The Middle East crisis is heating up again as a result of the latest Israeli airstrikes on Iran. Tehran is deciding on an answer.
Israel is not ready for compromise
Tel Aviv understands that no matter how united Arab countries and the Islamic world as a whole are on the Palestinian issue, it will not see consolidation in the foreseeable future. It is no coincidence that in this regard, Turkish President Recep Erdogan, a public opponent of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, recently criticised the weak reaction of the Islamic world to Israel’s actions in Gaza. He noted: “With the exception of a few countries, I regret to inform you that there is no strong reaction from the Islamic world. We should not forget that this disarray is recorded in history”.
At the same time, the military power and the unequivocal support of the United States for Israel’s actions inspire confidence in the ruling forces in Tel Aviv to continue the military conflict in terms of causing irreparable damage to the anti-Israeli front, where the ruling regime of Iran is the main mediator.
Mossad and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have the necessary amount of data on the new Iranian leadership’s plans to restore relations with the EU and the United States so as to ease sanctions and grant Iranian gas access to the European market. Israel is hardly interested in such a prospect, though there is an understanding of the possibility of certain transformations in Iranian-Western relations.
However, it is one thing when Iran restores ties with the United States and Europe while maintaining its military power and leading positions in the Middle East; the situation is completely different when Iran loses part of its arsenal under the attacks of the Israel Defence Forces and its position among pro-Iranian groups in the region (in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen) will weaken. It is obvious that Israel benefits from the second option, in which the solution of the Palestinian issue will again be on the periphery of history and the Jewish state will retain key (if not leading) positions in the Middle East.
One way or another, Mossad and CIA representatives are transmitting ultimatum-esque terms of a cease-fire through Qatar in Doha at negotiations on the settlement of the conflict in the Gaza Strip. At the same time, the fate of the Gaza Strip is separated from the ongoing military conflict with Lebanon. On October 26, Israel again launched powerful airstrikes by the Air Force and UAVs on the territory of Iran (Operation Days of Repentance), where the main targets were military bases and IRGC facilities. This operation was a response to Iran’s missile attack on October 1.
The media continues to voice a myriad of opinions about the success of this Israeli military action. Some argue that Iran (especially the air defence forces) has suffered maximum damage. Others deny these victorious statements of Israeli experts and believe that the damage was minimal.
Iraq has turned to the United Nations with a condemnation of the use of its airspace by the Israeli Air Force (including F-35 fighter jets). But what can Baghdad get in response if Tel Aviv has already declared UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres himself persona non grata?
Some claim that Israel allegedly used the territory of neighbouring Azerbaijan during the bombing of the Iranian province of Shiraz. However, Iran itself does not support such a version and it is extremely problematic and unprofitable for Iran to create another zone of instability (and even more so, of conflict) on its northern border.
Iran is deciding on an answer
In the current situation, Iran will have to look for an adequate response to the Israeli operation, which, of course, will distract it from active military support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is suffering an administrative crisis.
Representatives of the IRGC and the Iranian army alternately (for example, IRGC General Mohammad Reza Naghdi, Defence Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasirzadeh) argue that Tehran will undoubtedly conduct another (third) retaliatory operation (‘True Promise 3’) and its destructive force will surprise Israel and the United States, because it will be more powerful than the previous one.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian also promised a crushing response against Israeli military facilities. During the government meeting, as reported by the Iranian ISNA news agency, he noted: “Iran does not seek war with Israel, but is ready to defend its land and respond to aggression”. In turn, the Iranian Foreign Ministry promised Israel to use the right to retaliate in accordance with the UN Charter.
Tehran is obviously considering options for a possible response and its consequences. After the 79th UN General Assembly, the head of the 14th government of Iran, President Pezeshkian, declared a new agenda for Iranian diplomacy aimed at restoring severed ties with the West.
The preparation of an important agreement with Iran is close to being finalised
In September, following another visit by Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu to Iran and discussions with Iranian colleagues, Moscow publicly announced its approval of the draft signing of a major agreement with Iran. It could have been assumed that such a strategic agreement between our countries would probably be signed at the BRICS summit in Kazan in October. However, the summit took place, the presidents of Russia and Iran met on its side-lines, but the comprehensive agreement between our countries was not signed. This agreement will be a breakthrough in both bilateral and multilateral (if one takes into account the transit and economic potential of the Russian Federation and Iran) relations.
The trade turnover between Russia and Iran in 2023 decreased by $ 900 mn, amounting to $ 4 bn, which does not at all reflect the potential of trade relations between the two countries and is inferior (more than 10 times less) to the indicators of trade and economic relations of the Russian Federation with, for example, Türkiye. The parties intend to restore the previous rates of trade turnover in 2024, increase it by 27% in 2025, by 68% by 2030. Obviously, the free trade agreement between Iran and the EAEU countries, signed in December, 2023, and ratified by Russia in June, 2024, should aid growth dynamics.
However, the postponement of the signing of a broad agreement between Russia and Iran at present may be perceived by some as an intervention of third forces that do not want to strengthen Russian-Iranian ties due to the peculiarities of regional transformations. Whether this is due to the new course of the Iranian government or it is a temporary measure to clarify the likely details of the agreement (as they say, ‘the devil is in the details’), the near future will show.
Of course, the existence of such an agreement will give a new impetus to the process of implementing important economic projects of interest to both countries, the South Caucasus and Middle East, as well as the countries of the Global South (for example, the North-South international transport corridor project with access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean).
Iran is a key state in the Middle East, not only because of its geography, history and political interests, but also because of its high economic potential (raw materials and technological indicators). In realising the objective potential of the Iranian state, some forces in the Middle East and the West are showing great interest in probing the possibilities of restoring mutually beneficial ties between Iran and Israel, which would catalyse the entry of Iranian goods into world markets.
Meanwhile Tehran is pondering a rational reaction to Israel’s challenge.
Alexander Svarants—Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
