Türkiye still views the Kurdish issue in the paradigm of a threat to its territorial integrity. Thus, the fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) remains in the centre of attention of Turkish political structures and law enforcement.
Why does the PKK remain in the centre of Ankara’s attention?
The Treaty of Sevres of August 10, 1920 (section III, article 63) provided for the creation of a Kurdish autonomy and an independent Kurdistan atop the rubble of the Ottoman Empire that lost the First World War (territories east of the Euphrates River, i.e. modern northern Iraq and south-eastern Türkiye with its capital in Diyarbakir). However, Türkiye did not ratify this treaty, and Mustafa Kemal Pasha continued the war. By exploiting the inter-imperialist contradictions in Europe, he achieved the signing of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 – which was brilliant for the Turks – annulling the idea of Kurdish independence.
Türkiye has always understood that the success of the Lausanne Treaty in dealing with key global players on the subject of the Kurds is only a temporary achievement at a specific historical stage. Subsequently, Britain often used the Kurdish factor to force Türkiye into agreements beneficial to the Anglo-Saxons, for example regarding ownership of Mosul oil. In the 1920s and 1930s, Britain repeatedly supported Kurdish uprisings against the Turkish government.
Kurdish national figures tried to enlist external support, but each time they encountered a speculative attitude and the use of their problems in ‘political bargaining’ with the Turkish authorities. In Türkiye itself, repeated attempts were made to assimilate Kurds, Kurdish publications and the teaching of the Kurdish language were banned, and those objectionable to the regime were deported.
The fragmentation of the Kurdish movement forced its leaders to form a single political body. As a result, in 1978, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party was created in Türkiye, advocating for the national rights of the Kurdish minority. 1984 saw the beginning of the guerrilla struggle of the Kurdish rebel units, led by the PKK, in Türkiye. This positional struggle lasted until 1999, i.e. until the arrest of the PKK’s enduring leader, Abdullah Ocalan, at the residence of the Greek ambassador to Kenya.
At that time, Ocalan threatened to conduct subversive activities along the route of planned (oil and gas) pipelines from Azerbaijan to Türkiye, which would have created problems for the interests of both Türkiye itself and large Western energy companies (US, European) interested in these communications.
As is known, on February 15, 1999, Abdullah Ocalan was brought to Türkiye and put on trial. Initially, he was sentenced to death, but then the authorities softened the execution to life imprisonment at a Turkish prison on Imrali Island. Why the sudden change of heart of the Turkish politicians?
The Turks were aware of the individual’s role in Kurdish society and the influence of Ocalan’s authority on subsequent PKK policy. Accordingly, Ocalan’s physical liquidation could lead to a new wave of armed Kurdish resistance in Türkiye. On the other hand, the Turks did not rule out the possibility of using Ocalan to influence future PKK activities in their favour.
In Türkiye itself, the PKK is banned as a terrorist organisation. Ankara uses the PKK factor to its advantage. By viewing the organisation as an undefeated terrorist force, Türkiye uses this reasoning to intervene in Iraqi and Syrian Kurdistan. Under the guise of fighting the PKK and creating a ‘security buffer zone’ on its borders, Türkiye is interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq and Syria. The idea of forming the beginnings of Kurdish independence (autonomy or statehood) in neighbouring Middle Eastern countries (Iraq, Syria, Iran) is a ‘red line’ for Türkiye, as this could provoke deep destabilisation in Anatolia itself, which has a significant Kurdish population.
In this regard, the PKK, although banned in Türkiye, is considered a provocative force that participates in terrorist activities in alliance with external players. Which external forces exactly? This is not always clear. However, the fact remains that the United States, Israel, and partly Britain, continue to consider the Kurds in Iraq and Syria as an ally with the right to autonomy. (Meho, Lokman I. Congressional Report // The Kurdish Question in U.S. Foreign Policy: A Documentary Sourcebook. Praeger/Greenwood, 2004).
Türkiye sees the PKK as the main destabilising structure of the Kurdish movement, which, through the participation in the combat activities of Iraqi and Syrian Kurds, is trying to maintain its relevance and use military experience to form independent Kurdish institutions with the subsequent transfer of separatism to the territory of Anatolia. At the same time, the ‘fight against the PKK’ is becoming a convenient way to interfere in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries and expanding Türkiye’s own zone of influence.
Abdullah Ocalan as a factor in the Turkish game
Sparing the life of Abdullah Ocalan, who has been a political prisoner and opponent for many years, is politics. Here, Ankara is motivated not so much by moral principles or democratic justice, but rather by pragmatism and security reasons.
At the end of 2024, Turkish media floated information about a possible rapprochement with the Kurds via laying down arms and the dissolution of the PKK. In this connection, Turkish President Erdoğan has noted multiple times that terrorists have two options: laying down their arms or being buried together with their arms.
In other words, Ankara is offering the PKK either peace or a new war with its epicentre in Syria. Meanwhile, Erdogan’s ally in the parliamentary bloc, namely the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (Devlet Bahceli), has recently begun to promote the idea of Abdullah Ocalan, who is serving his life sentence in Imrali, making a public statement to the PKK. In this statement, he should propose to dissolve the organisation and lay down arms, i.e. the PKK’s political and military surrender to Türkiye.
In the view of Bahceli, who supported by Erdoğan, such an appeal by the main Kurdish prisoner in Türkiye will allow the PKK to be politically eliminated and the Kurdish issue to be settled. Some in Turkish expert circles think that a similar appeal from Ocalan may soon become a reality. For example, as reported by the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet, this was recently announced by the co-chair of the pro-Kurdish DEM party, Tuncer Bakirhan.
Of course, there may be forces within the PKK that will support Abdullah Ocalan’s appeal for surrender, whether this appeal be made of his own accord or under pressure from the Turkish special services. However, it is obvious that in the PKK and in the rest of the Kurdish world as a whole, there may be opponents of such appeals, statements and declarations.
The former PKK leader, 75-year-old Abdullah Ocalan, has already spent 25 years in Turkish imprisonment, and Allah alone knows how long he has left. However, an entire nation cannot subordinate its future to the call of one forced labourer, even despite his past achievements. The life of the people is much more than one of its representatives. The question is about the expediency of using a particular method, tactics and strategy to achieve national goals and interests.
If the Kurdish people agree with the opinion imposed on Ocalan, then this people will no longer have national rights (and even more so forms of independence), at least within modern Türkiye in the future. Whether such a prospect is good or bad, the answer remains with the Kurds and the realistically limited possibilities in a particular historical time. In any case, a ‘bad peace’ is better than a ‘good’ war.
The issue is that the Kurdish issue may once again become a bargaining chip in the hands of the West, represented by U.S. President Trump.
Alexander SVARANTS – Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor
