Discussions that the DPRK’s attempt to launch a satellite will entail the rupture of the inter-Korean military agreement impel the author to remind the audience how the preparation process for this launch is going on.
On May 31, North Korea launched its first military spy satellite, Malligyong-1, mounted on a new-type carrier rocket, Chollima-1. According to North Korean media, the rocket crashed into the Yellow Sea after the second stage engine malfunctioned. In July 2023, North Korean satellite debris was retrieved from the Yellow Sea, after which South Korean experts declared that the satellite “had no meaningful military use.” According to experts, for a satellite to perform as a full-fledged spy satellite, it has to have a sub-meter resolution camera.
On August 17, Conservative MP Yoo Sang-bum said North Korea was preparing to carry out various military provocations, including launching an intercontinental ballistic missile, ahead of the upcoming trilateral summit between South Korea, the United States and Japan.
On August 22, 2023, North Korea notified the Japanese Coast Guard of its intention to launch an artificial Earth satellite between August 24 and August 31, after which the ROK Unification Ministry Spokesperson called North Korea’s plans unacceptable and violative of UN Security Council resolutions. The United States also called on Pyongyang to refrain from launching the satellite.
The launch took place on August 24. According to KCNA, the flights of the first and second stages of the new-type carrier rocket Chollima-1 were normal, but the launch failed due to an error in the emergency blasting system during the third-stage flight (i.e., emergency detonation). The DPRK National Aerospace Development Administration said it would find out the cause of the abnormal operation of the emergency blasting system as soon as possible, take appropriate measures and carry out a third launch in October.
The rocket flew further than during the previous attempt and, as Russian experts noted, if during the first launch the first stage was normal and a failure occurred in the second stage, the second attempt failed during the third stage of its flight.
The UN Security Council held an open session on August 26 in New York to condemn North Korea’s satellite launch, which ended without the adoption of a resolution condemning the DPRK’s actions because Russia and China vetoed its adoption. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield said that despite the unsuccessful attempt to launch the satellite, it had once again violated UN Security Council resolutions. Pyongyang’s actions were condemned by the majority of council members, but no resolution was adopted due to opposition from China and Russia. Russia’s Ambassador to the UN Vassily Nebenzia called the session “a hypocritical attempt to divert attention from the reckless actions of the United States and its allies in the region, which pose real threats to peace and security.” China’s deputy U.N. Ambassador Geng Shuang supported the opinion of the Russian diplomat, blaming the United States for the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s U.N. Ambassador repeated Pyongyang’s previous statement that developing nuclear weapons and launching missiles was the legitimate right of a sovereign nation. South Korea’s Ambassador Hwang Joon-kook noted that the threats posed by North Korea had led to the strengthening of extended deterrence cooperation between Seoul and Washington.
Then, as with a nuclear test, they began to predict dates according to the well-known principle “a holiday is approaching, so they will launch it on the eve of it.” From a technical point of view, although ROK experts considered North Korea’s second failure to launch a spy satellite to be a humiliating setback for its leader Kim Jong-un, the country appears to have resolved its space rocket engine problems and is very likely to make its third attempt in October, as promised. The launch was “scheduled” for October 10, the founding anniversary of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party. And North Korea’s honest reporting of failure was interpreted by Hong Min, a researcher at the state-run Korea Institute for National Unification, as its desire to “announce its impending success after trial and errors, like other normal satellite-developing countries.”
On October 10, KCNA circulated an article by Ri Song-jin, a researcher at the National Aerospace Technology Administration, which states that the launch of the DPRK’s military reconnaissance satellite Malligyong-1 and the implementation of space programs are an “inevitable and uncontested strategic choice” for Pyongyang amid moves by Washington to “militarize space.” In this regard, specialists from the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) under the eponymous Ministry have set a launch date for the period from October 10 to October 26.
It was reported on October 19 that specialists from the 38 North Internet portal analyzed recent satellite images of the North Korean Sohae Cosmodrome, which showed that Pyongyang continues to modernize and expand the facility. However, there were no clear signs of the impending launch of a reconnaissance satellite.
On October 26, when time was up, the ROK Unification Ministry Spokesperson said there were no signs that North Korea was preparing for another launch of a military reconnaissance satellite. However, the official did not comment on rumors that North Korea may have delayed the launch of its satellite as it waits for advanced satellite technology from Russia. He said that military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang would be a violation of UN Security Council resolutions. Specialists from the Korea Institute for National Unification also explained the possible delay in the launch with consultations between Pyongyang and Moscow in this area in order to minimize the risk of failure.
