Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is one of the few modern politicians who supports a political solution to the Russia-Ukraine problem and offers his mediation services to Moscow and Kiev. Turkey’s presidential stance has not altered as a result of the election.
One of Turkey’s significant achievements in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict was the “grain deal,” from which Ankara received not only political dividends in the form of increased global prestige but also a corresponding financial benefit for the transit of Ukrainian grain to foreign countries via the Turkish-controlled Black Sea straits.
Alas, Russia did not get much benefit from this deal from May 2022. Our agricultural products (including fertilizers) have never been shipped outside of Russia; the Russian Agricultural Bank has not been connected back to the SWIFT international payment system; and agricultural machinery spare parts are not imported into Russia. This is not to say that Turkey is to blame for failing to fulfill its duties to Russia under the “grain deal,” which were originally pledged by the UN under the agreement. Of course, Erdoğan is one of the supporters of respecting the objective interests of the Russian side, without whose consent the deal itself would simply not take place.
President Vladimir Putin, assessing the one-year results of the Black Sea grain deal, rightly pointed out to the other participants of the agreement about the disrespect of their own commitments to Russia. Furthermore, the Russian leader noted that the primary flows of Ukrainian grain began to travel not to destitute African and Asian nations, as initially planned, but to prosperous Europe, filling up the grain stores of industrialized countries for the demands of their food security.
Despite the obvious discrepancies, the Russian government agreed in May 2023 to extend the “grain deal” for another two months, until July 18 of this year. With this decision, Moscow has made the following:
First, it expressed its respect for Turkey, the only contracting party that has taken the initiative and taken responsibility in resolving a crucial international humanitarian issue.
Second, it genuinely backed President Erdoğan’s reputation abroad, which in the midst of a tough race in the second round of the presidential election naturally raised Erdoğan’s standing with Turkish voters;
Thirdly, it exercised restraint and provided a second opportunity to save the “grain deal,” provided that the interests of Russia are upheld by the other parties to the agreement (including the UN and Ukraine).
At the same time, Russian President Vladimir Putin even made a humanitarian appeal to the international community by proposing to give away Russian grain for free to the countries in greatest need in Asia and Africa. This idea was again supported by Erdoğan, who declared Turkey’s readiness to contribute to this mission (in particular, to grind Russian grain into flour at its factories).
Nevertheless, the time for the deal is fast approaching July 18, and Russia has yet to have its interests and offers met. As a result, Moscow’s concern over the attitude of external (mainly Western) partners toward the fate of the “grain deal” has been widely publicized by news outlets. The Russian Foreign Ministry, from the minister down to his deputies and officials, was also forced to issue a public warning that Russia would not extend the Black Sea deal if such an attitude was maintained.
The Turkish Foreign Ministry seems to be publicly expressing solidarity and understanding of the justified concerns and negative reactions of its Russian colleagues. On July 7, Turkey hosted high-level negotiations between Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, during which the fate of the “grain deal” was once again a major topic of debate.
As the saying goes, bread is the staff of life. It’s bad enough when someone loses their head with illusory calculations of a military victory over Russia. Erdoğan seems to have publicly expressed his displeasure with those forces in the Russia-Ukraine crisis who are radical supporters of war and the disruption of political steps toward peace, which include the grain deal.
Being the initiator and creator of the “grain deal,” it goes without saying that the Turkish president is doing all in his power to protect and sustain his idea, which for more than a year has had a good influence on Ankara’s foreign policy and generated some income. Especially now when Ankara has increased the risks for ships traveling through the Black Sea straits and the Turkish economy is crumbling at an alarming rate. At the same time, Erdoğan understands as well as anyone that in big politics, a one-sided game cannot last long, and Russia will have to make its demands.
In this situation, Moscow cannot be satisfied with other actions in Turkish diplomacy on the Ukrainian track. As is well known, Ankara has supported and will continue to support the strict adherence to the international principle of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Consequently, Turkey regards Crimea and all other territories that have seceded from Kiev as being part of a united Ukraine. Furthermore, since the beginning of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine, Turkey has provided military and military-technical assistance to the Kiev regime in various forms, including supplies of military equipment and weapons, intelligence information, specialists in drone training and control, communications equipment, fuel and lubricants, and mercenaries.
