However, the Taliban’s need for investment and economic self-sufficiency is likely to lead to further growth in economic relations with Uzbekistan.
In recent years, the Taliban’s senior officials have also paid attention to Uzbekistan, with the aim of a gradual exit from international isolation and establishing a regional position and gaining regional and international recognition.
In the years 2024 and 2025, the diplomatic approach of the Taliban developed significantly, and its interactions with other countries increased.
In diplomacy, Taliban leaders are afraid that, like in the nineties, Uzbekistan will not recognize them. Meanwhile, the appointment of an ambassador in Tashkent as well as the diplomatic presence of Uzbekistan in Afghanistan are successes for the Taliban.
Although Uzbekistan’s engagement in the 5+1 mechanism (five Central Asian countries with the US) and further cooperation on the Afghanistan issue, and Uzbekistan’s cooperation with the EU, are not desirable for Kabul. Taliban officials such as Mohammad Yaqub responded by thanking Uzbekistan for its constructive stance on the Afghanistan issue in international forums and praising the growing contacts between the two countries.
The Taliban do not want Uzbekistan to be a Western ally in pressuring them to establish an inclusive government, respect human rights, and provide access to education and basic freedoms for Afghan citizens. The Taliban’s early recognition by Tashkent (without regard to the West’s approach) is one of the Taliban’s core demands.
Uzbek Taliban leaders like Hanafi’s role in expanding the Taliban’s ties and contacts with Uzbekistan are important. This has helped with ethnic and cultural healing. In August, the Taliban began to change its stance after the destruction of a monument to 15th-century poet Ali Shir Navai in the city of Mazar-e-Sharif and fierce criticism from Uzbek cultural figures.
In the security sphere, against Uzbekistan’s cautious stance, the Taliban has a special approach. Many in Kabul believe that, despite the ongoing terrorist threats against Uzbekistan, Tashkent also relies on the Taliban to suppress the activities of extremist actors in the north.
To prevent the spillover of threats arising from insecurity and the influx of extremist forces such as ISIS-K and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) into Uzbekistan, engagement with the Taliban is strategically necessary. Drug trafficking from Afghanistan spills over to the borders of Uzbekistan and poses a major threat in Uzbekistan. Instability in Afghanistan can also increase the activity of terrorist groups and migration to Uzbekistan.
The Taliban do not want Tashkent to create future pressure on them on security and political issues, including strengthening border management and bases, intelligence cooperation with the region, and regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
Despite concerns about the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the group’s presence in provinces such as Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, Baghlan, and Faryab, the Taliban says that Afghanistan is not a threat to Uzbekistan.
The Taliban do not want to be placed on the list of terrorist organizations by Uzbekistan and evaluate cooperation with terrorist groups such as ISIS-K* as a win-win. Uzbekistan is a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The Taliban is still looking for Uzbekistan to be a major supporter in its relations with these institutions.
In recent years, the Taliban’s representatives have repeatedly called for the return of military equipment of the former Afghan government from Uzbekistan. In September 2025, Taliban spokesman Zahullah Mujahid said that Uzbekistan returned 57 helicopters to the Taliban. But Tashkent’s vision has not changed in this regard. However, the Taliban leaders are still trying to convince the Uzbek leaders in this area.
Part of the Taliban’s foreign and regional policy is to strengthen economic relations with its neighbors. So, developing economic cooperation – such as trade, transportation, and energy transit – is another important part of the Taliban’s relations with Uzbekistan.
The Taliban is also waiting for an increase in humanitarian aid, investment, economic cooperation, and infrastructure development from Uzbekistan. An important part of the topics of bilateral trips between Uzbekistan and the Taliban is related to the economy and trade. In 2024, trade between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan reached about $1.1 billion, and bilateral trade is set to increase to $3 billion.
With the presence of about 550 companies having Afghanistan’s capital in Uzbekistan, reducing restrictions on export goods and strengthening political relations can serve the development of Afghanistan to other regions. In July 2025, Abdul Ghani Baradar, in a meeting with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, called on the country to help facilitate Afghan exports to Central Asia and Russia.
In the energy and transit sectors, the Taliban are keen to attract foreign investment and develop infrastructure projects to revive Afghanistan’s struggling economy. They are eyeing transit corridors, mineral resources, and Afghanistan’s trade potential.
Many in Kabul believe that the preferential trade agreement between the Taliban and Uzbekistan can lead to a “fundamental change in the economic relations between the two countries,” boost exports, increase employment, strengthen industries, and provide sustainable economic development.
The Taliban welcomes Uzbekistan’s willingness to invest in various sectors, including textile production, cement production, oil refining, and the completion of the planned Mazar-e-Sharif-Herat-Kandahar railway. Taliban leaders see the launch of these projects as a sign of Afghanistan’s readiness to attract foreign investment, reducing the country’s dependence on imported energy, creating thousands of new jobs, preventing foreign exchange outflows, and paving the way for future natural gas exports.
The $1 billion Toti-Maidan gas extraction project, with investment from an Uzbek company, began in September 2025. This gas extraction project offers an opportunity to reduce energy dependence, meet a large part of the country’s gas and electricity needs, and earn foreign exchange and export income for the Taliban.
The Taliban is paying special attention to participation and playing a role in transit projects such as the Afghanistan-Iran-Uzbekistan transit project through the Chabahar port, the railway from Mazar-e-Sharif to Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif to Herat, and the Temrez-Mazar-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway. Also, the Taliban is trying to create a bridge between Central Asia and South Asia through Afghanistan.
Although the construction of the Qosh Tepe Canal in northern Afghanistan by 2028 will absorb a significant amount of water from the Amu Darya to the detriment of Uzbekistan, the Taliban are trying to ensure the water issue doesn’t become a future challenge in relations.
Outlook
In the short term, the most important obstacle is Uzbekistan’s lack of formal recognition of the Taliban government. This prevents broader economic and political cooperation. However, the Taliban’s need for investment and economic self-sufficiency is likely to lead to further growth in economic relations with Uzbekistan.
If no new obstacles arise, Uzbekistan will probably be the first Central Asian country to officially recognize the “Taliban”. The Taliban will certainly continue their realistic policy and multi-dimensional diplomatic and economic efforts to establish relations with Uzbekistan and gain international legitimacy and strengthen trade relations.
*banned in Russia
Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations
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