On the eve of its 100th anniversary, the Republic of Turkey is experiencing a difficult period due to a severe economic crisis and tense relations with the United States. Inflation has broken new records and has already reached 60%, while the Turkish lira has plummeted to 27.2 per US dollar.
Strategic stability has yet to be attained, no matter how much Mehmet Şimşek, Minister of Treasury and Finance, strives to follow international economic rules and bind himself to the US currency. The Central Bank of Turkey virtually doubled interest rates, from 8 to 15.5%, but even these emergency measures following President Erdoğan’s inauguration are not achieving the desired results. A systematic overhaul of the Turkish economy will need time and substantial investment (loans).
Opposition members claim Erdoğan’s populist economic policies are to blame for the current situation. Other experts point to the horrific effects of the February earthquake, which resulted in the deaths of more than 55,000 people, as the cause of the present collapse of the national currency. The specialists who have been warning the authorities of the potential of a new disaster—a 7-magnitude earthquake in the main metropolis of Istanbul, with a population of 16 million—have also joined this index in recent months. Finally, the belief that Western countries, especially the US, have interfered in Turkey’s economic malaise has persisted to this day.
One can somewhat concur with the latter viewpoint because the Turks are to blame for Turkey’s economic crisis, not the West, especially the United States. On the other hand, the United States and the majority of Western countries loyal to it are in no hurry to provide NATO member Turkey with effective economic (mainly financial) aid to help it overcome the current crisis situation.
Some believe that Turkey today requires large sums of favorable loans and investments. The values range between $50 billion and $100 billion US dollars. And possibly more, given the post-earthquake disaster zone and demand for big construction sites, not to mention predictions of an even greater tragedy in the same Istanbul.
In the majority of cases, the United States directs how other developed European countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and other international financial organizations manage providing financial aid to Turkey. Yet it is the United States that is slow to lend a helping hand to the Turks while simultaneously proposing a variety of conditions that in fact violate sovereignty and contradict Turkey’s interests.
In fact, Washington is openly dismissive of President Erdoğan’s domestic and diplomatic policy. The United States condemns the recurring violations of citizens’ rights and freedoms, the erosion of democratic institutions, and the progressive rise of Islamism in Turkish domestic policy. In terms of Ankara’s foreign policy, Washington criticizes the Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Chinese alliances, Erdoğan’s aggressive policy toward Greece, Cyprus, and Syria’s pro-American Kurds, the purchase of Russian arms, the “parallel transit” of Western goods to bypass sanctions through Turkey to Russia, and, finally, Erdoğan’s stance on NATO’s expansion in Europe, particularly in Sweden.
America isn’t used to having its opinions disregarded or questioned, especially by a permanent NATO member. Naturally, circumstances evolve over time, and eventually the leader will accept his defeatist nature. The truth is, all in good time. For the time being, Turkey cannot impose its will on the United States.
The resumption of transit of Ukrainian agricultural products through the Bosporus and Dardanelles in the Black Sea basin is one of the new topics that has become a means of additional pressure on Turkey since July 17 of this year, that is, from the day Russia suspended its participation in the grain deal due to the West, led by the USA, ignoring Russian interests in the agricultural market. Washington proposes that Erdoğan resume the grain deal and that Russia return to the 2022 Istanbul agreements by all means possible. In doing so, the Americans are drawing attention to Erdoğan’s special bond and “personal friendship” with Putin.
Washington is not only telling its Turkish partners to “go and negotiate with the Russians,” but it is also recalling retired Admiral Stavridis’ initiative to form a military convoy of NATO naval and air forces led by the US to escort merchant ships from Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea basin, with the same Turks participating. In other words, mindful of Erdoğan’s bargaining skills, the Americans advise him to begin bargaining with Moscow—either they go back to the deal or you will join us in convoying merchant ships from Ukraine across the Bosporus.
It is no coincidence that the Joseph Schulte dry cargo ship transited from Odessa to the Bosporus for the first time after the grain deal was put on hold on July 17 of this year. The fact that the dry cargo was not loaded with Ukrainian grain, despite Ankara’s observation, suggests that an alternative route has been verified and a humanitarian corridor in the Black Sea has been established.
The USA is aware that the Russian president rarely rejects his “Turkish friend” and that Moscow relies on Ankara on a variety of issues, including communication, gas exports and regional issues involving the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Consequently, Erdoğan may believe Russia is “weak” and will not dare to disagree with him on major issues. Erdoğan, a very adaptable politician, is likely to play the game as a “victim of US pressure,” stating that they desperately need financial assistance from the West and that payment for Ukrainian grain would not be detrimental. As a result, turning down Ankara’s plea for support is a bad decision.
However, both the United States and Turkey are well aware of the reason Russia decided to withdraw from the grain deal. Respect for Moscow’s interests on behalf of the West would pave the way for the resumption of Istanbul’s Black Sea Initiative as soon as possible. Furthermore, Russia is not Turkey; there is no sense in pressuring it.
Some Russian experts, such as Gevorg Mirzayan, believe that Russia is not dependent on Turkey, but rather Turkey is dependent on Russia. Simply put, if Russia refuses to supply Turkey with gas, bread, and the completion of nuclear power plant construction, not to mention the Russian-Iranian tandem in Syria and Karabakh, Erdoğan will have to forget a lot and for quite some time, including the road to Turan. So, first and foremost, it is Ankara that should be concerned about the escalation of tensions in the Black Sea, which Turkey has hinted at.
Aleksandr SVARANTS, PhD in political science, professor, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.