In the past year (from March 2022), Ukraine has received quite a lot from Turkey: Bayraktar-TB2 UAVs; Mini-Bayraktar reconnaissance drones; cluster bombs; TRLG-230, 122-mm T-122 and 300-mm guided multiple rocket launchers (MLRS); electronic warfare (EW); HISAR-A+ air defense systems with a range of 15 km, HISAR-O with a range of 25 km; Korkut 35 mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (SPAAG); MRAP BMC “Kirpi” armored vehicles; mortars and ammunition. At the same time, Ankara and Kiev have not publicized military supplies to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Meanwhile, on July 6 this year, Brigade General Oleksii Hromov, the Deputy Chief of Head Operational Office of the AFU’s General Staff, released information that, allegedly following Moscow’s statement about a possible withdrawal from the “grain deal,” Turkey decided to supply Ukraine with its T-155 Firtina self-propelled howitzers.
Firtina is a Turkish modification of the Korean K9 Thunder howitzer with modernized turret, chassis and fire control system. It is considered the best and most long-range artillery piece in the Turkish army with a range of up to 40 kilometers. This self propelled artillery has a high rate of fire, firing three rounds in 15 seconds at targets ranging from 8 to 25 kilometers away.
It turns out that while declaring its steadfast support for a swift end to hostilities and a political resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, Turkey “adds fuel to the fire” by increasing the amount of weapons and equipment it provides to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
On the eve of the second round of elections at the Technology Trade Show in Istanbul, also used to showcase achievements of President Erdoğan, the final signing of the Turkish-Ukrainian agreement on the construction of a factory in Ukraine for the production of the Turkish Bayraktar-TB2 UAVs took place, which is scheduled to be launched in 2025.
When Russia drew the attention of Turkish colleagues to the issue of supplying drones to the Ukrainian side, which are used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine against Russian servicemen, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu replied that Baykar, which produces this type of drone, is a private company that decides where, to whom, when, and what to sell; the government has nothing to do with it. This is pure business.
However, Haluk Bayraktar, CEO of Baykar, who is the brother of Selçuk Bayraktar, the husband of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s younger daughter, said the following in August 2022 during his visit to Kiev in response to a Ukrainian journalist’s question whether Baykar would supply Russia with weapons if Moscow offered a better deal: “Money and material resources have never been the goal in our business. Our friendship and cooperation with Ukraine has been going on for many years. Therefore, no matter how much money they offer us, frankly speaking, in this case selling UAVs to Moscow is out of the question. We are entirely on Ukraine’s side because we have a very deep link and Ukraine is being unfairly assaulted. Therefore, nothing can mar our cooperation with Kiev, no matter how much they offer. Our position on this issue cannot be changed.” However, at the end of his assurances of “eternal friendship” with Ukraine, the head of the Turkish private company Baykar reminded that the final decision in such matters is made by the country’s leadership. It turns out that Haluk Bayraktar completely refuted the statements of Turkish officials, including then Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, about their non-involvement in the supply of weapons to the Kiev regime. Or is it the “family business” of the president?
It is obvious that the arms trade is a difficult type of commerce with political overtones because states do not purchase weapons for royal hunting but for army and defense necessities. Those who sell weapons or withhold these supplies do so out of pragmatism in politics, where money is co-subordinate to politics and not a decisive factor.
The Russian Foreign Ministry has repeatedly noted that NATO countries are playing with fire by supplying weapons to Ukraine. Turkey remains a member of the alliance and unfortunately continues to arm Ukraine against Russia. The Russian President’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, also noted that injecting weapons into Ukraine from outside does not contribute to the success of the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations and will have a negative effect.
Russia’s part in the “grain deal,” largely out of respect for Turkish President Erdoğan, extended the agreement. Moscow, however, is unable to constantly and in every situation put Turkey’s interests ahead of its own. Russia is one of the few countries in the world that supported Erdoğan in difficult moments of his life and political biography in particular, both in the days of the July 2016 Turkish coup d’état attempt and during the May 2023 presidential elections. If Turkey tries to put pressure on Russia’s opinion with its new military supplies to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, this practice can have the opposite effect.
Aleksandr SVARANTS, PhD in political science, professor, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”