And since that time, an interesting trend has emerged. If earlier launch delays were explained by the backwardness of the DPRK’s missile industry, which was a reason for joy, now the delay began to be explained by possible assistance from the Russian Federation, which caused concern. Therefore, on October 31, the chief of the press service of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the ROK Armed Forces, Lee Sung-jun, said that the military refrained from making forecasts regarding the timing of the third attempt to launch a North Korean satellite, and intelligence was limited to formulations like “preparations are in their final stages” because “the North lacks funds and technology and it has not yet mastered the atmospheric re-entry and multi-warhead technologies required for an intercontinental ballistic missile.”
ROK Defense Minister Shin Won-sik said on Friday, November 3, 2023, that North Korea may have delayed its plan to make a third attempt to launch a spy satellite to resolve technological glitches in the third-stage system with Russian assistance. This will probably happen at the end of November. But most interestingly, Shin revealed the South Korean military’s plan to launch its first reconnaissance satellite carried by SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket from California’s Vandenberg Air Force Base on November 30 and a plan to launch a domestic solid-fuel rocket later this year. This satellite is intended to become one of the “eyes” of the Kill Chain system (preemptive strike against the DPRK) and is a device on which electro-optical and infrared sensors are installed, which makes it possible to identify objects 30 cm in size, as well as carry out high-resolution photography. South Korea stated that the capabilities of its reconnaissance satellite were approximately 100 times greater than those of the North Korean device (resolution 30 cm versus 3 m).
On November 6, 2023, ROK Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho said at a press conference that North Korea could postpone the launch of its satellite because it was expecting technological assistance from Russia. “There is a very high probability that North Korea will undertake provocations once the technical issues are resolved.” Russia’s alleged transfer of satellite technology to the North is a violation of UN Security Council resolutions, but Seoul and Washington are working closely to respond “decisively” to these violations.
At the same time, the military set a new date for the launch, namely on the eve of Missile Industry Day, which will be celebrated in North Korea on November 18 this year. On this day in 2022, the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile was successfully launched.
On November 19, after the North missed a widely anticipated deadline, Minister Shin Won-sik said North Korea could launch its spy satellite “within a week or so,” or no later than November 30, the target date for the launch of the South Korean military-intelligence apparatus from the American Vandenberg base. “It takes about a week to move the engine from the test site to Tongchang-ri (launch site), assemble the launch pad and fill it with liquid fuel.” The minister indicated that the allies were closely monitoring the launch, as a successful launch would mean progress in missile technology that could be used as a weapon. In addition, Pyongyang’s progress in this area will diminish the ROK’s advantage over North Korea in reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities and means.
On November 20, Lt. Gen. Kang Ho-pil, chief director of operations at the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the ROK Armed Forces, said that if preparations for the launch continue, “necessary measures will be taken to protect the lives and safety of South Koreans.” Kang did not specify what he meant by “necessary measures,” but experts believe the government is considering partially suspending the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement.
Everyone froze in expectation, November 21 came and, according to Japanese media, Pyongyang notified Tokyo of its plans to make its third attempt between November 22 and December 1. The notice names three areas where fragments of rocket stages could fall: the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea and the Pacific Ocean east of the Philippine island of Luzon. All of these areas are outside Japan’s exclusive economic zone.
However, according to Chang Young-keun, a rocket scientist at the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy, the rocket drop zones remain almost the same as last time, meaning North Korea will use the same engine it used previously, and therefore there is no obvious help from Moscow. In an interview with the Korea Times, Chang explains that “their military suspects that the previous failure was caused by engine problems. But the expected drop zones suggest otherwise… “This attempt was also made just three months after the second… It would be unwise to assume that there were any changes in engine design or any significant technical additions.”
Given the short period of time for possible cooperation and the complexity of the technologies involved, Chang believes any help the Kremlin could offer at this near-completion stage is very limited. Consequently, “Russian technical support is not the most important success factor; rather, the point is that the problems North Korea found after the two attempts were not significant ones that would require structural changes. Russia may have provided support in managing ground operations, among other things, but it is certainly not a game changer.”
Of course, South Korea and Japan began to panic and prepare in case the rocket landed in the wrong place. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida instructed the military to be prepared for “unforeseen circumstances” by taking the necessary military measures. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have “created the necessary structure” using Aegis-equipped ships and Patriot PAC-3 systems, and the ROK Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries has issued a navigation warning for three sea zones that Pyongyang identified as potential areas for rocket stage fragments to fall.
It is very likely that by the time the article is published, the satellite will take off (hopefully successfully), and this will cause (hopefully less severe than we expect) a new round of the inter-Korean crisis. According to Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies, tension on the Korean Peninsula will certainly rise. Seoul’s most likely move is to terminate or suspend the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement. Pyongyang’s most likely response, other than remilitarizing the border area, is to launch a solid-fuel medium-range ballistic missile, although ultra-conservative experts are already proposing a nuclear test.
Thus, the author’s favorite “dangerous trait” in the headlines has become one step closer.
Konstantin Asmolov, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Leading Researcher at the Center for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the internet journal “New Eastern Outlook”.