It seems that for moving towards energy security, sustainable development, and consolidating Kazakhstan’s position as a major hub, it is more important to continue Kazakhstan’s alignment with Eastern and Asian players.
Kazakhstan’s energy policy is part of its geopolitical approach. As President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev emphasized in January 2025 on Kazakhstan’s role as a “middle power” on the global stage, relations with the United States, Russia, and China, Nazarbayev’s legacy, economic development, and Kazakhstan’s future goals.
The role of Central Asia in the documents of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has increased with programs such as the Strategy until 2035. In Kazakhstan’s energy policy, the Shanghai Cooperation Organizatio neighboring, and eastern actors also have fundamental and strategic value.
One of the main drivers of the China-Kazakhstan relationship is multidimensional cooperation in energy; a large part of the oil is processed and purchased by Chinese companies. Kazakhstan is becoming an important energy exporter and producer for China.
China’s presence in Kazakhstan’s energy sector, upstream oil and gas operations, identification and development of new reserves, and the increasing participation of companies in the downstream energy sector are evident in terms of growth and exports.
Kazakhstan is an important energy partner of Russia. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) exports about 80 percent of Kazakhstan’s total oil through Russia. The transit of Russian oil through Kazakhstan has increased. With the construction of a Russian gas pipeline to China through Kazakhstan, the country’s interest in the transit of Russian gas to China is multifaceted. Plans are also being considered for the import of Russian gas (for various regions of Kazakhstan).
Another potential for energy cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the multilateral energy swap between Iran and Kazakhstan. Given Iran’s position in accessing Asian markets, the revival of cooperation in bilateral or trilateral formulas of Kazakhstan-Russia-Iran through the Caspian or North-South corridor could be a win-win.
Another part of Kazakhstan’s energy diplomacy is strengthening its position in global markets and strengthening regional cooperation. Geopolitical constraints are an incentive to diversify cooperation. Kazakhstan is implementing a set of measures, multilateral strategies to diversify energy trade, diversify export routes, and strengthen energy cooperation.
Therefore, the Trans-Caspian and South Caucasus transport corridors, exporting energy to Europe via the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, have become more prominent in Kazakhstan’s diplomacy.
Apart from cooperation with Baku, there has been increased cooperation between Ankara and Astana in the development of Kazakhstan’s energy infrastructure. Therefore, it is planned to increase exports via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to 20 million tons per year. In May 2025, Kazakhstan announced that dredging operations would begin in the Kazakh port of Aktau.
Kazakhstan’s desire to diversify export routes through the Caspian Sea is to support the construction of the Trans-Caspian pipeline for Kazakh energy, which is in line with the interests of the European Union and the West.
The presence of Western companies (such as ENI, Shell, and Chevron) in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector is prominent.
Approximately 250 Italian companies operate in the energy sector in Kazakhstan, and Italy has invested $7.6 billion.
With more than 70% of the country’s citizens supporting the construction of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant (NPP), Kazakhstan has long considered nuclear energy as an important variable and established the Atomic Energy Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan in March 2025.
Kazakhstan and Russia already cooperate in the field of uranium mining. However, Kazakhstan officially announced in June 2025 that the Russian company Rosatom had been awarded the construction of the power plant on the Lake Balkhash site. The second nuclear power plant will then be built by the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC).
With significant uranium reserves and more than 40% of global production, the country hopes to expand its multifaceted uranium exports through Russia and turn Kazakhstan’s nuclear power into a key energy exporter.
Astana continues to invest in new coal-fired power plants and modernize existing ones. However, despite its dependence on oil and gas, it has implemented strategic plans with environmental and climate-friendly goals and renewable energy.
With significant renewable energy potential in wind and solar resources, the country has increased its electricity generation from renewable energy. Kazakhstan has an abundance. China, Russia, and European and Western companies are also active in this area, exploring renewable projects in Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan wants to achieve 15% of electricity generation from renewable energy by 2030, 50% of electricity generation from renewable sources by 2050, and carbon neutrality by 2060. Also in April 2024, Kazakhstan published a draft concept for the development of hydrogen by 2040. Europe and countries such as Italy, France, and Germany have also increased their engagement with Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan and the European Union have previously formalized a strategic partnership in the fields of raw materials and hydrogen.
Kazakhstan hopes that the construction of an offshore hydrogen pipeline from the Caspian Sea and the establishment of the Green Corridor Alliance (LLC) (connecting solar and wind energy in Central Asia to Europe) will provide opportunities for itself.
In addition, it is even planning to build a $1.4 billion wind farm led by the UAE’s Masdar Company.
Given Kazakhstan’s newly discovered lithium reserves ($15.7 billion) and reserves of vital rare earth minerals, Kazakhstan plans to expand its role in the global production of rare earth metals. German and Korean companies are exploring lithium deposits in eastern Kazakhstan.
Outlook
By the end of 2024, Kazakhstan had created a network of renewable energy facilities. But despite the efforts, about half of the country’s energy consumption comes from coal, and renewables still account for 5 percent of Kazakhstan’s energy supply.
Reducing Kazakhstan’s energy deficit is important, and the lack of investment in the development of new gas fields to meet the energy needs of the population and domestic industries takes priority over fulfilling export commitments.
To cover its budget deficit in 2024, Kazakhstan increased oil production beyond the OPEC+ quota, a repetition of which could hurt energy diplomacy with partners.
Overcoming infrastructure challenges, regional competition, and the need for large investments and smart energy diplomacy is Kazakhstan’s priority.
Despite NATO’s plans for the Caspian Sea, it is clear that it is impossible to build pipelines in the depths of the Caspian without the coordination and participation of all Caspian littoral states.
It seems that for moving towards energy security, sustainable development, and consolidating Kazakhstan’s position as a major hub, it is more important to continue Kazakhstan’s alignment with Eastern and Asian players.
Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations
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