The more I watch the Armenian government and its increasing desire to divorce itself from its traditional protector, Russia, and join the EU and NATO, the more I wonder what possible logic they could be following? I am constantly wondering what the leadership in Yerevan is thinking, and what information they have which is not public. Maybe there is a method to their madness.
Armenia wants to give more land to Azerbaijan, with a promise from the US that it will protect it, and that is really delusional – and also to cancel their security pact with Russia, and that is suicidal madness! It is as if they don’t know their own history. It can end up like Gaza, even worse!
Armenians, their own worst enemy!
In light of the abject failure of US and EU policy in Ukraine, and the Russian demolition of the Ukrainian armed forces and defense industry, it seems tantamount to national suicide for Armenia to irritate, some would even say betray, the Russian Federation, especially given the repeated defeats of the Armenian armed forces in the 2020 and 2023 wars over Nagorno-Karabakh, which have resulted in ever more Azeri battlefield victories.
It is interesting to compare the trajectory of the Armenian pivot towards the west with that of its neighbor, Georgia. Despite officially retaining the ‘desire’ to join the EU and NATO, Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party has been increasingly dragging its feet on the so-called ‘reforms’ demanded by the west.
Georgia has also staunchly refused to join sanctions against the Russian state over the conflict in Ukraine. In addition, the Georgian government has bowed to public pressure to implement laws banning gay propaganda, particularly the so-called pride movement, and such a law is currently being drafted.
The attitude displayed by Pashinyan and his minions, especially foreign sponsors, towards Russia is proving counterproductive. Pashinyan came to power in what is strongly suspected to be another of the infamous ‘Color Revolutions’ that the US and EU have sponsored throughout the former Soviet Republics since the first one in Georgia in 2003.
Pashinyan came to power on May 8th 2018, and immediately began changing the country’s course from membership of the CIS and CSTO to a ‘path to EU membership’, which, needless to say, was only ever going to antagonize the country that had, for at least 200 years, provided a shield to protect the Armenians from their historic enemies in the region, especially Turkey and Azerbaijan.
The policy brought about a bitter ending, when in the 2020 war for Nagorno-Karabakh, the Russians, to the surprise of many (but not, let us say, to anyone with an understanding of regional history, or any form of logic), did not come to the aid of the Armenians as they were following international law, and Armenia proper was not attacked.
Disciplined and resurgent Azeri military
Armenian troops were resoundingly defeated by a disciplined and resurgent Azeri military, backed up in Turkish technology, military advisors, and leadership.
Hence, Russia limited its involvement to brokering a ceasefire, claiming that its security guarantees to Armenia only applied to “Recognized Armenian Territory”, which, given even the Armenian state did not recognize Artsakh (the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh), as part of their territory, meant that any Russian intervention would not be legal or politically appropriate.
It is my belief that the Azeri government had received some form of green light to retake the internationally recognized areas of their country occupied by Armenia surrounding the main Armenian enclave.
Some claim that elements of the Russian state saw this as a way to punish Pashinyan, and encourage him to revise his policies to a form less unfriendly to Russia. The Russian government publicly warned against any attack on Armenia proper, at which point Russia would be forced to intervene, and the Azeri military were careful not to spread the conflict outside their lost territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh itself.
At the end of the conflict, Russia, in agreement with both parties, deployed peacekeepers to ensure the physical safety of the Armenian population in the conflict zone, while Baku agreed not to move against NK itself.
Rather than reversing course as a result of these disasters, Pashinyan doubled down on his pro-western policies. This only served to further antagonize the Russian government. Repeated public statements blaming Russia for the loss of the areas around NK were made. The only result was that Azerbaijan began to act more confidently in their actions toward the Armenian population in NK, step-by-step tightening the screws in the form of a blockade of the remaining Armenian populated areas, especially the regional capital of Stepanakert.
Tensions again came to a head in 2023, and the Azeri military launched a full-scale invasion of the de-facto republic on 19th September, and the demoralized Armenian militia units (and some regular Armenian army units as well) soon collapsed. By the next day, it was obvious that the Armenians would have to surrender, and the Russians again began brokering a ceasefire.
Fighting ended on the 21st of September, and, despite Azeri promises to respect the rights of Armenians in return for their acceptance of Azeri citizenship, the Armenian population began to flee the area en masse. By 28th September, the leadership of Artsakh declared the republic “dissolved” and the Azeri victory was complete.
No base, then no security umbrella!
Since the end of 2023, Pashinyan has only increased his rhetoric against Russia, threatening to leave the CSTO, and to close the Russian base at Gumri. He has also, for the first time, raised the specter of Armenia joining NATO. Either policy would be a disaster for his country. The Russian base at Gumri, and Russian guarantees of Armenian security, are all that stand between the country and a full-scale invasion by Azerbaijan.
The US and France have been making promises to rearm and even protect Armenia from “further Azeri aggression” and both the US and EU have been pushing Georgia to side with the Armenians, though given the tensions between both countries, particularly over Armenian support for separatists in Abkhazia, this is highly unlikely.
Given their abject failure to protect their neo-Nazi puppets in Ukraine, it is hard to understand why anyone would bank on western security guarantees. We can only speculate that the US and its European allies hope to create some form of second front that they hope will divert Russian resources from the SMO in Ukraine, having singularly failed to do so in Georgia.
Now the Azeris are making more claims, demanding the return of villages in other disputed areas of the border, one of which carries the main pipeline supplying gas from Russia via Georgia. It is obvious that the Azeri government has not been satisfied with its previous gains, and is now talking about the need for a transit corridor to its enclave to the south-west of Armenia. Pashinyan seems to be ready to cave to Azeri demands over the villages, but is also banking on NATO, after a recent visit by Jean Stoltenberg, the current NATO chairman where a new tailored partnership was announced. Given how little NATO has done for Georgia in 2008, or Ukraine in the current conflict, this seems unwise at best.
One can only question if Pashinyan’s course is really supported by the majority of the Armenian population, and if so, question what madness has overtaken them. The current course is likely to end in a disaster for the Armenian people, who would be well advised to return to their traditional good relations with Russia, upon which their future almost certainly depends.
The same can also be said for Georgia, though at least the public in that country seem to be waking up to the fact.
Henry Kamens, columnist, expert on Central Asia and Caucasus, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.