With the outbreak of hostilities in Syria in 2011 – the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ – the EU immediately introduced sanctions against Syria and backed the opposition. EU policy on Syria has seen no drastic changes throughout the years of conflict, but is this about to change?
EU policy on Syria
Although the EU’s influence in Syria has mostly been through humanitarian aid, the union has had a firm ‘Pressure through disengagement’ political position vis-à-vis Syria since the beginning of the conflict. The initial response (2011-2013) was the introduction of sanctions by the Council of Europe in line with US sanctions, support of a diplomatic resolution to the conflict by engaging in the UN-led Geneva Process and Friends of the Syrian People platform, as well as sending humanitarian aid. The Geneva Communiqué became the effective basis for EU policy on Syria. Similarly to the US, the EU refuses to engage in the reconstruction of Syria alongside official Damascus before power-sharing and political demands are satisfied, as outlined in UNSC Resolution 2254.
Currently, the main pillars of EU Syria policy remain humanitarian aid and unilateral restrictive measures. Besides this, the EU plays an extremely limited political role. In the earlier years of the conflict, there were attempts by member states to intervene militarily, but they failed to agree upon such a step. The 2015 regional strategy for Syria and Iraq, adopted in response to the rise of Daesh*, which was reviewed and published again as the Strategy on Syria (2017), calls for political transition in line with resolution 2254 as a sole solution to the crisis. This policy solidifies EU aversity to normalisation with Bashar al-Assad’s government and maintains extensive EU involvement in the humanitarian aspect. The annual Brussels Conference (active since 2017) kept alive the opposition and saw it thrive with the help of the EU. There is no formal EU recognition of AANES, as already difficult relations with Türkiye remain a priority for the Union, as well as curbing any more migration. Thus, the broad EU vision for Syria is as follows: political transition as stipulated by Resolution 2254 and the Geneva Communiqué, overseen by the UN Special Envoy and supported by key international actors; promoting democracy by supporting Syrian civil society and related organisations; trial for war crimes should be a precursor to a legitimate political transition.
Some European countries are reconsidering
Earlier this month eight European states, namely Croatia, Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Slovakia and Slovenia, appealed to Brussels to reassess the EU’s Syria policy. The foreign ministers of the eight states directed a letter to High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, in which they stated: “Our goal is a more active, outcome-driven and operational Syria policy. This would allow us to increase our political leverage [and] the effectiveness of our humanitarian assistance”. The foreign ministers also point to EU Syria policy being outdated, as it has remained unchanged for years despite significant changes, including the stabilisation of the military situation (official Damascus controls approximately 70% of Syria), the start of Russia’s Special Military Operation and the steady intra-Arab normalisation with Syria taking place (in May of last year, for example, Syrian membership in the Arab League was fully reinstated).
Another document was circulated to other European capitals with the proposal to create a European envoy for Syria, who would engage with official Damascus, as well as other Syrian actors and states in the region. Additionally, the ministers considered re-evaluating the EU sanctions policy, admitting that it had largely failed, producing “unintended negative effects…on the [Syrian] population” – to put it mildly. Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg: “After 13 years of war, we have to admit that our Syria policy has not ages well”.
It is nonetheless a controversial move, and it can be expected that other European capitals will criticise such a change of policy, citing the same reasons as always, i.e. human rights violations of the al-Assad government.
Why the change of heart?
The letter of the foreign ministers also said that “Syrians continue to leave in huge numbers, putting additional strain on neighbouring countries, in a period when tension in the area is running high, risking new refugee waves”. It is no secret that Europe is facing a refugee crisis, and many European politicians use the problem of refugees as a key talking point. In Türkiye, there are currently approximately four million Syrian refugees; Türkiye is a key link in the Western Balkan Route, one of the main route for migrants coming into Europe. A lot of Syrian refugees also reach Cyprus via Lebanon.
It was not made clear in the letter what exact measures should be taken to curb the flow of Syrian migrants into Europe. Do they want to adopt the Danish approach? Since 2019, Denmark has declined to renew the residency permits of 1,200 Syrians from the Damascus governate and thereby deported them, citing that the region had become safe for return. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, a Cypriot official said that a policy of deporting Syrians would not necessarily be implemented, rather that Syrian refugees from ‘safe areas’ would lose allowances, benefits and work permits, creating a ‘disincentive’ (this effectively sounds the same as the Danish approach).
Besides deportation, it is difficult to imagine how the EU intends to solve this issue. Cooperation with official Damascus would likely aid in this process, although the forced return of a large number of Syrians to Syria would be problematic in terms of security, infrastructure (a lot of civilian infrastructure still has yet to be rebuilt because of the war) and job opportunities.
Another reason for reconsideration was clearly expressed by Italy. Italy has announced that it will soon return its ambassador to Syria after a decade’s absence – the first G7 state to do so (although six European countries currently do have an embassy in Damascus, namely the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus and Hungary). Speaking before parliamentary committees, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani explained that re-establishing diplomatic relations with the Syrian Arab Republic would ‘prevent Russia from monopolising diplomatic efforts on Syria’. Schallenberg also said that “bitter as it is, with the help of Iran and Russia, the Assad regime remains firmly in the saddle, the Syrian opposition is fragmented pr in exile altogether – the European Union cannot turn a blind eye to this reality any longer”.
Although Damascus is very much interested in lifting sanctions – the EU was Syria’s number one trade partner before 2011 – it is difficult to imagine that the years of sour relations will be set aside and forgotten. The dreams of certain European leaders to force out Russian and Iranian influence from Syria are just that: dreams. Both Russia and Iran consistently stood by Syria throughout the conflict militarily (Russia since 2015), economically and diplomatically. The EU did – and still does – everything to promote the Syrian opposition and participated in the illegal invasion of Syria under the auspices of the Global Coalition headed by the US. Furthermore, US influence over Europe should also be considered; it is very unlikely that the US’ European NATO allies will depart completely from the staunch anti-Assad stance of the US.
If there will, indeed, be a European consensus of a revision of Syria policy and the EU will restore diplomatic ties with Syria (though this is currently only a possibility being floated), Damascus will certainly be open to this and will readily discuss and cooperate on problems in bilateral relations, especially regarding the economic and financial dimension. However, Damascus will not forget who stood by its side for years, so the European hope to weaken Russian and Iranian positions within Syria is not grounded in reality, rather it is wishful thinking.
*- Organisation banned in the Russian Federation
Vanessa Sevidova, researcher-expert on the Middle East and Africa, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
