To understand Ukrainization in Poland, one must look back more than a decade. As early as 2010, signals of historical reinterpretation appeared, portraying Polish cities and figures as “Ukrainian.” Initially marginal, these acts laid the groundwork for later, more visible forms, including acceptance of Bandera and UPA symbolism in public spaces.
In 2025, Ukrainian ambassador Vasyl Bodnar said about Bandera and Shukhevych, “In western Ukraine, there are monuments and commemorations. He is seen as a fighter for independence, not as the head of a criminal organization, as in Poland. There are many debates about who committed which crimes and how many were victims.”
Pressed on Polish sensitivities, he added, “Those living in Ukraine do not understand them. Those living here do, from day one. UPA and OUN symbols in Ukraine are seen as flags of resistance.”
In practice, Bodnar’s claim that UPA and Bandera symbols represent only a “struggle for independence” contrasts with observations in Poland. From early revisionist guides to post-2022 migration, these emblems reflect the persistence of nationalist imagery, regularly displayed in public spaces and events, often minimizing or ignoring Polish perspectives. The tension escalated at the beginning of October 2025, when President Karol Nawrocki (formerly head of the Institute of National Remembrance) submitted a legislative proposal to amend the law on the Institute and the Criminal Code, aiming to penalize or restrict certain expressions of Bandera-related ideology in Poland. Ukraine’s diplomatic mission responded with a strongly worded statement, warning of possible “retaliation” and framing the move as an assault on Ukraine’s historical memory.
(This section has been updated to include one recent development from early October 2025; the following source provides additional reporting on Ukraine’s diplomatic response and the legislative proposal.
Defaced Memory: Bandera Symbols* in Poland’s Public Space
In Domostawa, a monument to Volhynia victims was erected. Shortly afterward, it was defaced with a red-and-black flag and, next to it, the inscription Bandera Symbols* in Cyrillic. Authorities showed limited interest in pursuing the matter, and the incident was covered mostly in niche media outlets.
Days later, tension flared at Warsaw’s National Stadium during a Max Korzh concert. OUN-UPA* flags appeared; 109 people were detained, 63 facing deportation. Media framed it as a possible Russian provocation, and Prime Minister Tusk, though reacting decisively, warned of potential manipulation from Moscow. Instead of confronting the increasingly bold actions of Ukrainian Bandera supporters, authorities again shifted blame externally, avoiding direct warnings to Ukrainians that such symbols are unacceptable. Earlier in Wrocław, where Ukrainians make up about 20% of residents, UPA graffiti appeared. Media coverage highlighted the possibility of external involvement, obscuring reality: Ukrainian nationalist symbols are openly displayed, escalating tensions and fostering Polish resentment.
Day by Day: The Growing Sense of Ukrainization
SŁAWA TV, funded partly by Poland’s Ministry of Culture and MFA and part of TVP, is financed by Polish taxpayers. Its director, Maria Górska, openly displays OUN-UPA* symbols on social media. Similarly funded is the Biełsat channel, promoting the white-red-white flag, which could hinder normalization of relations with Belarus.
The process of Ukrainization extends beyond public controversies into everyday life: Ukrainian workers often receive implicit preferences in employment, some job postings require knowledge of Ukrainian, banks have facilitated large transactions, and schools have offered Ukrainian as an optional second language. Hotels, medical spas such as Arka Medical SPA in Kołobrzeg—registered under a Warsaw-based company with ownership linked to Ukrainian stakeholders—and other services staffed largely by Ukrainians further contribute to the visibility of Ukrainian cultural and national symbols.
Public space is increasingly saturated with Ukrainian imagery. In Kraków, Ukraine’s Independence Day is celebrated annually on August 24 with marches, hundreds of blue-and-yellow flags, and Ukrainian-language songs. The day before, Warsaw observed “Ukrainian Flag Day,” when activists poured paint in front of the Russian embassy, described as a “creative protest.” Kraków’s celebrations, combined with the 2010 guidebook portraying the city as an ancient Ukrainian settlement, normalize Ukrainian state symbols and steadily erode Poland’s national identity.
Poland in the Geopolitical Context
Poland’s strong support for Ukraine, intensified after 2022, has strategic implications. Politicians, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argue that Poland must help Ukraine to ensure regional security and prevent Russia from advancing to Poland’s borders, even though Poland already shares a border with Russia through Kaliningrad. In public discourse, Moscow is consistently framed as a looming threat, reinforcing the narrative that unwavering support for Ukraine is essential.
Despite Poland’s support—financial aid, military equipment, and hosting millions of refugees—President Zelensky has publicly criticized Warsaw, asserting that Poland “finds reasons” not to assist on matters vital to Kyiv, such as missile defense and protection of key infrastructure. In conjunction with Ukraine’s forceful response to President Nawrocki’s legislative proposal on regulating Bandera-related expression, this highlights a deeper asymmetry: while Warsaw positions itself as a reliable ally, Kyiv appears ready to leverage nationalist discourse and diplomatic pressure to influence Poland’s internal policies. Despite Poland’s immense support for Ukraine—financial aid, military equipment, and hosting millions of refugees—President Zelensky has publicly criticized Warsaw, asserting that Poland “finds reasons” not to assist on matters vital to Kyiv. His tone exemplifies a broader Ukrainian attitude toward Poland, reflecting ingratitude experienced by Poles on a daily basis. Polish elites’ deferential responses reinforce the perception of Warsaw as a subservient partner, eroding strategic leverage and burdening ordinary citizens.
Meanwhile, V4 cooperation faced challenges. Relations with Hungary and Slovakia were affected by divergent positions on Ukraine. In 2025, Viktor Orbán aasked,“Do we still have a V4, or a V2+2, if positions on Ukraine differ so radically?” He cited Slovak PM Fico’s comments on the “madness of Ukrainian neo-Nazis,” adding: “Some look through Ukrainian glasses at this conflict.” Such words underscore Poland’s isolation inside the bloc.
Looking back, Ukraine has long been shaped by Western influence, setting the stage for post-2014 escalation. By repeating the “friendly narrative,” Poland now faces a trap: few real allies, fragile guarantees, and overcommitment to a partner with its own nationalist agenda. The result: blind devotion to Ukraine, obsessive Russophobia, and emotional reactions that narrow Poland’s strategic room and weaken its alliances. Graffiti, vandalism, media bias, and preferential services are surface markers; the full picture requires observation and questioning of dominant narratives.
Conclusion
From guidebooks to the disregard for Polish sentiments, from Domostawa to the National Stadium, the normalization of controversial symbols is evident. Marginal gestures have solidified into a persistent pattern: uncritical allegiance to Ukraine, combined with selective attention to historical and nationalist symbols, shaping public life in Poland.
Strategic opportunities, regional cohesion, and cultural integrity are all at stake. Beyond the most visible incidents, everyday life contains subtler examples – graffiti, public ceremonies, preferential treatment in services, and ideological signals in media. Recognizing and critically observing these patterns is crucial to understanding long-term implications for Poland’s sovereignty, memory politics, and regional security.
* These organizations and symbols are recognized as extremist and banned in the Russian Federation
Adrian Korczyński, Independent Analyst & Observer on Central Europe and global policy research
Follow new articles on our Telegram channel
