The Saharo-Sahelian zone (SSZ) is the region most exposed to climate change. These processes have a direct impact on regional stability. Soil degradation, droughts, desertification and water scarcity, above all, undermine the region’s food security.
The struggle for natural resources is intensifying
The climatic factor exacerbates the struggle for natural resources and in most cases this confrontation is subject to ideologization and radicalization by jihadist groups. The Sahel has never been noted as a region where religious extremism is extremely strong, but it is jihadist terrorist organizations, especially the Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)* that are taking advantage of the scarcity of natural resources to recruit among the most vulnerable populations, especially pastoralists and farmers, whose tensions have increased significantly. For example, between June and November 2024, more than 1,600 conflicts between agrarians and herders were recorded in the region over disputes access to pastures, arable land, and drinking water. Thus, climate change aggravates the situation, first of all, of those employed in the agricultural sector.
Droughts and soil erosion exert considerable pressure on agriculture in the Sahel region. This is partly due to the long dry seasons that last from November to April-May. During this period, daytime heat peaks in the northern Sahel reach 45°C. According to a number of projections, the average temperature in the region will increase by 2-4.3°C by 2080. The number of extreme hot days with temperatures over 35°C is also expected to increase to 125. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, about 50% of crops are lost under such climatic conditions.
One of the most recent severe droughts in the region was in 2021, when Mali’s agricultural sector lost 90,000 hectares of crops. This led to a 10.5% drop in cereal production across the country, affecting the food security of more than 3 million people. It is worth noting that Mali is the second-largest cereal producer in West Africa after Nigeria with a consumption of about 5.4 million tons of cereals. It is also a major player in the cross-border grain trade in West Africa and exports between 10 and 15% of its crop. Therefore, any climatic fluctuations in the country simultaneously affect the region as a whole.
In addition, there is overgrazing in the Sahel, especially during droughts. This leads to the destruction of vegetation, absorbs more solar radiation, which raises the temperature of the land surface, which is then subjected to severe wind and water erosion. According to official data from national governments, more than 489,000 hectares of arable land have been lost to soil erosion in Mali over the past 15-20 years. In neighboring countries, the situation is more alarming. Every year in Niger the size of fertile land is reduced by 100-120 thousand hectares, while in Burkina Faso this figure reaches 105-250 thousand hectares (with a forecast of up to 360 thousand hectares per year).
Climate change is an ally of radicals
Regional droughts in 1968, 1973, 1983, 1985 are identified as one of the key factors of current instability in the region. During this period, more than 250,000 people died due to hunger and disease. The most affected were nomadic Fulani and Tuareg pastoralists who were unable to feed their herds. The national governments, in turn, prioritized the rehabilitation of local farmers, including the Dogon, Hausa and Mosi.
The lack of support from the central authorities and worsening land conflicts between herders and farmers led many Fulanis to radicalize or join jihadist structures for lack of alternatives.
Jihadists are also often joined because they are seen by many as arbiters of justice in disputes over resources, while the central government is unable to control the situation on the ground. In central Mali, for example, one JNIM offshoot, Katiba Macina, has established its own model of resource exploitation. Terrorists define the responsibilities of farmers and pastoralists, regulate their relations, require the clearing of crop residues from fields, collect manure to prevent the reproduction of locusts and other pests, impose restrictions on the cutting of trees, etc.
It is important to note that 60% of JNIM militants are pastoralists who have lost their livestock. Another significant fact is that intensified recruitment of new militants occurs precisely during the dry season, particularly in March-April, when pasture shortages and depleted fodder supplies are observed. For instance, in late 2024, reports already indicated that 42% of settlements in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger were facing fodder shortages. An additional aggravating factor is wildfires, with over 60,000 recorded between May and November 2024. These fires destroyed approximately 1.43 million fodder crops.
Serious climatic fluctuations directly affect pasture availability. According to regional monitoring resources, between November and December 2024, only 2% of the SSZ area had sufficient pasture resources, with 53% of the area having moderately suitable pasture. In turn, there is a shortage of land for grazing in 41% of the territory, and in regions such as Koulikoro, Sikaso (Mali), Tillabéry (Niger) and Est region (Burkina Faso), the pasture situation remains critical.
Prolonged dry seasons have an unfavorable effect on cattle breeding, as it reduces fodder resources and water levels at watering holes, the main sources of which are wells (60%), ponds (20%), boreholes (15%), and rivers (5%). Notably, terrorist organizations seek to exacerbate the problem and are waging a systematic campaign to destroy water infrastructure. Between 2019 and 2024, the frequency of attacks on boreholes, wells, water pumps in the Liptako-Gourma region (triple border zone between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), which is the epicenter of terrorist activity, increased by 40%.
During the rainy season, which lasts from May to September-November, the situation with access to water resources improves, but not everywhere. First, there is an uneven distribution of rainfall. The arid regions of the northern Sahel receive about 100 millimeters of rainfall per year, which corresponds to a desert climate, while in the south rainfall can reach more than 5,000 millimeters per year, leading to widespread flooding. For example, floods from May to November 2024 in West and Central Africa affected more than 2.3 million people, Niger lost 25,700 cattle, Mali 33,000 cattle and 20,100 hectares of grazing land, Burkina Faso 4,100 cattle and 415 hectares of arable land.
In addition to aggravating the situation of herders by eroding pastures and damaging grass cover, heavy rains also increase the risk of herd diseases (foot and mouth disease, dermatosis, pasteurellosis, diarrhea) and disrupt distant livestock routes.
In this regard, it is worth noting that traditional seasonal cattle drives from the central Sahel are gradually shifting further south to the Gulf of Guinea countries (Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Ghana, Ghana, Togo, Guinea and Benin), where the chance of finding forage resources is much higher. At the same time, the new herd routes are closely monitored by jihadists and other gangs, for whom the hijacking and sale of livestock is one of the key sources of funding (jihadists’ income from livestock sales ranges on average from 25 to 30 million West African francs/$41,000 to $49,000 per month).
Thus, although climate change is not a determining factor that contributes to radicalization and the spread of extremist ideology, it certainly acts as a catalyst for instability in the context of intense competition for resources. Terrorist organizations are trying to use this factor to establish control and take over the distribution of necessary benefits to the population in exchange for loyalty.
*– banned terrorist organizations
Mikhail Ilevich, junior research fellow at the Centre for Scientific and Analytical Information at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences
