In recent weeks, several notable developments have taken place both in Taiwan’s domestic political arena and around the island, significantly complicating the position of the current leadership.
The Failure of the Campaign to Recall Kuomintang Lawmakers from Parliament
The ruling political faction in Taipei was stunned by the resounding failure of its attempt to recall several members of parliament from the opposition Kuomintang (KMT). The current rather complex structure of Taiwan’s governance, established in the early 1990s after the end of the open dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo, at least on paper contains several branches of power. At the top is the president, elected through universal suffrage. Crucially, members of Taiwan’s unicameral legislature are chosen through the same electoral process, Since 2016, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), victorious in that year’s general elections, along with President Tsai Ing-wen, elected under its banner, has effectively governed all these branches in a de facto one-party system. This arrangement allowed the party, at the end of the last decade, to push through the legalization of LGBT values (banned in Russia) into the island’s legislation — despite Taiwan’s highly conservative society having expressed clear opposition to this issue in a 2018 referendum. Ignoring the popular will, however, fits neatly into the current version of “Western democracy” adopted (along with these “values”) by Taiwan’s ruling authorities.
Yet in January 2024, the well-oiled “democracy machine” broke down. In that year’s general elections, the DPP retained the presidency, now held by Lai Ching-te (“William Lai”), but lost control of the legislature. Out of 113 seats in parliament, the opposition now holds 62, with 52 belonging to the Kuomintang. This marked the end of the DPP’s eight years of “quiet governance” and, more importantly, the comfort of its external (obviously which) “patron.”
Against these “disturbers of the peace,” especially the KMT, the DPP unleashed every remaining instrument of “democratic normalcy” still under its control. Prosecutorial and judicial proceedings against KMT officials and members of its coalition partner, the Taiwan People’s Party, followed one after another — of course, for reasons “unrelated to politics.” This did not work, as the “troublemakers” refused to cooperate in the way their persecutors expected.
Thus, at the start of this year, a more radical step was decided upon: launching the complex process of recalling certain KMT lawmakers to deprive the opposition of its majority. Instead of tackling the island’s pressing problems, DPP activists began collecting the necessary signatures from residents of the constituencies where these “undesirable” legislators had been elected just a year earlier. Two groups of targets were selected: 24 and 7 lawmakers from the KMT. By mid-summer, the signatures were gathered and handed to the Central Election Commission to initiate what amounted to a re-election for these MPs.
Judging by the enthusiasm of pro-government media, which gave extensive coverage to this effort, the DPP was already rubbing its hands in anticipation of success. Yet on July 26, not a single member of the initial group of 24 KMT lawmakers even came close to receiving the required number of “no-confidence” votes. In essence, the electorate “sent” the DPP and its leadership packing.
This was, without exaggeration, a shock. As for President Lai Ching-te, he apologized to his party for the debacle and promised to openly support it in the upcoming August 23 recall vote against the remaining seven KMT lawmakers. Only sheer confusion can explain this odd statement, as the position of Taiwan’s president not only allows but, in some ways, requires him to maintain neutrality in such interparty disputes.
The Collapse of Another Presidential “Transit Through the U.S.”
Another blow — in fact, more than one — soon came from the current U.S. administration. This concerned the trip, announced two or three months ago, for President Lai Ching-te to visit Paraguay this August. Paraguay is among the 12 states maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Such foreign visits by Taiwan’s top officials invariably prompt formal protests from Beijing to Washington, which ostensibly has nothing to do with the trips.
The “ostensibly” is important because the route for such journeys almost always passes over U.S. territory, with equally routine “stopovers” there. During these stopovers, the “accidental guest” inevitably meets with certain representatives of the American political establishment. In response to Beijing’s question, “What about the ‘One China’ principle you claim to respect?”, the State Department feigns puzzlement.
This was precisely how Lai Ching-te’s trip to Paraguay as vice president two years ago unfolded. A year later, Paraguayan President Santiago Peña visited Taipei as an honored guest for Lai’s inauguration as president. As recently as mid-July of this year, messages from Paraguay expressed eager anticipation of the return visit, which was to include stops in Belize and Guatemala.
However, by the end of July, it became clear that this carefully planned diplomatic move would not take place. The central feature — the “stopover” in the U.S. — would not happen. It did not fit into the current complex and delicate U.S.–China relationship, and President Donald Trump still hopes that his “best friend Xi” will invite him to Beijing — if not by September 3, then “by year’s end.”
But misfortunes, as the saying goes, come in clusters. Taipei barely had time to recover from this news, pretending that “no such plans had ever existed,” when a fresh blow arrived from its Washington “benefactor.” Despite all hopes, Taiwan was not spared from Trump’s “tariff hammer.” For Taiwan, the tariff rate was moderate — 20%.
Even so, Taipei nearly threw its hands to the heavens: “For what!?” If any government was eager to kiss the spot Donald Trump offered, it was Taiwan’s current leadership. They are building advanced chip factories in the U.S., investing in the American economy — and all in vain, with no positive response in return.
Still, Taipei presses on “undeterred.” Evidence of this includes its ban on Kuomintang veterans traveling to the PRC for the September 3 celebrations of the main all-China holiday — an event at which, notably, Donald Trump himself rather clearly expressed a desire to be present.
Vladimir Terehov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region
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