Turkey’s approach to Kazakhstan would be a combination of cultural diplomacy, economic and geopolitical pragmatism, energy needs, regional rivalries, and expanding influence in the Turkic world.
Turkey’s goals in Kazakhstan:
Strengthening political and geopolitical relations
Relations in various fields have been institutionalized through the signing of numerous agreements, and Kazakhstan has become one of Turkey’s most important political and economic partners in the region.
Ankara and Astana have developed relations by signing a Strategic Partnership Agreement in October 2009, establishing the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC) in 2012, and an “Enhanced Strategic Partnership” in 2022, and a series of cooperation agreements ranging from tourism to energy.
In recent years, high-level visits by high-ranking officials, such as the visit of the President of Kazakhstan to Ankara in June 2023, the visit of Erdoğan to Astana in July 2024, and the visit of the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan to Ankara in April 2024, have been manifestations of the development of friendly relations.
The establishment of strong political relations, frequent high-level visits, mutual support in international organizations, and the establishment of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) have contributed to the strengthening of political and diplomatic relations.
Turkey sees itself as a leader of the Organization of Turkic States of the Turkic World and sees it as a platform for strengthening solidarity and cooperation in various fields with Kazakhstan, advancing the interests and reducing the geopolitical influence of other actors in Central Asia.
The concept of the Turkic world in all areas of politics and security, economic interaction, energy, tourism, culture, and people-to-people relations continues to strengthen cultural cohesion and economic integration.
While Pan-Turkism has a place in Turkish foreign policy and there are explicit references to Pan-Turkism in the programs of nationalist parties such as the MHP, Turkey’s relations with Kazakhstan are also dominated by mutual pragmatism and geopolitical motives in Eurasia.
Multifaceted economic cooperation:
The economy is a key variable and driver of Turkey’s policy in Kazakhstan. The goal is to reach $10 billion by 2030 and increase the volume of bilateral trade.
Key areas of economic cooperation include investment and construction and infrastructure, trade, and transit. While Kazakhstan welcomes Turkish investment, Turkish companies have been extensively involved in the development of Kazakhstan’s infrastructure in various sectors, such as telecommunications, coal chemistry, and petrochemicals.
Turkey continues to diversify its energy partners. With 3 percent of the world’s oil reserves, natural gas reserves of over 2 trillion cubic meters, and major producers of uranium, coal, iron ore, and gold, Kazakhstan is becoming a vital partner for Turkey’s energy security goals.
While Kazakhstan wants to increase oil exports via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to 20 million tons per year, this will allow Turkey to strengthen energy transit and reduce its dependence on other energy sources such as Russia.
Turkey is also looking to use Kazakhstan’s position to strengthen trade routes. Both countries are also keen to develop the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TMTM) or (Middle Corridor) to enhance their roles as transit hubs, key links on the East-West route and geopolitical importance.
The corridor will connect China to Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, reducing the time it takes to deliver goods. Turkey, with nearly 5,000 companies established in Kazakhstan, is one of Kazakhstan’s five largest trading partners and the top 20 investor countries in Kazakhstan. Working on about 100 joint investments projects between Kazakhstan and Turkey worth $3.8 billion by 2024 reflects the important dimensions of economic relations.
Military and security cooperation
Kazakhstan is the second-largest military power in Central Asia. Kazakhstan and Turkey have already been developing military cooperation. In recent years, cooperation has become more prominent, including military training, intelligence sharing, and defense industries.
Apart from the joint exercises of the member states of the Organization of Turkic States, an agreement was signed to produce various drones and ships for Kazakhstan. The September 2024 agreement on the transit of military equipment and personnel, and the signing of a military cooperation program for 2025 are also important.
Cultural Cooperation and Strengthening Soft Power
Using the common Turkish heritage, language, and cultural values, and the “soft power” strategy includes educational initiatives, cultural exchange programs, religious cooperation, cooperation in the media, tourism and joint cultural projects. In Turkey’s cultural diplomacy, creating cultural bridges such as educational and cultural exchanges, scholarships, Hodja Ahmet Yesevi Turkey-Kazakhstan International University, “Bilim-Innovation Lyceums”, the development of joint schools, Turkish language education, media cooperation, and increasing the number of sister cities of the two countries play a key role.
Turkey has made significant investments in strengthening its soft power in Kazakhstan with Sunni Islam, popular culture, TV series, and institutions such as the Yunus Emre Foundation, TİKA, Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), Organization of Turkic States (OTS). In the 2023 foreign leaders survey, Erdoğan ranked first. Also, in the field of tourism, hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs go to Turkey every year.
Challenges and Prospects
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is evident in its interactions with Middle Eastern countries, with a pragmatic and multi-vector approach.
But Kazakhstan’s multilateral foreign policy, balancing relations with Russia, China, the European Union and the United States, limits Turkey’s room for maneuver.
In addition, Kazakhstan, with a significant ethnic Russian population, shares the longest border (7,644 km) with Russia and is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
Kazakhstan’s participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization and Turkey’s participation in NATO are certainly major obstacles to more strategic security and cooperation, and would even hinder Turkey’s military presence in Kazakhstan.
The Turkish model is different from the Kazakh model in the Turkic world, and Kazakhstan, with its traditions, approaches Turkic unity with caution and pragmatism.
There are also differences in foreign policy approaches, for example on “Cyprus” and Astana’s recent decision to open an embassy in Nicosia, which was even described by Turkish media as a “betrayal.”
It seems that Kazakh Russians and Kazakh socialists are opposed to the excessive expansion of Turkey’s role, participation in exercises such as Kysh-2025 (Winter 2025) and either do not want Kazakhstan to be drawn into NATO’s orbit or the Organization of Turkic States to become a military bloc.
What is clear is that Turkey’s internal political and economic constraints limit its ability to maintain and excessively expand its role in Kazakhstan. However, Turkey’s approach to Kazakhstan would be a combination of cultural diplomacy, economic and geopolitical pragmatism, energy needs, regional rivalries, and expanding influence in the Turkic world.
Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations
