On July 28, 2025, Pyongyang reacted sharply to Seoul’s attempts to start an inter-Korean dialogue, repeating that South Korea is aiming to take over the North regardless of the ruling party.
President Lee’s new inter-Korean policy and North Korea’s answer
It should be recalled that the attitude towards the DPRK is one of the most striking differences in the politics of the two main political parties in South Korea. While the conservatives have always advocated a hard line against North Korea, the Democrats have also traditionally talked about the need for dialogue. All attempts at rapprochement between North and South took place during their (democratic) rule, including the “Olympic warming” of 2018.
After returning to power, the Democrats immediately took a number of steps designed to show Pyongyang a new, more benevolent course.
- Well-known supporters of cooperation with the North were made minister of unification and head of the national intelligence service. Actually, Minister Chung Dong-young was minister of unification under Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008);
- Propaganda broadcasting to the North has been stopped; both the loudspeakers at the border and the ‘enemy voices’ associated with intelligence;
- NGOs that send leaflets to the North have been pressured not to do so anymore. As of now, they have not resumed their activities;
- There are talks about the possibility of individual tours for South Korean citizens to the DPRK;
- Finally, there was a tip that Kim Jong Un would be invited to the APEC summit in South Korea in the fall.
However, Pyongyang has stated that Seoul has no interest in politics or reconciliation proposals. On July 28, 2025, the North Korean KCNA news agency issued a statement by the Deputy Department Director of the Publicity and Information Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), Kim Yo Jong. The sister of the DPRK’s leader called out the actions of Lee Jae Myung’s administration, stating that they are not a new step towards dialogue but a correction of malicious actions on the part of South Korea. They should not have happened in the first place and thus do not deserve the DPRK’s assessment. Pyongyang does not intend to sit down at the negotiating table, since there is nothing to discuss and the attitude of the North towards the South it remains unchanged.
Moreover, she states, “In the 50 days since he took office, Lee Jae Myung has proved that he is no different from his predecessor in terms of blind commitment to the alliance between South Korea and the United States, as well as confrontation with us.”
They swallowed the pill, saying that the North’s statement was a demonstration of “the high wall of distrust between the two Korean states, which arose due to years of hostility and confrontation”. However, the South does not lose hope and “will consistently take the necessary measures to eliminate hostility and conflict”.
Reasons for the DPRK’s behavior
Firstly, as was the case with the US, the DPRK’s negotiation position has significantly strengthened since 2018:
- Significant progress has been made in building the armed forces, reducing the likelihood of a military solution to almost zero;
- With the world increasingly forming clusters, the value of the DPRK in the eyes of the PRC and Russia has grown, and “exchanging a toxic asset for concessions from the West on more important issues” is no longer an asset;
- Separately, one may note the conclusion of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between the DPRK and Russia. Assistance to Pyongyang is provided in a number of spheres, decreasing the importance of the humanitarian assistance that the South could provide according to the 2018-2019 ‘Olympic warming’;
- The entire country’s self-isolation during the coronavirus pandemic has shown that the DPRK is able to withstand a higher level of sanctions pressure compared to the current one, which means that the arsenal of methods of pressure on the DPRK does not work.
Secondly, Pyongyang has reason not to trust Seoul or expect any real steps towards cooperation:
- The negative experience of the ‘Olympic warming’ cannot be ignored. It showed that even in a situation most conducive to dialogue, the authorities of the South were interested in ceremonial events and reducing tension in the border region rather than real assistance to the North. The author remembers how in December of 2018 the South Korean government announced a plan to send 200,000 doses of Tamiflu and other medical supplies to North Korea. The delivery was supposed to take place on January 11, 2019, but was postponed allegedly due to lengthy attempts at coordination with the UN troop command in the DMZ. As a result, the drug was never delivered to the DPRK. The South Koreans justified this by referring to an American ban, but in 2020 it turned out that the United States had not put up any serious obstacles. The South Korean side simply did not meet the bureaucratic deadlines; it seemingly did not really want to.
- If Pyongyang has abandoned the concept of unification (although it is not yet known whether constitutional amendments have been adopted), the South still extends its jurisdiction to the entire peninsula. For Seoul, reunification does not mean a confederation or state in which both systems have representation, rather erasing the DPRK from the world map and creating an ‘even greater Republic of Korea’.
- This means that steps such as the abolition of the ‘five provinces administration’ as the governing body of the ‘rejected territories’ or revising the view of the DPRK being an ‘anti-state organization’ (which really reconsider Seoul’s approach) are unlikely. Although President Lee Jae Myung is able to pass the relevant bills, with a
- Legislature under his control, this will cause external pressure and internal political tension (even if one imagines that Lee would like to do this, he is not allowed to).
- The steps taken can always be undone just as easily. They are not irreversible, despite the fact that military exercises are still in full swing and the new president’s rhetoric vis-à-vis the United States does not particularly differ from the old one: “Through joint efforts in politics, economics, security and culture, we will continue to strengthen the South Korean-American alliance, cemented with blood”.
What next?
Thus, Seoul has nothing to offer in terms of organizing an inter-Korean dialogue; the stick is worn out, and the carrot is too small, especially compared to what can be obtained from Moscow. Pyongyang understands this well. Therefore, it is worth considering how the situation will develop in the future. There are several scenarios.
- The most likely scenario is that, driven by the idea of factional struggle (since conservatives advocate a hard line towards the North, democrats cannot but advocate dialogue), the South Korean leadership will reciprocate, but imitatively. Surface-level developments, ceremonial events, blabbering, and no real success will be attributed to the North’s lack of constructiveness or pressure from Washington.
- The most optimistic one assumes that there will be some real steps, but the important question is at what cost. In exchange for opening an inter-Korean route, Washington may demand concessions from Seoul on other matters, including Russia.
- The most original will come down to the fact that, having received a sharp rebuke, the democrats will turn to the position held by former democrats who jumped over to the right camp: “We defeated the dictatorship in the South, so now it is time to defeat the dictatorship in the North and achieve the unification of the country in this way”.
Konstantin Asmolov, Ph.D. (History), Leading Researcher at the Center for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Modern Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences
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