On January 15, 2024, the extended 10th session of the Fourteenth National People’s Congress of the DPRK was held in the Mansudae Convention Palace in Pyongyang, with central and regional leaders, including the Party Central Committee, the Presidium of the National People’s Congress, the Cabinet and representatives of ministries, central agencies, and security agencies participating as observers.
The agenda of the session included two items:
- The fulfilment of the DPRK’s State Budget for Juche Year 112 (2023) and the State Budget for Juche Year 113 (2024);
- The abolition of the DPRK’s Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Homeland, the Office for the Promotion of the National Economy, and the Office for International Tourism in the Kumgang Mountains. In fact, it was the latter item that attracted the most attention, because Kim Jong-un’s policy speech “On the Next Tasks for the Prosperity and Development of the Republic and the Improvement of the People’s Welfare” gave official form to the decisive U-turn in the DPRK’s policy on relations between the two Koreas that was first initiated in the December 2023 plenary session of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea.
The military and political section of Kim Jong-un’s keynote speech began by summing up the current situation. “Far from improving, the security situation of our state has continued to deteriorate day by day, and today it is facing a more serious risk of war than any other region in the world.”[1] Therefore “preparations for the great event have become an unfortunate reality.” Kim also notes the importance of paying attention to the situation in the Middle East. “The deputies present at this session should not consider the horrors of the indiscriminate war being waged in the Middle East today as only someone else’s business, but should remain firm in their conviction that military force represents the security, dignity and imposing appearance of a state and its people, and make every effort to strengthen our defense capability a hundred, a thousand times over, and up to the very maximum.”
As far as military construction is concerned, Kim pointed out that “the preparation of the People’s Army for war is inconceivable without the modernization of military equipment,” while also drawing attention to the civil defense sector, which “needs to learn an important lesson from the superficial and misguided work done in this area in the past, and must keep records of the improvement of war readiness preparations, and, starting anew, take up this task with revolutionary zeal.”
This is a rather important point. Kim calls war a “great event,” but in his speech this phrase is not unambiguously positive in its connotations. In fact, throughout the speech he emphasizes that readiness for war does not mean readiness to initiate a military conflict. Moreover, his focus on civil and territorial defense indicates that he thinks of war not as a “mighty blow with little bloodshed” against the South, but as a conflict launched by the South side and implying hostilities against the territory of the North. It is in the territory of the DPRK, in fact, that the territorial defense troops (Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Militia) would embark on an all-out war. It is in this context that we should understand the quote: “the organs of the people’s power must take consistent measures to switch to military action immediately in the event of an emergency, and make thorough and practical preparations for a nationwide resistance.”
To what extent is Kim right? If we look at the world from North Korea’s perspective, then the intensification of military cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Korea, insofar as it amounts to moves towards the formation of an Asian version of NATO, and taking into account the scale of the exercises, may well be interpreted as preparations by Washington and Seoul for a war of aggression against the North. Moreover, being, in terms of his values, a confirmed pro-Westerner, President Yun Seok-yol clearly does not like the DPRK and does not intend to make any concessions to a regime for which he feels a personal distaste.
From an external perspective, it is evident that both North and South Korea are caught in a security dilemma, which is leading to an arms race. Each side believes in “achieving peace through power” and demands that its “legitimate self-defense measures” (as North Korea puts it) must not be confused with “enemy provocations”. In this context, North Korea’s missile launches are contributing less to regional tensions than South Korea’s constant military drills involving practice maneuvers including “preventive strikes” and “decapitation attacks”.
In fact, many actions are being taken with the long-term goal of a regional confrontation with China and Russia, although this objective is not openly publicized, and all the measures are presented as a response to the threat from North Korea.
Just as importantly, in 2023, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration nullified the few gains of the 2018 Olympic rapprochement. The military agreement between the two Koreas has been discarded. The US Department of Defense White Paper and other documents list North Korea as an enemy, and in some places as “enemy number 1”. South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, which was responsible for organizing contacts between the two Koreas during the Moon Jae-in administration, has been radically reorganized and turned into a propaganda and intelligence agency.
To be frank, Moon Jae-in maximized the benefits of the dialog between North and South Korea for his own personal political gain, following his calm and problem-free hosting of the Olympics and his trip to Pyongyang. It was not necessary for him to do any more. The Democrats adopt a “soft” line towards North Korea not so much out of real sympathy, but out of the logic of factionalism. With the Conservatives actively disliking North Korea, the Democrats are forced to take a different position.
It is no coincidence that South Korea’s reunification strategy has failed to change under Moon Jae-in’s administration. If the North Korean model was developed on the principle of “one country, one nation, two systems” and moved away from the idea of a Confederation, South Korea saw unification as “reunification.” According to Article 3 of South Korea’s constitution, cited by Kim Jong-un at the December 2023 forum, South Korea claims the entire Korean Peninsula and its islands as its territory. The Committee for the Five Northern Korean Provinces, as a body that “administers” the “illegally seized” territories, has not been disbanded, nor has the National Security Law been repealed, under Moon Jae-in’s administration, which treats the DPRK as an “anti-state organization”.
In this situation, North Korea’s concept of unification, which was already questionable when it was first proclaimed in 1980, has become rapidly obsolete, given the ongoing debate in the expert community about whether North and South Koreans are two different nations or a single nation.
75 years of division is a significant amount of time, and, regrettably, once the toothpaste is out of the tube it cannot be put back. Although the North and South agreed on the three principles of unification in 1972 and even built an arch in 2001 to celebrate the future unification after Kim Dae-jung’s visit to Pyongyang in 2000, they have continued to drift apart over the past 20 or so years. That is why, during the December 2023 session, Kim Jong-un found the strength to embark on a radical change of course and acknowledge that there are two adversarial states on the Korean Peninsula. Naturally, the plenary session described South Korean politics and culture as having become a mere appendage to US politics and culture, and recognized that the basis for cultural communication no longer exists, reconciliation is impossible and South Koreans are not compatriots dreaming of a unified country.
The ideas presented in December are now being implemented. As Kim Jong-un stated succinctly, “today the Supreme People’s Assembly put an end to 80 years of relations between the two Koreas, and put the policy of our Republic toward the South on a new legal footing based on the recognition of two states coexisting in the Korean Peninsula”.
According to the North Korean leader, “the bitter history of relations between the two Koreas has led us to the undeniable conclusion that we cannot go along the road of national restoration and reunification together with a “Republic of Korea” that has adopted as its state policy an all-out confrontation with our Republic and dreams of “the collapse of the power of the North” and “unification by absorption.” Naturally, Kim blamed Seoul for the situation, but, more importantly, Pyongyang recognized the reality of the situation – that the two Koreas are not two parts of a divided nation, but rather two states that are extremely hostile to each other. This leads to a series of new conclusions.
Firstly, “all the organizations we established to promote solidarity and peaceful reunification” are legally obsolete. The agenda of the plenary session names the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Homeland, the National Economic Cooperation Bureau, and the Office for International Tourism in the Kumgang Mountains. The United Front Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which was in many ways the North Korean counterpart of the Ministry of Unification, will either be abolished or restructured.
After the plenary session, North Korean media reported on a working meeting between Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui and officials dealing with South Korean issues, including Ri Son-gwon, Head of the United Front Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea. Shortly afterwards, Radio Pyongyang, which used to broadcast to South Korean audiences and transmit encrypted numbered instructions to North Korean agents operating in South Korea, ceased its operations. Its website is now unavailable. The Naenara website (which uses the North Korean .kp domain) has removed its Uriminzokkiri (Korean for “ The Way of Our Nation”) page, which featured content dedicated to unification. The Way of Our Nation) page, which featured content dedicated to unification. Other propaganda websites aimed at readers in the South have also become inaccessible.
