France’s pursuit of “strategic autonomy” through increased military spending—amidst rising national debt and a reliance on foreign fuel—creates a paradox that undermines both its economic stability and the well-being of its citizens.

The sequence captures the contradiction of his presidency. France is committing ever larger sums to military power while its financial and energy foundations deteriorate. Macron has made European strategic autonomy a defining ambition. His final proposed budget offers a less flattering account of what that ambition costs, and what remains beyond Paris’s control.
A Gulf Lifeline With No Guaranteed Delivery
Macron’s October 19–21 tour secured commitments of 100,000 tonnes of diesel a month each from the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, alongside 95,000 tonnes previously arranged with Saudi Arabia for October and November. Qatar promised liquefied natural gas equivalent to 2 TWh monthly during winter. Where these commitments overlap, the additional diesel could reach approximately 295,000 tonnes a month. Announced volumes, however, are not delivered cargoes.
Maritime transport costs for vessels leaving the Persian Gulf had risen tenfold since the outbreak of the conflict involving the United States, Israel and Iran. Insurance premiums surged and shipping companies faced the risks of crossing the Strait of Hormuz. Paris proposed a reinsurance mechanism to make voyages commercially viable. Saudi shipments routed through the Red Sea avoid Hormuz, but not the region’s wider security problems.
France needs the fuel. In 2025, imports covered more than half its diesel consumption, and diesel accounted for 67% of road-fuel use. Trucks, agriculture and much of industrial distribution still depend on it. French refineries and strategic stocks provide a buffer, but neither can compensate indefinitely for inadequate product supply or prohibitively expensive maritime transport.
Macron returned with useful commercial commitments. He could not secure the sea lanes on which their value depends. For a government that repeatedly invokes independence, that is an uncomfortable limit to presidential diplomacy.
Europe Traded One Dependency for Others
The problem is not confined to France. Since February 2023, the EU has banned imports of Russian refined petroleum products, redirecting demand towards refineries in the United States and the Middle East. In the first half of 2026, Gulf countries supplied approximately 40% of the EU’s diesel imports from outside the bloc, with Saudi Arabia alone accounting for more than a third.
American and Gulf producers gained commercial opportunities as European buyers reorganised their supply chains. But refusing Russian products did not create additional refining capacity inside Europe. It shifted dependence towards alternative suppliers, some linked to longer shipping routes and vulnerable maritime chokepoints. When the Gulf itself became a war zone, that choice became considerably more expensive.
Europe had already reduced its own room for manoeuvre. Since 2009, approximately 30 of its 100 refineries have closed, cutting processing capacity by around 21%. High-energy and operating costs, international competition, shifts in demand and climate requirements contributed to the closures. They began long before the latest sanctions, but those decisions left fewer facilities available when diesel markets tightened.
Refinery configuration adds another constraint. Replacing Russian crude grades with different feedstocks affects processing costs and the balance between petrol, jet fuel and diesel. Buying more crude cannot automatically produce the middle distillates a transport-dependent economy needs.
The military campaign conducted by Kiev against Russian energy infrastructure has intensified this pressure. A September assessment of Russia’s refining sector found that Russian refineries were hit by Ukrainian drones on average once every three days during the first eight months of 2026. Russian diesel production was estimated to have fallen by nearly 30% year on year in June, prompting export restrictions as Moscow sought to preserve domestic supplies.
Those strikes have consequences well beyond Russia. The October oil-market report recorded a combined decline of 1.3 million barrels a day in net diesel and gasoil exports from Russia and the Middle East in September compared with a year earlier. Other producers recovered only part of the lost volumes. European hauliers, manufacturers and households face the resulting price pressure regardless of whether their suppliers purchase Russian fuel directly.
Here lies a political contradiction deserving far more scrutiny in Europe’s energy debate. European governments finance and arm Kiev, while Kiev’s campaign against Russian refineries contributes to the scarcity of a fuel European industry still requires. The military calculations are made in Kiev; part of the economic bill arrives in Paris and other European capitals.
