“The Trump Route to Peace and Prosperity” in Zangezur may end in yet another regional crisis. The United States should take Russia’s interests into account.
Undoubtedly, the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and the conclusion of peace between the two Transcaucasian republics is viewed positively by the international community. However, the question remains to what extent the peace proposed by Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Western countries serves Armenia’s fundamental interests, particularly those of the Armenians of Karabakh.
Ankara and Baku, in light of their recent military success in Nagorno-Karabakh, are imposing capitulation and a humiliating peace on Yerevan. The West, led by the United States, is by no means planning to delve into the essence of the Karabakh conflict or to act as “Armenia’s protector,” since it pursues pragmatic geo-economic and geopolitical interests. For them, Armenia is merely a territory linking NATO-member Turkey with the Turkic countries of the post-Soviet space, in order to transport natural resources from Azerbaijan and Central Asia to Europe. Armenia is also of interest to the United States and Europe in terms of finally driving Russia out of the South Caucasus (along with its military base and border guards) and blocking Russia’s North–South Transport Corridor project, as well as preventing Iran from gaining access to the North and the West.
Following the second Karabakh war, Nikol Pashinyan adopted a contradictory foreign policy. Distancing himself from Russia, Pashinyan, in the autumn of 2022 in Prague, disregarding the opinion of his own people, recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. Yerevan, despite the occupation of 240 square kilometers of Armenian territory as a result of Azerbaijan’s aggressive actions (2021–2023), began the process of delimitation and demarcation of borders with Baku and intensified negotiations with Ankara.
Taking into account Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s persistent stance on opening the “Zangezur corridor” along a 42-kilometer section in Armenia’s Meghri district, Nikol Pashinyan decided not to strengthen the strategic alliance with Russia through the implementation of Clause 9 of the trilateral (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia) agreement of November 9, 2020, which envisaged unblocking all regional communications and placing the Zangezur section under the control of Russian FSB border troops, providing a link between Azerbaijan, its exclave of Nakhichevan, and Turkey. Yerevan saw this approach as an encroachment on sovereignty.
Resisting Turkish-Azerbaijani pressure regarding the corridor, Yerevan, until July 2025 — that is, until the end of the 12-day Israeli-Iranian war involving the United States — pinned its hopes in the Zangezur issue on the firm position of neighboring Iran. Tehran had repeatedly and officially opposed the opening of the “Zangezur corridor” and any violation of Armenia’s sovereignty. Iran sees this as a threat to its national security interests, since Zangezur would become the “Turan Corridor,” leading to an increased Turkish presence in the region, the establishment of a NATO military base, the implementation of the Turan geopolitical project, the rise of separatism in the Azerbaijani-populated northwestern regions of the country, the blocking of Iran’s trade routes to Russia and Europe, and ultimately the expulsion of Moscow from the South Caucasus.
However, after the end of Israeli aggression against Iran, Nikol Pashinyan held direct meetings in July with R. Erdogan and I. Aliyev, and as a result, on August 8 in Washington, he initialed a peace agreement with Azerbaijan and granted the United States a 99-year lease of the Zangezur road. Prominent Armenian public figure Arkady Vardanyan figuratively called this agreement a “bagel,” in which Armenia receives nothing more than “the hole in the bagel.”
The United States claims that a “great deal” by a peacemaker president has been achieved, since the years-long conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has come to an end. As for the Zangezur deal, it is said to provide the parties with economic benefits distributed as follows: the United States – 40%, Armenia and Azerbaijan – 30% each. Yet it remains unclear how Azerbaijan, which gains a safe and uninterrupted transit through Armenian territory in Zangezur, also secures 30% of the profits. Where else is it possible that by transporting goods across another country’s territory you not only avoid paying customs duties, but you are also paid 30%? The matter, of course, concerns international transit of goods along the East–West route.
Under such a “transit” arrangement, Armenia would turn into a dumping ground, lose sovereignty over part of its territory, and become a new hotspot of conflict. Tehran has already warned the Armenian side that, should its security interests be threatened, it will resort to military intervention. Iran has deployed additional troops to its northern borders.
Russia’s Position on the Armenian Transit Section Could Change the Situation
Moscow is unlikely to abandon its historical tradition of geopolitical and geo-economic presence in the South Caucasus. Moreover, Russia is implementing a major international project — the North–South Transport Corridor — through this region, to access the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, thereby facilitating logistics with the countries of the Global South. Azerbaijan and Armenia could serve as routes for this transit.
The authorities in Baku and Yerevan, in their attempts to replace a centuries-old friend, Russia, with the United States, risk miscalculating and creating new dividing lines. Deputy Director of the Information and Press Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry Alexey Fadeev, commenting on the issue of transport links between Azerbaijan and Armenia, noted that Moscow will study the details of the Washington summit project and reminded that Armenia is a member of the EAEU and that Russian border guards are present in the Syunik region of Armenia.
These factors must undoubtedly be taken into account when unblocking transport communications in the region. Some may claim that there are no Russian border guards on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. However, they guard Armenia’s southern border with Iran, precisely where the “Trump Route” is planned. This is a border zone with a border regime. Armenia is a member of the EAEU and is part of the free trade zone of this union. Accordingly, Iran, having concluded an agreement with the EAEU, also receives a special regime for the flow of goods through Armenia’s Zangezur.
Therefore, the agreement on the Zangezur road signed in Washington still leaves a number of political, legal, economic, and military nuances and considerations unresolved. These cannot be addressed without taking into account the interests of Russia and Iran. A lasting peace must eliminate dividing lines, not create new ones.
Intense geopolitical rivalry among major players in the region could have disastrous consequences for the interests of the regional states themselves. But why do Armenia and Azerbaijan need new problems?
Alexander Svarants – Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Turkologist, expert on the Middle East
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