In the context of the transition from a unipolar world order to a multipolar system of international relations, the cases of Germany and Korea in conflict resolution help to understand how the shifting balance of power affects the effectiveness of peace initiatives in contemporary global crises.
How can the destructive consequences of this proliferation be minimized in a world transitioning from a unipolar order to multipolarity? To what extent can historical models of conflict resolution be applied to contemporary crises? This analysis examines two contrasting approaches to post-conflict crisis management: the Korean model of freezing conflicts and the German model of integration.
The German and Korean Models of Conflict Resolution in the System of Geopolitical Coordinates
Historical conflict resolution models must be analyzed within their geopolitical context. Wars do not emerge in a vacuum; they result from complex interactions between various factors such as the level of involvement of the parties, territorial scope, historical background, and technological escalation. These factors determine key conflict parameters, including intensity, cyclicality, and—most importantly—the effectiveness of peace models.
Conflicts evolve alongside shifts in the global geopolitical landscape. The Afghan crisis is a prime example: during the 1980s, it was a proxy war between the USSR and the U.S. under a bipolar world order. However, after the Soviet collapse, it became a testing ground for American power projection in a unipolar world.
The Korean and German crises were also products of bipolarity, but their resolutions occurred at different stages of this system’s evolution. If the Korean conflict was frozen at the peak of Cold War tensions, German unification occurred during the decline of the bipolar structure. The 1990 reunification of Germany was only possible because of the geopolitical weakening of the USSR, which shifted the global balance of power toward a single pole. Conversely, the Korean Armistice Agreement of 1953, which established a demilitarized zone and ceasefire between North and South Korea, was effective because of the stability of the bipolar order, where a balance of external powers preserved the status quo.
The success of any peace model depends on the external consensus among global actors. In prolonged conflicts where no party has a decisive military advantage, a frozen conflict may become the only viable scenario. This occurs when continued fighting becomes a zero-sum game for external players, locking the conflict into a static phase.
While freezing a conflict can prevent escalation and reduce the risk of direct confrontation, it also creates long-term instability. If the balance of power shifts, a frozen conflict can reignite with even greater intensity. The German model of integration, on the other hand, led to a lasting resolution, though its applicability is contingent on three factors:
- Degree of militarization – Korea’s conflict was far more militarized than Germany’s.
- Internal consensus – German reunification was supported by strong centripetal forces within both East and West Germany.
- Global balance of power – Unlike Korea, where external balance dictated the conflict’s stasis, German integration was only possible due to the systemic shift toward unipolarity.
At the end of the Cold War, East Germans overwhelmingly favored integration with the West, seeing it as a path to economic and political prosperity. Yet, without the collapse of Soviet influence and the transition to a U.S.-led unipolar world, reunification would have been impossible. However, despite its political success, German integration resulted in strategic dependence on the U.S. and NATO, limiting Germany’s foreign policy autonomy within the framework of Western hegemony.
The German and Korean Models in a Multipolar World
How applicable are these models in today’s rapidly evolving international system? The global geopolitical context is shaped by the decline of unipolarity and the rise of multipolarity, where power is distributed among multiple regional and global actors rather than two dominant poles.
In international relations theory, historian Percival Taylor’s world-systems model provides a framework for understanding global transitions. He argued that a hegemonic power ensures relative geopolitical stability, but the shift to a new system is always accompanied by turbulence. Such transitions are triggered by wars, economic crises, and global shocks, which catalyze the redistribution of power. Today’s international system is in such a bifurcation point: unipolarity has eroded, but a stable multipolar structure has yet to emerge.
The rise of international conflicts is a natural consequence of this transition. As realist scholar John Mearsheimer notes, conflict is inherent to power shifts. In a post-unipolar world, new power centers compete to expand their spheres of influence, increasing global instability. In contrast to bipolarity, where conflicts were mostly contained within two rival blocs, multipolarity creates a more fragmented and unpredictable competition, generating new security dilemmas.
This analysis underscores a fundamental question: What role does the balance of power play in modern conflicts? Unlike the rigid stability of bipolarity, multipolarity is fluid and dynamic. Power shifts force competing poles to constantly react, often leading to escalations. Consequently, when no side can establish strategic dominance, the Korean model of freezing conflicts becomes a more viable alternative than the German model of integration.
Case Studies: Syria and Ukraine
To illustrate this argument, let us examine two major conflicts of the multipolar era: the Syrian and Ukrainian crises.
The Syrian conflict, which began in 2011, remained in a state of managed stagnation until the pivotal events of December 2024. The high fragmentation of both internal and external actors meant that despite prolonged warfare, no side could achieve full dominance. This scenario aligns with frozen conflict dynamics, where competing forces maintain a fragile status quo.
Meanwhile, the Ukrainian conflict remains in its active military phase but exhibits growing signs of transitioning into a frozen conflict. Given the existing strategic variables, the probability of a prolonged stalemate is high.
Conclusion
Despite the empirical relevance of the Korean freeze model in the multipolar era, its universal applicability remains uncertain. The unpredictable dynamics, unique power structures, and shifting consensus principles within multipolarity challenge its long-term viability.
Nevertheless, elements of the Korean model are increasingly adapted to contemporary conflicts, suggesting partial applicability but not universal effectiveness. The high level of uncertainty and geopolitical competition necessitates the modernization of conflict resolution models to reflect the realities of the 21st century.
In the rapidly shifting multipolar world, where the rules of the game are being rewritten in real time, the rigid formulas of the 20th century are no longer sufficient.
Ramiz Hojatov – political scientist, international observer, expert in geopolitics, international security and Russian-German relations
