On August 8 in Washington, a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia was initialed. In reality, this signifies the U.S. entering the South Caucasus through the so-called “Zangezur Corridor.”
Trump’s “Peace Initiative” with Far-Reaching Goals
However, Azerbaijan viewed this route under the logic of a corridor — that is, extraterritoriality (uninterrupted and uncontrolled by Armenian border and customs services). Armenia, while not rejecting unblocking routes, refused to give up sovereignty or allow a third party to assume control functions. On this issue, Yerevan received active support from Tehran.
Iran regards the “Zangezur Corridor” as a threat to its geopolitical and geo-economic interests. Geopolitically, Iran fears the strengthening of Turkey, the implementation of the Turan project, the placement of NATO and Israeli military bases on its northern border, and ultimately, the fragmentation of Iran driven by the Turkic (Azerbaijani) factor centered in Tabriz. Economically, Tehran worries that opening the “Zangezur Corridor” would block Iran’s route through Armenia and Georgia to the Black Sea (and onward to Europe and Russia).
Following the 12-day Israeli-Iranian war in July 2025, Nikol Pashinyan intensified contacts with Turkey and Azerbaijan (meeting with R. Erdoğan in Istanbul and I. Aliyev in Abu Dhabi), where, unsurprisingly, the issue of the Zangezur route was discussed. According to Recep Erdoğan, Armenia had not been opposed to opening this route for Turkey to connect with Azerbaijan and other Turkic countries in Central Asia. The sticking point remained Iran’s categorical stance. With the arrival of D. Trump’s administration in the White House and in the aftermath of the Israeli-Iranian conflict, hopes emerged in Ankara for a breakthrough.
As a result, on July 11, the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Special Presidential Envoy for Syria, Thomas Barrack, proposed during a briefing in New York that the Zangezur issue be resolved by transferring control of the Armenian route to an American company on a 99-year lease (outsourcing).
Essentially, this project became a modernized version of Paul Goble’s mid-1990s plan, when the U.S. proposed resolving the Karabakh issue through territorial exchange (the former NKAO with the Lachin Corridor to Armenia, and the Meghri section with the Zangezur Corridor to Azerbaijan) and the creation of transit routes (including oil and gas pipelines) from Azerbaijan through Turkey to Europe.
In 1999, Armenia rejected Goble’s plan and instead witnessed the assassination of its parliament on October 27, 1999, and in 2001, during talks in Key West, Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev refused to sign an agreement with Armenia on a territorial exchange.
But times have changed. With the backing of the UK, the U.S., and Turkey, Baku developed energy routes bypassing Russia through Georgia, created the Southern Gas Corridor, became a reliable energy supplier to the European market, and ultimately secured military success in Karabakh.
President Donald Trump apparently allowed the information to leak via Ambassador Barrack to gauge the positions of interested and uninterested parties. Nearly a month later, on August 8 in Washington, Trump held a meeting with the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia, secured the signing of an agreement between Baku and Yerevan, initialed the peace treaty, and announced the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group on Karabakh settlement. The U.S. President also declared agreement on a long-term lease of the Zangezur route by the United States to create “Trump’s Road to Peace and Prosperity,” and suspended Section 907, which prohibited the U.S. from providing any state assistance to Azerbaijan.
It is clear that Washington’s goal is not simply to link Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan and lay pipelines and fiber-optic lines through Armenia. The aim is a systemic U.S. and NATO entry into the Caspian Basin and the resource-rich Central Asia (particularly gas-rich Turkmenistan), which would transform the geopolitical and geo-economic landscape of the post-Soviet south.
Thus, without yet resolving the Ukrainian crisis and Russia’s justified demand to halt NATO’s eastward expansion, the U.S. is creating another problem in the South Caucasus with similar risks.
Iran Voices Discontent with “Trump’s Road” in Zangezur
According to many experts in Armenia, Russia, and Iran, the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia made a mistake by trusting U.S. “peace initiatives.”
In Baku and Ankara, it is believed that the functioning mechanism of “Trump’s Road” implies the corridor logic and would enable the implementation of the Turan geopolitical project along with economic development of Central Asian resources. In Armenia, observers note that Nikol Pashinyan has once again compromised national interests in favor of Azerbaijan, creating a crisis in the region and setting the interests of major powers (Russia, Iran, India, and China on one side, and the U.S., Turkey, and NATO on the other) against each other. Armenia gains nothing whatsoever.
Iran, through the diplomatic tone of Supreme Leader’s chief adviser Ali Akbar Velayati, expressed categorical dissatisfaction with the U.S. entry into the region via Armenia. Tehran believes that a NATO base and the blocking of the northern route would create a conflict situation with possible military escalation.
IRGC Deputy Commander General Yadollah Javani called Baku and Yerevan’s trust in Washington a mistake. The Iranian newspaper Kayhan stated: “Aliyev and Pashinyan have made the same mistake as Zelensky… They will pay dearly for their disgraceful act. Iran, India, and Russia will not remain silent in the face of this move.”
Ali Velayati also strongly opposed the “Trump’s Road” project in Zangezur and asserted that Iran would prevent its implementation regardless of the positions of other players.
On August 11, the Armenian Prime Minister held phone talks with the Presidents of Russia and Iran, and on August 12, Armenia’s Deputy Foreign Minister traveled to Tehran for consultations. An official visit of Iranian President M. Pezeshkian to Yerevan is expected soon. Russia and Iran welcome the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan but oppose U.S. involvement in regional affairs.
Thus, the Zangezur issue goes beyond the Armenian-Azerbaijani agenda, and without major players, achieving peace and security will be difficult. Geographically, Russia and Iran cannot detach themselves from the topic of international transit and the shift in the balance of power near their borders. NATO’s eastward push and the Ukrainian experience have already demonstrated the “bloody consequences.”
One possible way to resolve the situation is for Armenia to quickly sign a separate agreement with Russia integrating the “Crossroads of Peace” initiative with the North-South International Transport Corridor and granting Russia the right to ensure security along this route through Armenia to Iran. If “Trump’s Road” is to be the horizontal line in the “Crossroads of Peace,” then Russia’s North-South Corridor will serve as the vertical line.
Otherwise, what is the point of a “crossroads”?
Alexander Svarants – Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Turkologist, expert on the Middle East
Follow new articles on our Telegram channel
