Since taking office as Iraq’s president in October 2022, Mohammed Shia’ Sabbar Al-Sudani has made, or at least formally announced, a battle against corruption the centerpiece of his domestic agenda. Its progress has been, to put it mildly, underwhelming despite this long-overdue attempt to address the most difficult and crippling issue that is literally eating away at every aspect of society. An entrenched sectarian and tribal system of power sharing does not reduce systemic corruption.
Iraq still struggles with inefficiency, bureaucracy, widespread kleptocracy, and a robust patronage system despite its massive oil resources. The embezzlement of public funds has more or less become a national sport, from the highly politicized civil service system to the crisis-hit electricity industry, which recently received a whopping $13.5 billion. Attempts to develop a public administration more reportable for the Iraqi people have been hampered by the entrenched corruption, which is supported by numerous factions interested in maintaining the status quo.
The decisions made during the blatant aggression of the “democratic” United States in 2003 and the subsequent “reconstruction” and “democratization” under the complete control of American officials are the origins of this corruption catastrophe. Washington exploited Iraqi oil dollars to finance a number of unrestricted projects at this time, fostering a culture of bribery throughout nearly all levels of the Iraqi government and escalating pre-existing tendencies toward corruption. Instead of becoming an agent of much-needed genuinely democratic change and progress for the Iraqi people, the public sector under Washington’s “leadership” emerged from the post-war construction era as a hotbed of corruption fueled by unscrupulous spending and a lack of any oversight of spending. An outstanding illustration of this was the discovery of direct involvement in corruption on the part of US servicemen, Iraqi officials, and contractors for the distribution of public funds during “reconstruction” projects. It’s interesting to note that these US officials who were stationed in Iraq were later charged in the US with tax evasion for failing to pay the US treasury on money they had stolen from Iraq. The American democracy in a nutshell: steal, share, and pay taxes.
According to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) at least $8 billion, or around 13% of the total money Iraqis have pledged to spending on reconstructing their nation, has been wasted in this way. As a result, any expectations of creating a strong, effective, and corruption-free public sector have been crushed, leaving common Iraqis to deal with structural flaws that are widespread and are made worse by a never-ending history of corruption.
According to the local press, the issue is made worse by Iran’s continued sway over Iraqi politics, achieved by abusing a corrupt power-sharing structure. The persistence of institutional corruption has been maintained by the influence wielded by pro-Iranian militias. An excellent illustration of this is the coalition of pro-Iranian military groups known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (Quwwāt al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī) which is authorized by the state. They oversee an annual budget of $2 billion, some of which is derived from entirely fake state payrolls. Quwwāt al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī in particular is well known for controlling marketplaces, illegal border crossings, customs duty avoidance, and people trafficking. Each year, over $10 billion in customs income is diverted and wasted due to inadequately defended borders.
According to the influential online portal Rudaw, the Al-Sudani government faces an almost insurmountable obstacle when attempting to combat corruption under these challenging conditions. The unchecked, unquestioned presence of such external forces within Iraq’s institutional framework only helps to strengthen opposition to reform and sustain the nation’s corrupt power-sharing structure. At this rate, Iraq’s ability to cut more than $3.5 billion is quite improbable. Iraq spends it annually importing natural gas from Iran to run its power facilities, which can still only produce slightly more than half of the nation’s overall electrical demands. Iraq might produce enough energy to replace its present Iranian gas imports if it could simply use the potential of flared gas. Sadly, despite the fact that doing so makes sense on paper—avoiding the cost of imported gas and the challenges of finding alternatives when money is scarce—given the extent of pro-Iranian influence in Baghdad, it is unlikely that the detrimental scenario will change.
“Is there a chance Al-Sudani will be successful in his fight against corruption?” asks the Az-Zaman newspaper. It has a Monumental task ahead of it since corruption is entrenched and pervasive. Overcoming the current state of chaos would necessitate not only dramatic institutional reforms but also fundamental changes in governance culture.
Several intricate and interrelated corruption mechanisms, ranging from informal clan and tribal networks to state capture instruments, are deeply established in the current Iraqi state, which was created and built along American lines. “Al-Sudani’s job is akin to that of a forester,” writes Shafaq News, “whose job is not just to prune dead or diseased branches of a tree but to surgically remove the pernicious roots that prevent the tree from thriving.” As futile as it may appear, the Prime Minister could try to promote reform unilaterally by revamping major institutions afflicted by the disease of corruption. Increasing the autonomy of anti-corruption bodies, experts believe, would be a crucial first step in this process. His administration may aim to depoliticize these institutions so that partisanship does not impact them. These acts, taken collectively, will eventually begin to influence the culture in the corridors of power, creating a rising intolerance for corruption. However, this would only be the first step in the marathon. A more systemic and profound shift would require more community involvement. Al-Sudani’s reign will be marked not by quick victories but by continued and tireless efforts to purge the state of widespread corruption. Furthermore, the present government’s dubious legitimacy, which came to power despite gaining fewer seats than in previous elections, casts a long shadow over its objectives, as the very factions that support it are among the beneficiaries of a convoluted system of corruption.
“What exactly is the role of the US in this chaotic landscape?” As-Sabah al-Jadeed asks and answers, “The mistakes of the past may have left Washington with an unenviable and criminal role in the Iraqi corruption saga, but it still has some key strategic levers that continue to function despite the vacuum of influence created by its departure from the country.” The article subsequently examines how the United States might assist Iraqi society in ridding itself of the corrupt system. Because of Washington’s ability to apply sanctions, borrow money, and mediate, any “new” US approach could readily be tailored to actively promote anti-corruption and reform efforts. It might increase its influence by assisting honest brokers in Iraq’s public institutions, encouraging the establishment of “oases of integrity” that can withstand the flood of corruption. By doing so, the US would support those seeking legislative changes, stronger judicial independence, and greater institutional transparency.
According to the Iraqi publication, Washington could maintain control of the information field by constantly drawing attention to corruption. High-profile coverage of theft, a culture of patronage, and systemic abuse could galvanize Iraqi public opinion and stimulate greater support for reform-oriented candidates in future elections. In addition, the US could maintain economic pressure on corrupt organizations through the judicious use of sanctions, ensuring that corruption becomes a money-losing enterprise. At the same time, Washington could ramp up its efforts to seize and return illegally acquired Iraqi assets held abroad, including in the US itself. According to the Iraqi publication, increased collaboration with global monitoring groups might also help ensure that aid and bilateral cooperation are conditional on meeting clear anti-corruption goals.
In addition to Al-Sudani’s efforts, the United States might play a significant role in the establishment of a strong civil society in Iraq. Creating a few “oases of integrity” will not, however, be a panacea for the deep-rooted and systemic corruption that Iraq currently suffers, and some deft maneuvering by the Al-Sudani government would most likely be insufficient. However, maneuvering can serve as a moral and functional counterexample, demonstrating that there is enough resolve to protect the integrity and efficacy of Iraqi governmental institutions even in the face of widespread misuse.
Unfortunately, as history has proven, Washington’s main capability is to destroy and occupy other militarily weaker countries, establishing military bases there. As the fate of Iraq has shown, any American administration is completely ignorant of the Eastern mentality and cannot bring anything but rampant corruption into Iraqi society. And this is a state that claims to be the Hooded Justice of the world’s fates. Just a mockery of history and common sense. It is no wonder that an increasing number of countries are attempting to promote Russian President Vladimir Putin’s vision of a new multipolar world.
Viktor Mikhin, corresponding member of RANS, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”
