The major split in the Tigray People’s Liberation Front has the potential to significantly shift the balance of power not only in the Tigray Regional State, but possibly in Ethiopia as a whole.
With the signing of the peace agreement between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal government of Ethiopia in Pretoria in November 2022, there has been a certain amount of speculation about the fate of Tigray. In this context, the “fate” of Tigray includes a wide range of different aspects, ranging from the safety of civilians to the problem of the possible redrawing (or “compression”) of the state’s borders. Largely in line with observers’ instinctive expectations, almost two years after the signing of the treaty the overall political situation in the region has by no means stabilized. On the contrary, the gradually growing differences of opinion have led to the emergence of new conflicts, including, above all, the internal crisis in the TPLF, one of Ethiopia’s oldest and once most influential political parties, whose long-standing unity has been undermined by a complex set of factors that are not always apparent to the casual observer. Nevertheless, it is very important to understand the reasons for the split among the Tigrayan political elite, and thus its possible consequences, given the general instability of Ethiopia’s political system and the security architecture in the wider region.
The TPLF: a historical overview
The TPLF was established in 1975 by a small group of ethnic Tigrayan students to carry out revolutionary activities in Tigray, an agrarian region in northern Ethiopia, long considered the cradle of Abyssinian civilization. The birth of the TPLF followed the overthrow of the last Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie I by the military, who formed a junta that formally proclaimed a turn towards socialism and a reorientation towards the USSR. However, the new authorities’ program was not accepted by certain figures from among the small Tigrayan intelligentsia, who, guided by nationalistic concerns, sought to protect their ethnic identity. During the years of guerrilla warfare in rural Tigray, the TPLF was able to garner widespread local support, with its land reform and ethnic mobilization initiatives rallying Tigrayans around the party. By 1991 it had not only cleansed the region of regime loyalists but also, with the help of Eritrean allies, gained control of the Ethiopian capital. In other words, what began in Tigray as a nationalist and revolutionary movement became a force whose military potential and political influence enabled the new Tigrayan elite to form part of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of ethnic parties that governed Ethiopia from 1994–2018.
Overall, up until 2018, the TPLF was able to maintain control over the Ethiopian political system through a wide range of administrative, military and political-ideological measures: (1) Ethiopia, which had hitherto been a unitary state, was transformed into a federation, in which the position of each of the country’s 85 ethnic groups was determined according to the principles of ethnic federalism—any ethnic group was given the right to establish its own administrative-territorial unit;
2) While it was always far from being the largest party within the ruling EPRDF, the TPLF initiated the formation of ethnic parties whose leaders were guided by the influential “Tigray clan”;
3) Ethnic Tigrayans made up about 75% of the top command staff in the Ethiopian National Defense Force (even though Tigrayans represent about 6% of the country’s population);
4) The TPLF actively appealed to the nationalist sentiments of various other ethnic groups, particularly by demonizing the Amharic people, the most influential group during the imperial period. However, the events of the Oromo Revolution in 2016–2018 and a series of miscalculations by Tigrayan politicians led to the collapse of the TPLF-centered system, the expulsion of its leaders from all key positions, and the subsequent clash between the new government of Abiy Ahmed and the TPLF during the 2020–2022 conflict in Tigray.
It should be noted here that despite the apparent cohesion of the “Tigray clan,” already in the 1990s there were some signals indicating the inability of the narrow circle of the movement’s leaders to maintain unity even in the absence of serious external challenges. In particular, Aregawi Berhe, one of the founding fathers of the TPLF, left the party, and subsequently wrote a number of academic papers criticizing the policies of its leadership. And then, as a result of controversies during the 1998–2000 armed conflict with Eritrea, Lt. Gen. Tsadkan Gebretensae, the head of the country’s Armed Forces, resigned from his post. Thus, even during the period when the TPLF’s political power was at its greatest, there were isolated instances that demonstrated the leadership’s inability to ensure a permanent consensus among the party’s core members and to avoid open manifestations of dissent. However, despite the departure of some functionaries who formed opposition parties in Tigray, until 2022 the TPLF remained a fairly coherent structure that proved its internal resilience both in the face of the loss of control over the federal center and during the ensuing civil war.
The 2020–2022 Tigray conflict: impact on the internal health of the party
With the fall of the government of Hailemariam Desalegn, which remained loyal to the TPLF although it was not led by an ethnic Tigrayan, and the emergence of Abiy Ahmed as prime minister, a direct clash between the TPLF and the new ruling coalition became more and more likely with each passing month. To a large extent, the emergence of such a visible threat from non-Tigray elites contributed to the relatively painless resolution of the crises that had been brewing in the TPLF’s relations with the Tigrayan population and within the party. The point is that following their loss of control over the federal center, the TPLF leaders retained only one natural pillar of their now unstable political influence—the support of ethnic Tigrayans. However, this was now in question, as, initially focused on resolving the problems of its own region, the TPLF eventually changed its priorities in favor of a country-wide agenda. However, the approaching escalation of the conflict with Addis Ababa allowed the leaders of the TPLF to effectively take advantage of the ethnic mobilization and thus 1) avoid mass protests, 2) bring a number of major figures, including Lt. Gen. Tsadkan Gebretensae, back into Tigray’s service and, finally, 3) gain the support of the regional opposition to hold elections without the consent of Addis Ababa.
Ivan Kopytsev, political scientist and research assistant at the Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
