This is not the first time that Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has demonstrated to Russia the policy of double standards. Once again, it is all about Ukraine.
On the one hand, Ankara assures Moscow of its interest in: achieving peace as soon as possible; extension of the “grain deal”; maintaining the pace of economic cooperation; development of flexible diplomacy and peacekeeping missions; recognition of the realities on the ground (that is, the fact of Russian military control of a number of former Ukrainian regions and Crimea), etc.
On the other hand, Turkey: continues to declare recognition of the territorial integrity of Ukraine according to the borders as defined before March, 2014 (that is, Crimea as part of Ukraine); in violation of the agreements reached with the Russian Federation in the fall of 2022, transfers to the Kiev regime former prisoners from among the Azov militants (a nationalist organization banned in the Russian Federation); supports Ukraine’s entry into NATO; provides the Ukrainian Armed Forces with humanitarian, intelligence and information, military and military-technical assistance, including the supply of lethal weapons, military equipment, operators and even militants.
It cannot be said that Russia does not notice such contradictions in the behavior of its “friend” Erdoğan. However, every time high authorities note that, despite obvious disagreements or differences in some issues (interests and approaches), Russia highly appreciates the existing partnership and reliability of Turkey on other topics of bilateral and multilateral relations.
Some see this as Russia’s obvious economic dependence on Turkey in light of the harsh anti-Russian sanctions of the Collective West and Erdoğan’s refusal to join all sanctions. In particular, it is noted that Turkey has become a kind of “new window” for the Russian Federation, because a considerable part of our goods pass through Turkish territory and so-called “parallel transit” from third countries arrives from Turkey. Moreover, Ankara strictly adheres to the Black Sea Montreux Convention of 1936 and does not allow NATO warships to enter the Black Sea, where the conflict is taking place in the Special Military Operation zone. However, NATO already has a military fleet in the Black Sea basin, taking into account the presence of three Black Sea member countries of the alliance (Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania) and two aspiring partners in pro-Western Georgia and Ukraine.
Meanwhile, the position of the Russian Federation’s leadership boils down to maintaining maximum constructivism in relations with Turkey, taking into account not only the current crisis in Russian-Ukrainian relations, but also for many other reasons the trade, economic and regional ties. Russia offers Turkey stability and constructive partnership, searching for common ground and eliminating tendencies towards confrontation. This approach of Moscow cannot but be considered positive. The whole problem is that partnership (or cooperation) is not achieved by the desire or intention of one party, but requires an adequate approach on the part of the partner itself – in this case, Turkey.
There are, of course, many skeptics in Russian circles regarding a long-term partnership or alliance between Russia and Turkey. Their arguments include: the long and relatively turbulent history of Russian-Turkish relations, where the parties fought more than once and many times remained opponents; Turkey’s continued membership in NATO, which views Russia as its main enemy; the imperial past and present neo-imperial ambitions of modern Turkey with the key generation of the doctrine of neo-Ottomanism, neo-pan-Turkism, neo-pan-Turanism and Turkish Eurasianism under the slogan “The 21st century will be the golden age of the Turks” by President Recep Erdoğan himself; Ankara’s revanchist strategy to create the Organization of Turkic States – the prototype of the future Turan, the Turan common economic market and the Turan army; Turkey’s interest in drawing Russia into a kind of economic and energy dependence on Turkish transit, ensuring Ankara’s long-term access to the richest natural resources of the Turkic CIS countries – Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics.
Erdoğan supports the idea of a multipolar world, and in this sense, he agrees with the position of Russian President Vladimir Putin on the fundamental issue of forming a new world order. At the same time, in this new world order, Erdoğan intends to define a new role for Turkey itself as the leader of Turkic countries. For this, Turkey has already done a lot in terms of: (developing or reinforcing) a common ideology, economic integration and communication ties, military and military-technical cooperation, (resulting in) joint all-Turkic victories – for example, in Nagorno-Karabakh.
But let’s leave the prospects of wider-area politics with the participation of Turkey, to what extent they combine or contradict the interests of Russia, and return to the events of the Ukrainian crisis. The head of the Turkish company Baykar Defense, Haluk Bayraktar (whose brother Selcuk Bayraktar is the son-in-law of President Recep Erdoğan himself) on October 2 of this year said that Turkey could soon transfer modernized Bayraktar Akıncı (Flag-Bearing Raider) heavy drones to the Ukrainian army.
Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences, Reserve Colonel Konstantin Sivkov, touching on the tactical and technical characteristics of the new Bayraktar Akıncı, notes that this is a high-altitude, long-range heavy drone adopted by the Turkish Armed Forces in 2021. This UAV is capable of launching air-launched cruise missiles. Its carrying capacity is 1350 kg (of which 950 kg is external load); its wingspan is 20 m, length is 12.2 m, height is 4.1 m. Bayraktar Akıncı is capable of flying at an altitude of 9–12 thousand meters for as long as 24 hours in automatic mode, carrying cruise missiles and guided bombs.
In May 2023, at a tech festival in Turkey, an agreement was signed to build a plant for the production of military drones in Ukraine. Baykar Makina is already working on the construction of said enterprise on Ukrainian soil, which will replenish the arsenals of the Ukrainian Armed Forces against the Russian Armed Forces in the Special Military Operation zone. To say that this is just business and nothing else, as Turkish politicians note, is the same as saying nothing. Weapons are not tomatoes; they shoot and kill based on the interests of some against others.
Turkey has previously supplied Ukraine with its Bayraktar TB2 drones, which became famous in the second Karabakh war. Russia had to spend considerable effort in electronic warfare and air defense to destroy them in the Special Military Operation Zone. Regular statements by the Turks about the supply of updated drones to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which, although they are not a fatal threat to Russia or a game-changing weapon, in political terms indicate an unfriendly step, and in military terms, the Russians will have to spend additional forces and means to fight them and search for their vulnerabilities and defeats.
Thus, the Turks verbally tell the Russians about the desire for peace, but in reality, they supply deadly weapons to continue the war and support the nationalist Kyiv regime against Russia. Erdoğan says: “Crimea is lost to Kiev for a long time,” but at the same time he supports the nationalist claims of the Crimean Tatars to independence in the very Crimea.
Such a line of Turkish diplomacy may in the near future lead to undesirable consequences for the interests of Turkey itself, because the Turkish wolf should not flirt with the collective image of the patient Russian bear. The successes of Turan in the same Transcaucasia can dissipate like early morning fog in the very same Karabakh.
Aleksandr SVARANTS, Doctor in Political Science, professor, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.