Secondly, Kim Jong-un has proposed adding a clause to the Constitution that defines the country’s territorial limits, similar to that in South Korea’s Constitution. According to Kim Jong-un “there is currently no such clause in our country’s Constitution.” The amendments are expected to be adopted in the next session, and it will be interesting to see what language is used to describe the national boundaries. On North Korean TV, only the northern part of the Korean peninsula is now shown, in situations (such as on weather forecasts) in which the entire peninsula used to be shown. Thus, on January 17, North Korea’s state broadcaster showed a map depicting only the northern part of the Korean Peninsula in red. Previously, on such maps, the entire Korean Peninsula, including the Jeju and Ulleung islands, was highlighted in red. However, it is also possible that, as in South Korea’s Constitution, and in response to it, the entire peninsula will be declared as the territory of the DPRK.
In this context, the question of what to do with the current borders, particularly the Northern Limit Line, is interesting. The maritime boundary in question is disputed and was drawn solely for the benefit of the South. The North did not recognize it, and most border conflicts have occurred in this area. Kim Jong-un has stated that “if South Korea violates even 0.001 mm of our territorial land, air or waters, this will be considered an act of war.”
Thirdly, the Constitution is expected to reflect that if war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, the South Korea will be fully integrated into North Korea. This language used by North Korea would be similar to that of South Korea, but with an important caveat: the South is not considered as a “surrendered territory that MUST be invaded,” but rather as a hostile state that MAY be invaded if it initiates a war.
Fourthly, “the constitutional revision should be followed by timely practical measures to do away with remnants of the past era which may be seen as symbols of such concepts as ‘two Koreas with a shared heritage and homogeneous relations’, ‘the shared strength of our nation’ and ‘peaceful reunification’ etc.”
The removal of the “One Korea” concept from North Korea’s national history appears excessively harsh and dogmatic. However it is, in fact, based on a recognition of the real state of affairs. In many ways, the North Korea’s actions mirror those of South Korea, although South Korea’s policy shift was carried out with less fanfare. What is more, when describing life in South Korea, North Korean propaganda has exaggerated anything that fits in with its party line, while ignoring other trends. Reading North Korean articles about the South, one might think that the latter country was in a state of unrest, with mass demonstrations demanding the impeachment of Yoon Suk-yeol.
That having been said, immediately after describing practical measures that could be taken for preparations for war, Kim Jong-un clarified North Korea’s position on a possible conflict, stating that “We will never unilaterally unleash a war if the enemies do not attack us.” Kim emphasized that not wanting war is not a sign of weakness, and that if “the danger of the outbreak of a war breaking out because of an escalation following a physical clash has considerably aggravated, and has reached a red line… we will not seek war, but we also have no intention of avoiding it.” If there is any indication of an attempt to initiate a war, the DPRK will utilize its entire arsenal, including nuclear weapons, and “this war would destroy the entity called the Republic of Korea and put an end to its existence, and would also inflict an unimaginable calamity and defeat on the US.”
At the end of the foreign policy section, Kim Jong-un named his country’s policy goals:
- To prevent violations of its sovereignty and counter the US policy of double standards, to “strive to realize international justice based on respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and to seek to establish a new international order.”
- To prioritize the establishment of relationships with socialist countries, and “cooperate with all countries and nations aspiring after independence and justice, irrespective of their ideology and social system.” As readers will note, neither the People’s Republic of China nor the Russian Federation were explicitly mentioned.
Although Kim Jong-un’s statements may have caused quite a stir among political commentators, it is significant that, as an English-speaking acquaintance of the present author put it, “Pyongyang has finally gotten off its dead horse.” The extent to which the new model of relations between North and South Korea will provide deterrence is a topic for a separate discussion. On one hand, the current situation is reminiscent of the Cold War-era standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States, in which, despite the high tensions, neither side crossed the line. However, political tensions and propaganda can lead to provocations, misinterpretation of others’ actions and other undesirable consequences, all of which can lead to conflict.
Konstantin Asmolov, Candidate of Historical Sciences and Leading Researcher at the Center for Korean Studies at the Institute of China and Modern Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”