The conflict in Sudan, which has been going on for more than a year and a half, is today unfolding in a curious way; unfolding, on the one hand, in the absence of visible steps towards a settlement, and, on the other, against the background of relative parity on the front.
However, today, in November, 2024, the civil war in Sudan – which is how it is appropriate to call this conflict, given its scale and intensity – is in its 19th month. At the same time, the confrontation is still defined by an extreme degree of tension and unpredictability, including individual cases of certain units switching to the enemy’s side, as well as cases of both alleged and proven interference by external actors.
Zones of warfare
At first the parties regularly, albeit often unfoundedly, claimed major military victories (whether it was the next ‘capture’ of high-ranking commanders of the RSF and the Sudanese Army or the capture of enemy rear bases), but in recent months the situation has changed dramatically.
Although the conflict in Sudan can hardly be positional in nature due to the geographical and demographic characteristics of the country, in general, it is appropriate to identify the relatively stable areas with RSF presence, which includes most of Darfur and North Kordofan. The army controls the eastern regions of the country. In these conditions, a significant part of the territories remains outside the zone of intense hostilities, which are mainly concentrated 1) in Khartoum, 2) around El Fasher and 3) in the state of Al Jazirah.
In the first case, it is a kind of symbol of the current conflict: it was the capital that became the subject of the most brutal confrontation between the RSF and the army. In April and May of 2023, it seemed that all efforts of the leadership of both Sudanese factions were aimed at capturing Khartoum and its millions of residents.
However, the inability to gain an advantage even at the cost of engaging reinforcements from all over the country forced the parties to reconsider tactics. As a result, although the positional battles in Khartoum are ongoing, both the RSF and the army began to ‘divide’ the states of Sudan. In this context, the most acute confrontation in the summer and autumn of 2024 was observed in Northern Darfur, where the RSF continue the protracted siege of El Fasher, the stronghold of forces loyal to al-Burhan in the region. Equally significant is the struggle for the Al Jazirah region, located south-east of the Sudanese capital and, thus, playing a prominent role in battles for the city.
Changes in the balance of power
In general, in the first two months of autumn 2024, three noteworthy events occurred within the framework of the civil war in Sudan.
Firstly, in September, representatives of the Transitional Sovereignty Council of Sudan announced the start of a decisive offensive in Khartoum. Attracting public and international attention to the fighting for the capital in itself testifies to the confidence of the army in their impending success; a prolonged lack of progress or even the loss of previous positions will be the strongest blow to the image of al-Burhan’s supporters.
Secondly, in October, the commander of the RSF in the disputed state of Al Jazirah joined the Sudanese military along with some of his fighters. This demarche became the first of its kind in the ranks of supporters of Mohamed Dagalo ‘Hemedti’.
Finally, after numerous accusations against the UAE of supporting the RSF, the Transitional Sovereignty Council moved from words to deeds: on November 3, a $ 6 billion deal with an Abu Dhabi port operator for the development of Abu Amama harbour was cancelled.
What is all this leading to?
Thus, a year and a half of fierce confrontation later, the parties to the Sudanese conflict – the RSF and the Transitional Sovereignty Council – have not been able to crown the winner on the battlefield. Moreover, at the moment, the uneven distribution of success across various states shows that there can be no talk of the transfer of the initiative into the hands of one or the other opponent.
At the same time, the severe humanitarian consequences – currently temporarily displaced persons make up about 1/3 of the country’s population– and the resource constraints that arise in this connection can serve as an objective prerequisite for intensifying the negotiation process. At the same time, the positive influence of external players, which under other circumstances could have become an effective means towards de-escalation, is extremely limited considering the insufficient interest of major actors in resolving the Sudanese crisis.
In turn, for many neighbours, including Egypt, Eritrea, Chad and Ethiopia, it is much more profitable to support one of the parties or, in the case of the latter, to take advantage of the weakness of the central government in Sudan, rather than acting as intermediaries.
Ivan Kopytsev, political scientist, junior research fellow at the Centre for the Study of North Africa and the Horn of Africa at the Institute of African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences; research intern at the Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at the Institute of International Studies of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, exclusively for the magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
