White Paper 2025, Defense Minister Gen Nakatani writes about China, which is “rapidly increasing its defense spending to enhance the quantitative and qualitative capabilities of its armed forces.” Their growing presence in the East China Sea—”particularly around the Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands)” — as well as in Pacific waters, is presented as a direct threat to Japan’s national interests and security. Accordingly, the defense minister’s rhetoric is focused first and foremost on “strengthening Japan’s own defense potential,” which is to be secured in part through higher military spending. Equally emphasized is the importance of “bolstering the U.S.–Japan alliance” and “cultivating new security partnerships.”
Shortly after the publication of these documents, reports emerged that the Ministry of Defense would request “8.8 trillion yen (about USD 60 billion)” for the coming fiscal year. This represents a 4% increase over the current 2025 budget but still falls within the long-standing range of “1.3–1.4% of Japan’s GDP” — a relatively modest figure compared with other leading Western states. Given Japan’s serious domestic challenges, it is highly unlikely that these figures will rise much beyond their present boundaries. Even so, the modernization of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, “with the benefit of cutting-edge military science and defense technologies,” will almost certainly go forward.
When it comes to international partnerships, both papers highlight not only “the U.S. alliance” but also the cultivation of “quasi-alliances with India, Australia, South Korea, and several Southeast Asian states (especially the Philippines, but not exclusively).” They also underscore the importance of Japan’s participation in international forums such as “the G7 and the Quad” — neither of which, it must be said, has shown any friendliness toward China.
Taiwan in Sino-Japanese Relations
Until recently, “the Taiwan issue” lay largely in the field of U.S.–China relations. But over the past year or two, Japan’s role in this matter has become increasingly visible. It cannot be ruled out that Japan may eventually take Washington’s place in the Taiwan equation—with obvious consequences for Sino-Japanese ties. This would become especially likely if Washington chose to “sacrifice its relatively secondary involvement in Taiwan” for the sake of addressing “the strategic-level contradictions” in its relationship with its chief geopolitical rival.
It should also be noted that, in geographical terms, Japan and Taiwan together form half of the so-called “First Island Chain,” control of which has now acquired exceptional strategic importance. To the south, it extends through the Philippine archipelago, and further still lies Australia. With both the Philippines and Australia, Japan already maintains quasi-allied relations. In this connection, one may point to the fact that on September 6 of this year the twelfth round of the Japan–Australia “2+2 Format” talks was held, bringing together the foreign and defense ministers. The meeting concluded with an extensive Joint Statement, the focus of which was “the China factor” and various aspects of further cooperation in the field of defense.
In this light, Japan’s growing involvement in the Taiwan issue as a whole—and on the island itself, as the key link of the “First Island Chain” — appears entirely natural. Particular attention in both of the aforementioned government papers is devoted to “the situation around Taiwan” and to “the defense of the Nansei Islands,” which form part of Japan’s Ryukyu archipelago. One should also note the development of “various bilateral ties and contacts between Japan and Taiwan.”
Not Everything Is Hopeless in East Asia—Nor in Europe
As has already been observed on similar occasions in New Eastern Outlook, within the strategic triangle of “China–Japan–India,” which increasingly shapes the evolution of the Indo-Pacific, “positive signals do appear from time to time.” For instance, during the events in Japan marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba underlined “the need to draw lessons from the horrors of war” and declared his intention to present Japan as a “promoter of peace.”
It would be highly desirable to hear similar words in other regions as well—above all in Europe, which is once again becoming “one of the most dangerous” parts of the world. In fact, such words were voiced by “the president of Russia during his recent visit to China.” Yet they clash with the long-running “anti-Russian, as well as anti-German and generally anti-European propaganda campaign,” accompanied by attempts to resurrect certain “symbolic historic myths and long-buried specters.”
As for the leading players in the Indo-Pacific—who also played active roles in the second of those great conflicts 80 years ago—the considerably higher level of “sobriety among today’s ruling political elites” offers hope that “Asia may be spared that ordeal.” Nor is it inevitable that Europe must “drink from that cup once more.” In Germany, for example, “positive tendencies are already beginning to emerge.”
With regard to Russia’s own policy, “it should not be aimed against Europe, but pursued together with Europe—against the anti-European forces of the New Normal.” One of the major prizes of such a course would be “to halt, and even reverse, the devastating momentum of the arms race,” which otherwise “threatens inevitable catastrophe.”
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on issues of the Asia-Pacific region
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