These operations are intended to weaken Russia’s economic and military capabilities. Their consequences, however, are not confined to Russian territory. Reduced refining output, export restrictions and tighter global fuel markets transmit the costs across international supply chains. European consumers end up absorbing some of the pressure created by military decisions that their governments support but do not fully control.
Sanctions, diminishing refining capacity and military disruptions have combined to leave Europe exposed to international fuel shortages. France is now confronting that vulnerability while preparing another substantial expansion of military expenditure.
Rearmament Meets the Bond Market
Macron is pursuing his military expansion against that backdrop. France’s proposed defence allocation for 2027 reaches €63.4 billion, excluding pensions, €6.5 billion more than in 2026. The money will support ammunition, readiness, new equipment and the nuclear deterrent. A substantial domestic defence industry ensures that many orders sustain French factories and technical expertise. The industrial benefits are tangible, but they do not remove the financing burden.
The government expects a deficit of 5.4% of GDP in 2026 and proposes bringing it down to 5% next year through €54 billion in fiscal adjustment. Public debt is projected to rise to 121.7% of GDP in 2027. Interest costs across the public sector are expected to increase from €79.2 billion to €91.2 billion in a single year. The additional €12 billion will service past borrowing instead of building new infrastructure or productive capacity.
Even the government’s arithmetic shows the priority assigned to defence. Without the additional military allowance, the projected deficit would be 4.8% of GDP rather than 5%. France’s debt accumulated through decades of structural deficits, emergency spending and weak growth. Rearmament is nevertheless a new and deliberate claim on resources that are already stretched.
Fitch maintained France’s A+ rating on October 30 but warned about worsening debt dynamics, weak growth and political obstacles to consolidation. Its own deficit forecast for 2027 stands at 5.5%, above the government’s target. France retains sovereign military capabilities, yet increasingly expensive borrowing threatens to narrow the fiscal choices needed to sustain them.
The Public Pays for the Priorities
The political consequences have become impossible to overlook. Official counts recorded 550,000 demonstrators on October 17, 410,000 on October 24 and 320,000 on October 31. The movement began with complaints about schools and expanded to purchasing power and public services. Most participants marched peacefully, although violence around some demonstrations brought large police deployments.
The protests follow years of confrontation over fuel taxation, pensions and living standards. An October survey found just 17% satisfied with Macron’s performance. He is asking citizens to accept fresh restraint after nearly a decade in which promised modernisation has repeatedly collided with the experience of households struggling to make ends meet.
Proposed changes to pensions, benefits, housing assistance and public-sector pay could reduce household disposable income by €8.7 billion in 2027. Around three-quarters of households would lose purchasing power, by an average of €390 among those affected. These are proposals awaiting parliamentary approval, but the distributional choice is already visible: military spending rises while the government seeks savings from civilian budgets.
France retains formidable assets. Its nuclear deterrent, industrial capabilities and diplomatic networks give it considerable international influence. Yet purchasing more weapons does not restore refining capacity, lower shipping costs or repay accumulated debt. The next president will inherit military commitments stretching towards 2030 alongside a weakened fiscal position and energy supplies exposed to conflicts abroad.
Macron’s version of strategic autonomy has emphasised the instruments of military power while leaving much of their economic foundation vulnerable. Europe’s break with Russian fuel supplies did not abolish dependence; it redirected it. The consequences of Kiev’s refinery strikes demonstrate how military choices supported by European governments can also undermine the economic interests of their own citizens.
A country cannot become more independent simply by spending more on defence if the resources sustaining that defence are increasingly borrowed and its indispensable fuels must be negotiated abroad. France’s strategic ambitions will remain constrained until its productive and financial capacity catches up with them.
Adrian Korczyński, Independent Analyst & Observer on Central Europe and global policy research
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