The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) marks its first anniversary, and we are witnessing the dynamic development of relations between the two countries.
Chronicle of the Visit
The Security Council Secretary arrived in Pyongyang for the third time in three months—his first visit to the North Korean capital took place on March 21, and the second occurred on June 4. Additionally, in late May, Shoigu held talks in Moscow with DPRK State Security Minister Ri Chang Dae, highlighting the high level of trust between Moscow and Pyongyang. As reported by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), “Kim Jong Un warmly welcomed Sergey Shoigu, who visited Pyongyang on the significant occasion of the 1st anniversary of the signing of the DPRK-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, and held a cordial conversation with him.”
The DPRK leader “reaffirmed the unwavering choice and firm will of his country’s government to consistently and unconditionally support Russia’s policy aimed at protecting state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international justice from imperialist hegemonic schemes, and to faithfully implement the provisions of the Korea-Russia interstate treaty in the future.” The main focus of the visit was on security discussions.
Outcomes of the Visit
Several key points were publicly announced:
- Monuments to Fallen Soldiers
The top leadership of the DPRK confirmed that a monument will be erected in North Korea to honor North Korean servicemen who died during the liberation of Kursk Oblast in the Special Military Operation (SMO). Similar memorials will also appear in Russia, and Vladimir Putin has endorsed this decision.
- Deployment of 1,000 Korean Sappers
A thousand North Korean sappers will be sent to assist in demining operations. Russian Security Council Secretary Shoigu emphasized that this is fraternal assistance from the Korean people and Kim Jong Un to Russia.
This move has two reasons:
– First, Russian officials collecting data on Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) actions on Russian territory have reported the use of prohibited mining techniques designed to harm civilians.
– Second, North Korean sappers will gain experience with modern mine warfare, including Western weaponry and tactics taught by Western instructors to Ukrainian forces.
- 5,000 Military Engineers Sent to Kursk Oblast
A full division—two brigades—of 5,000 military construction personnel will be deployed to Kursk Oblast. The author has long anticipated this news, having repeatedly mentioned the possibility while analyzing prospects for military-technical cooperation between the two countries.
The quality of North Korean builders in Russia is well-known. Compared to other migrant workers, they represent an almost ideal combination of cost, quality, safety, and low visibility.
North Korean military engineers have proven themselves in both civilian construction (including new districts of Pyongyang) and post-disaster recovery, where they rapidly built tens of thousands of standardized homes for displaced persons. This expertise will be crucial in Kursk Oblast, where those who lost homes due to hostilities must receive new housing before winter.
Some analysts in Seoul speculate that the sappers and military engineers may also perform combat tasks, such as river-crossing operations in conflict zones.
Sanctions Evasion? A separate question is whether sending construction personnel constitutes a circumvention of UN Security Council sanctions banning North Korean labor exports. Formally, no—the North Korean military engineers will assist in rebuilding Kursk Oblast as part of an “international duty,” not as paid workers. Legally, sanctions are not violated, though the author has noted that the first sign of Moscow shifting its stance on sanctions would be the appearance of North Korean laborers in Russia.
Reactions to the Visit
– South Korea’s government stated: “We express deep concern over North Korea and Russia’s continued illegal cooperation and strongly urge its immediate cessation.”
– The U.S. also voiced “deep concern,” with the State Department calling the move a violation of UNSC resolutions, alleging Pyongyang receives much-needed financial resources from Moscow in exchange for labor and military personnel. The statement emphasized that North Korean workers financially support WMD and ballistic missile programs.
– Conservative South Korean media argued that “the expanding military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow is a serious development that could destabilize international security,” urging President Yoon Suk-yeol to urgently revise foreign policy strategy by recognizing the dangerous reality of the DPRK-Russia alliance: “A strong alliance with the U.S. and reliable trilateral partnership are not just strategic choices—they are necessities.”
The Myth of 6,000 Dead
Each such visit is accompanied by Western propaganda campaigns repeating claims that Putin’s regime, unable to defeat “free Ukraine,” is plugging its manpower shortages with North Korean cannon fodder. This time, the UK Ministry of Defense claimed North Korean losses reached 6,000 killed—half of their personnel involved in the SMO.
The author questions these figures, noting that even South Korean intelligence (which tends to exaggerate North Korean losses) reports far lower numbers: ~4,700 casualties, including ~600 dead.
– First, North Korean troops were not sent unprepared; rotations kept only 3,000–4,000 soldiers at the front at any time.
– Second, the UK has no direct access to casualty lists—these figures likely come from Ukrainian sources, which have previously made dubious claims (e.g., “we destroyed an entire enemy column, but the internet was down, so no visual proof exists”).
What’s Next?
Multiple developments are underway:
– Direct rail service between Pyongyang, Moscow, and Khabarovsk will begin soon, with air travel to follow (per Shoigu).
– Russian Post announced plans to resume parcel delivery to North Korea for the first time since the pandemic.
Thus, the key outcome of the Russian Security Council Secretary’s visit to Pyongyang is the deployment of sappers and military engineers to Russia, marking a significant step in bilateral cooperation. However, assistance remains limited to Russia’s “old” borders, with no confirmation yet of North Korean personnel in the four new regions.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD (History), Leading Researcher at the Center for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences
