EN|FR|RU
Follow us on:

Another aggravation in the South China Sea

Vladimir Terehov, November 19, 2024

The beginning of November of this year saw another aggravation of relations between the PRC and the Philippines over overlapping claims to island territories in the South China Sea.

islands in the South China Sea

On geographical toponymy and international law

To begin with it is worth looking at the perennial “problem of nomenclature” in international politics, in this case in relation to the differing names given by the PRC and the Philippines to certain disputed territories in the South China Sea.
The struggle over the islands has repeatedly led to armed conflicts

In this respect, the naming, or toponymy, of geographical territories, especially disputed ones, is far from a politically neutral issue. To extinguish unnecessary passions, and there are already more than enough of these in our imperfect world, the United Nations bodies include a special United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names (UNGEGN). This body periodically conducts a kind of audit of the global system of geographical toponyms, making amendments to it where necessary.

At the center of the controversy is Scarborough Shoal

In the present case, the dispute relates first and foremost to Scarborough Shoal, which consists of a number of small islands and reefs in the northern part of the waters of the South China Sea, with a total area (including the internal sea space) of 150 square kilometers. This shoal, which for centuries was only of interest because of its rich fishing waters, is located 200 kilometers from the main Philippine island of Luzon and 800 kilometers from the Chinese island of Hainan. It would seem that there should be no doubt as to who this territory belongs to. After all,  according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), signed in 1982 and ratified by most countries (but not all, one exception being the United States), Scarborough Shoal is within the 370-kilometer Zone of Economic Interest of the Philippines.

However the UNCLOS was clearly unable to take into account various aspects of interstate relations, including historical disagreements between neighbors over the ownership of certain territories.

And it is precisely the history factor that China cites when claiming ownership of 80-90% of the waters of the South China Sea. However, in summer 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, ruling on a submission brought three years earlier by then Philippine President Benigno Aquino III, rejected an argument based on this factor. However, Beijing did not participate in the proceedings and does not recognize the decision.

The PRC reiterated these territorial claims in the summer of 2023, when it published a set of “standard maps” that outlined its own and other countries’ borders. This provoked a rather noisy and negative reaction in several of China’s neighbors, as well as in countries quite far away from the region.

Especially by the United States, where China’s emergence as the number two global power is seen as the main foreign policy challenge. It is this factor, above all, that should be borne in mind when assessing the phenomenon of the USA’s “return to the Philippines” that emerged with the election of Ferdinando Marcos Jr. as president of the island nation in the spring of 2022. The same factor lies behind the latest incident to exacerbate tensions in the South China Sea — an incident which at first sight appears to be of only minor importance.

Disputes over the Spratly Islands

First of all, it should be noted that, to date, the overlapping Chinese-Philippine territorial claims have been particularly acute in another part of the South China Sea, to the south of Scarborough Shoal. We are talking about the Spratly Islands, which occupy a huge area of sea (about half a million square kilometers) and are only partially inhabited. Some other countries in the region, such as Vietnam, also claim these islands, either in part or in full.

The main motive for the escalating situation around this archipelago is the fact that it is located on one of the world’s major trade and transportation routes. What is more, the populations of the surrounding countries have, for centuries, fed on the abundance of fish found in these waters. In addition, it has been argued that the bed of the South China Sea is rich in fossil fuel reserves, almost a second “Persian Gulf”.

Back in 1999, in order to stake its claim to the Spratly Islands, the Philippine Navy grounded a US-built military transport ship dating back to 1944 near one of the islands in the archipelago. Since then, it has been regularly flying the Philippine flag to confirm its claim. However, all this has caused an entirely predictable reaction in China, and incidents involving border service vessels from both countries have become more frequent in these waters in the last two years, invariably attracting global media attention.

At the beginning of November, however, the focus of media attention switched to Scarborough Shoal, following its mention (along with the Spratly Islands) in two documents published on November 7 by the Office of the President of the Philippines, which formally set out the country’s claims to these territories. The next day US Department of State spokesman Matthew Miller expressed the Department’s support for both of these documents.

But, naturally, no such “support” for these documents was forthcoming from the PRC. The latter country’s approach to the problem of ownership of “certain islands and reefs” in the South China Sea was outlined in a joint document published by two PRC ministries, which lists the “standard toponyms” of 64 territories in that sea.

But one recent development provided evidence that the “war of names” in the South China Sea is just one factor, and not the most important one, in the general exacerbation of the situation in a region which is the focus of the global competition between the two leading superpowers. This was the news of the Philippines’ possible purchase of the latest Typhoon medium-range missile systems from the United States. The issue of the possible “parking” of these systems on Philippine territory was raised during the regular “Balikatan” field training exercises held in April this year, in which Typhoon systems played a key role.

In conclusion

Finally, it seems appropriate to note once again the trend, which is extremely important in the current stage of the “Big World Game”, of a shift in key US interests from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific region. With an “intermediate stop” in the Middle East.

Unless, of course, the organizers of the two European conflicts of the 20th century manage once again to involve the US in a carefully prepared third conflict, with the key participation of both Russia and Germany.

Let us hope, however, that this time the crafty international tricksters, and the “useful idiots” from various countries who play along with them, will fail. Both of these groups, incidentally, appear to be behind the current global attack on the new president of the leading global superpower, who clearly does not fit into their plans referred to above.

In conclusion, it seems natural to add another issue to the list of pressing global problems, namely the latest seemingly unimportant episode in the “nomenclature dispute”, and the wider long-term and escalating situation in the South China Sea.

 

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook

More on this topic
South Korea Declares and Cancels Martial Law: What Are the Geopolitical Impacts?
Lebanese-Israeli ceasefire: will it last?
Why Biden Allowed Ukraine to Fire US missiles into Russia
Martial Law for Five Hours: A Live Broadcast of Political Suicide
Georgia at a Crossroads: Protests, Power Struggles, and the Battle for Legitimacy