On October 7 and 8, the eleventh session of the Fourteenth Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea took place in the Mansudae Palace of Congress in Pyongyang.
Expectations and forecasts
At the January 2024 session of the Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim Jong-un called for a review of the constitution at the next parliamentary session and raised the need to remove provisions related to unification and to clarify the country’s territorial borders, including its maritime boundaries. The next session was therefore awaited with interest. What everyone wondered was whether North Korea would mirror South Korea by claiming its territory extends to the entire peninsula, or whether it would fix the borders as they currently stand.
The second important issue concerned the disputed maritime boundary, the so-called Northern Limit Line, drawn unilaterally by the Americans and their allies after the Korean War. North Korea did not recognize it, insisting that the border should be further from its shores.
The session usually takes place in the summer. When it did not take place, this was a subject of much discussion about the problems of the regime both in the West and in South Korea. After it had been announced that the session would be held in October, Korea observers held their breath in anticipation as they waited for the amendments to be publicized.
Ahead of the session, the South Korean media made numerous predictions about the agenda:
North Korea might abrogate the 1991 inter-Korean agreement, which is inconsistent with the DPRK’s current “two hostile states” stance. The 1991 agreement defines inter-Korean ties as a “special relationship” of an interim nature which has developed as the two Koreas seek reunification, rather than as a relationship between states.
North Korea could unilaterally declare a new maritime border south of the current de facto one.
It could also start a process of organizational restructuring or initiate personnel changes by dissolving all special agencies dealing with the South and transferring the management of inter-Korean affairs to the Foreign Ministry.
A constitutional revision could remove references to unification and the common ethnicity and race of the populations of the two Koreas, replacing them with an emphasis on a violent takeover of South Korea in the event of a conflict.
The session might again emphasize the country’s nuclear status, thus sending a signal to Washington ahead of the US presidential election in November 2024.
Representatives of the South Korean authorities added oil to the fire. On October 8, South Korea’s Reunification Minister Kim Yung-ho said that “tensions in the region may escalate as Pyongyang is likely to amend the constitution”, and that the new version would describe South Korea as the country’s main enemy. The minister pledged to take “decisive action against North Korea’s anti-national and hostile behavior.”
“Unexpected” outcome of the session
North Korean media remained silent on whether a parliamentary session was held. Then, on October 9, after it had finished, the KCNA published a brief report on the session. The following is clear from that report.
Kim Jong-un did not attend the session and did not deliver a policy statement. Party Secretary Jo Yong-won was also absent, but the rest of the Big Five members of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the KWP’s Central Committee, Kim Tok-hun (prime minister), Choe Ryong-hae (head of the legislature) and Ri Pyong-chol (overseer of the military bloc) were all present.
The constitution has been amended (with Choe Ryong-hae proposing the amendments), but the report did not mention what the amendments were. There is no news yet about any responses to the changes in the North Korean media either.
As reported by the KCNA, in his speech Choe stated that “in order for the Socialist Constitution to fully discharge its mission as a powerful legal weapon for glorifying the new era of a great powerful country, an era of our-state-first principle, it is needed to specify in it in time the WPK’s outstanding idea on national building and action programmes for it which meet the requirements of the changing and developing revolution and the aspirations and interests of the people.” Therefore, the issue of “amending the working and voting ages of the DPRK citizens was reflected in the relevant agenda item as the age of students who finish senior middle schools changes from this year after the adoption of the Law of the SPA on Enforcement of the Universal 12-Year Compulsory Education System.” The minimum voting and working ages (previously 17 and 16, respectively) ages are assumed to have been raised by one year.
A Law on light industry and a Law on Foreign Economic Affairs were adopted, and issues relating to the implementation of the Law on Quality Inspection were discussed. There was debate on all points.
There were new personnel appointments as well. No Kwang-chol was appointed as Defense Minister, Ri Man-su as Minister of State Construction Control, Kim Song-bin as chairman of the State Commission of Science and Technology, and Pan Tu-sop as Chairman of the SPA Legislative Suggestion Commission.
Discussion of results
Some experts said North Korea may have delayed the expected amendments until the next parliamentary session after the election of a new SPA in March 2025. Others insist that “it remains unclear whether the lack of mention in the KCNA report indicates that no amendments were made, or whether changes were made but not publicly disclosed.”
“There is a possibility that North Korea may adjust the timing of such a revision to after forming the 15th SPA in a bid to politically use the outcome of the US presidential election to the maximum,” said Yang Moo-jin, President of the University of North Korean Studies.
Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, also states: “I would say the amendment on unification was delayed until the next SPA to minimize internal confusion… The regime will take further steps to publicly show that it still upholds the ‘two-Koreas’ narrative”.
Tae Yong-ho, secretary general of the Peaceful Unification Advisory Council and a former North Korean deputy ambassador to the United Kingdom, believes that “North Korea may not have included leader Kim Jong-un’s position on two hostile states in the revised constitution because the regime has failed to fully communicate its anti-unification policies.” Inter-Korean unification has been a longstanding state goal of North Korea since the days of Kim Il Sung, and the radical change in policy, he argues, is hard for the people to understand and support.
What could that mean? While some publications, even respectable ones, have claimed to know exactly what amendments have been made to the Constitution, given their distance from North Korean sources their reports look like mere speculation. Scholars should focus on more valid sources, so as we wait for the publication of official documents, we need to bear in mind that the treaty between the DPRK and the Russian Federation was published by the KNCA before it was announced by the Russian Federation. On such an important issue, it would be a mistake to follow the example of those who interpreted the North Korean law on the struggle against reactionary culture by relying ONLY on South Korean or Western sources.
Konstantin Asmolov, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies, part of the China and Modern Asia Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
