Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s visit to Moscow, where he joined President Vladimir Putin for the May 9 Victory Day celebrations, signals a bold diplomatic maneuver. It reaffirms Brazil’s position in the BRICS and Global South, while drawing sharp rebukes from Kiev and domestically.
“President Lula does not want to align himself with just one camp,” said Angelo Segrillo, a Russia specialist at the University of São Paulo, speaking to O Globo. “He does not want to distance himself from the United States and other Western countries, but he also does not want to miss what he considers the train of the future, which is the BRICS side of China and also Russia.”
This balancing act, however, has come at a cost.
Ukrainian Outrage and Diplomatic Fallout
Ukraine’s ambassador to Brazil, Andrii Melnyk, has been vocally critical of Lula’s overtures toward Moscow. In an interview with RBC-Ukraine, Melnyk warned that since February 2022, the once “formal strategic partnership” between Brazil and Russia has become “strategic in substance.” He noted that Russian diesel exports to Brazil surged from less than 1% in 2021 to 65% in 2024, worth nearly $10 billion. The ambassador’s claim could not be confirmed.
Commercial ties have expanded dramatically, with bilateral trade reaching $12.4 billion in 2024. However, the balance is lopsided: Brazil carries a $9.5 billion trade deficit, driven by Russian exports of diesel and fertilizers, both essential to Brazil’s vast agribusiness sector.
In response to Lula’s visit, Ukraine took the unusual step of recalling Ambassador Melnyk without appointing a successor. The Ukrainian embassy in Brasília is now headed by a chargé d’affaires until at least 2026, according to The Rio Times. Kiev’s frustration extends beyond Lula’s Moscow trip; it also stems from Brazil’s repeated abstentions on UN votes condemning Russia and its refusal to provide military aid to Ukraine. “I will not sell weapons to kill Russians,” Lula said in February, reaffirming his policy of neutrality.
Melnyk, who will now represent Ukraine at the United Nations, had urged Lula to visit Kiev as well, or at least meet with the Ukrainian leadership. Instead, he was received not by the president, but by Vice President Geraldo Alckmin. In an interview with NV Radio, Melnyk lamented that “no one here wants to talk about the war… Civil servants are even embarrassed by the official position.”
Ambassador Melnyk, a Controversial Figure in Diplomacy
Ukrainian diplomat Andriy Melnyk, until recently serving as ambassador in Brasília, previously held a high-profile and often controversial post in Berlin. During his tenure as ambassador to Germany, Melnyk drew attention for his outspoken and combative style, frequently criticising Berlin’s perceived hesitancy in supporting Ukraine militarily and politically.
He made headlines for regularly visiting the grave of Stepan Bandera, a polarising nationalist figure accused of collaborating with Nazi Germany — a move that drew sharp criticism in Germany, especially given its historical sensitivities.
Melnyk also stirred controversy by openly commenting on German domestic and foreign policy matters, often crossing diplomatic norms. His confrontational approach ultimately strained relations with German officials, and under mounting political pressure, Berlin reportedly urged Kiev to recall him. His assignment in Brasília has not been marked by a quieter chapter, either.
The BRICS Factor and the “Group of Friends of Peace”
Lula’s peace push hinges on Brazil’s leadership of the BRICS bloc, which now includes 11 countries representing 40% of global GDP. It’s within this context that Brazil co-sponsored with China the “Group of Friends of Peace” at the United Nations last September. The initiative’s language, echoing Beijing’s, called for respecting sovereignty and “legitimate security concerns” of all sides—an ambiguous formulation that Kiev viewed as favoring Russia’s narrative.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky flatly rejected the proposal, calling it “destructive” for failing to include Russia’s complete withdrawal from occupied Ukrainian territories—a non-negotiable element in Kiev’s own peace formula.
The ideological fault lines are deepening. Lula’s shared stage at Victory Day not only with Putin, but also with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel, plays poorly at home.
Lula Faces Sharp Domestic Criticism for Moscow Visit
The Brazilian president is facing mounting domestic criticism over his growing alignment with Russia, China, and the Global South, including his recent successful visit to Vietnam, at the perceived expense of relations with Washington and Western nations.
Mainstream media and conservative sectors of Brazilian society and politics disapprove of Lula’s emphasis on BRICS and South–South cooperation at the expense of closer ties with the Global North, which they traditionally associate with development and strategic progress. These groups see themselves as aligned with the West — even if the West does not necessarily recognise Brazil as part of it.
Lula’s preference clashes with the worldview of an important part of Brazil’s foreign affairs establishment, too, which is largely drawn from the economic elite. The recruitment system for the diplomatic corps, based on highly competitive exams and multilingual proficiency, systematically favours the children of privileged backgrounds. This structural bias often runs counter to Lula’s social policies and his emphasis on a Global South perspective. His stance of non-alignment with Washington or Brussels has polarised public opinion and could become a political liability as he looks ahead to re-election next year.
Between Principles and Pragmatism
Lula’s engagement with Moscow is emblematic of his broader foreign policy philosophy: non-alignment, dialogue with all sides, and autonomy from Western dominance.
To Lula’s supporters, the visit is a pragmatic assertion of Brazil’s sovereignty and a reminder that global leadership need not be monopolized by Washington or Brussels. To critics, it reflects opportunism cloaked in diplomacy—one that risks normalizing authoritarianism and undermining Brazil’s democratic credibility on the global stage.
As Lula prepares to host the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro this July, the question remains whether Brazil can genuinely mediate a third way in global diplomacy is on full display—and under heavy scrutiny.
Ricardo Martins ‒PhD in Sociology, specializing in policies, European and world politics and geopolitics
